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Abstract 
Despite the vast research that has been done on the Nigerian military, virtually all 
of these studies have failed to critically examine the accepted role of the military 
in the democratising phase. This is important because the relationship between the 
political elite and the military in post-military authoritarian states guarantees 
either democratic consolidation, or its reversal. In Nigeria, despite an appearance 
of significant progress in subordinating the military institution to democratic 
civilian authority, the military remains a crucial political actor in the polity. It 
appears that the military has yet to accept the core democratic principles of 
civilian oversight of the institution. This thesis, therefore, explores whether a new 
form of military authoritarianism is emerging in Nigeria, with the aim of 
understanding Nigeria’s military behaviour in a transitional phase, from prolonged 
military authoritarianism to democratisation. To examine this military behaviour, 
Alfred Stepan’s concept of military prerogatives that was used to understand the 
military’s behaviour in a transitional phase in Latin America is applied to Nigeria.  
A crucial understanding of authoritarianism in Nigeria is initially discussed in this 
study using mainly document analysis strategy to examine whether multi-ethnic 
states, such as Nigeria, tend to have authoritarian systems. Six hypotheses form 
the core analysis of this thesis: first, that the military has retained significant 
military prerogatives; second, that retired military officers are gaining influential 
political and economic positions; third, autonomous military involvement in 
human rights abuses since 1999; and fourth, that civilian government oversight 
remains weak, and facilitates military authoritarianism. These hypotheses are 
primarily analysed using the elite interview technique. During the first half of 
2011, the author conducted field research where serving and retired military 
officers were interviewed. The fifth hypothesis is that the military has intervened 
in politics post-1999. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on key 
security-related media reports (mostly newspaper editorials) on the military after 
1999. The examination of the final hypothesis, that increases in military 
expenditures might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism, relies 
primarily on descriptive statistical analysis. In addition, this study collated 
relevant historical materials that relate to the military, utilising national archival 
collections. 
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The empirical findings of this research did not identify a new form of military 
authoritarianism in Nigeria. The study, however, argues that the unrestricted 
institutional framework accorded the military has contributed significantly to 
authoritarian practices in the post-military era in Nigeria. This study discovered 
that there were similarities between the Brazilian and Nigerian militaries in regard 
to their military spending during their period in power. Both countries had lower 
defence budgets. Just as in Brazil, it appears that part of the reason the Nigerian 
military decided to relinquish power in 1999 had to do with its desire to gain a 
higher budget, something that was precluded in a military government struggling 
to retain a sense of legitimacy. The military needed a higher budget to modernise 
and re-professionalise its institution after more than a decade in power. This 
feature, which the Nigerian military shares with the Brazilian military, appears to 
justify the application to Nigeria of Alfred Stepan’s concept of military 
prerogatives.  
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Chapter One 
Background to the Study 
Introduction 
This thesis has explored whether a new form of military authoritarianism is 
emerging in Nigeria. On 29 May 2014 Nigeria celebrated fifteen years of 
uninterrupted civilian rule. This was the first time in more than fifty years of 
Nigeria’s political history that the military had not terminated the civilian process. 
Prior to this, the military in Nigeria had ended the First Republic in 1966, the 
Second Republic in 1983, and the Third Republic in 1993. There was, therefore, a 
renewed hope on 29 May 1999 when General Abdulsalami Abubakar handed over 
power to a former military head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo. Many had high 
expectations at the start of the Fourth Republic that Nigeria, Africa’s most 
populated country and until recently the largest economy on the continent, would 
live up to its full potential after decades of military authoritarian rule. This 
expectation was, however, short-lived as the relatively smooth transition of 1999 
has not led to democratic consolidation in Nigeria. As Larry Diamond (2008) 
states: 
… governance in Africa is in a state of transition, or some would say, 
suspension. Two powerful trends vie for dominance. One is the longstanding 
organization of Africa politics and states around autocratic personal rulers; 
highly centralized and over powering presidencies; and steeply hierarchical, 
informal networks of patron-client relations that draw their symbolic and 
emotional glue from ethnic bonds. The other is the surge since 1990 of 
democratic impulses, principles, and institutions. Of course, the formal 
institutions of democracy—including free, fair, and competitive elections—can 
coexist with the informal practices of clientelism, corruption, ethnic 
mobilization, and personal rule by largely unchecked presidents. Indeed, much of 
the story of Africa politics over the last two decades has been the contest 
between these two approaches to power—even in countries that are formally 
democratic (Diamond 2008: 138). 
Diamond further argues that there is no democracy in Nigeria. This is similar in 
his view to five other big countries in Africa (Congo Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Sudan and Tanzania), which constitute a significant part of the continent’s 
population (Diamond 2008: 140). Similarly, Adigun Agbaje (2004) argues that the 
current political system in Nigeria is a showcase of ‘electoralism’, or what some 
other scholars refer to as ‘electoral authoritarian regimes’(Agbaje 2004; Agbaje 
and Adejumobi 2006; Schedler 2006; Lindberg 2009: 3). 
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The importance of the military’s contribution to the democratising phase in 
Nigeria cannot be overstated. The Nigerian military remains a crucial political 
actor. As William Gutteridge (1985) notes, “the question is not whether armies 
will participate in politics but to what extent and by what means” (Gutteridge 
1985: 79). While the role of the military within a full blown authoritarian system 
could be negotiated with the ruler, a democratising/democratic system requires 
civilian control over the security apparatus (especially the military) if it is to 
remain a well-functioning and effective democratic system (Houngnikpo 2010). 
As Staffan Lindberg (2009) argues, a ‘true democracy’ can only be achieved when 
there is: 
An absence of ‘reserved domains’ of power for the military or other political 
forces that are not accountable to the electorate; 
Established and effective mechanisms for “horizontal accountability” of 
officeholders to one another, constraining executive power and protecting the 
rule of law; and, 
Extensive provisions for political and civil pluralism, as well as for individual 
and group freedoms (Lindberg 2009: 11). 
Overall, the several studies on democratization in Nigeria over the last decade or 
so have presented this period as less than democratic, even though the country 
typically holds elections that are, at least on paper, multiparty and competitive 
(Omotola 2009; Adejumobi 2000; Guardian Editorial 2014; Vanguard Editorial 
2013). 
   
The quest for Nigerian achievement of a ‘true democracy’ is also complicated by 
the challenge of providing adequate security in the country principally due to the 
rise since 1999 of several violent ethnic and religiously inspired militias across the 
country (Hill 2012; Maier 2000; Peel 2010). The second challenge entails how to 
ensure that the military does not defy civilian authority or play a role that is 
unconstitutional within the country. In the past decade, there have been cases that 
appear to suggest that the military acted in an unconstitutional manner. 
Noteworthy examples include 2010, when the then-Chief of Army Staff 
Lieutenant-General Abdulrahman Dambazau ordered a brigade of guards (the 
president’s personal security), without the approval of the then acting president 
Goodluck Jonathan, to welcome and escort the ailing president Umaru Musa Yar’ 
Adua (2007-2010) who flew in from Saudi Arabia at the Nnamdi Azikiwe 
International airport in Abuja (Zounmenou 2010; Sahara Reporters 2011). 
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Similarly, on 6 June 2014 the military conducted the censoring of the leading 
newspapers in the country. Explaining the reasons for such an action against the 
print media, the director of defence information, Major General Chris Olukolade 
said that: 
Troops, this morning, embarked on a thorough search of vehicles conveying 
newspapers and newsprints across board. This followed intelligence report 
indicating movement of materials with grave security implications across the 
country using the channel of newspaper related consignments. The Defence 
Headquarters wishes to clarify that the exercise has nothing to do with content or 
operation of the media organizations or their personnel as is being wrongly 
imputed by a section of the press. The military appreciates and indeed respects 
the role of the media as an indispensable partner in the ongoing counter-
insurgency operation and the overall advancement of our country’s democratic 
credentials. As such, the military will not deliberately and without cause, infringe 
on the freedom of the press. The general public and the affected media 
organizations in particular are assured that the exercise was a routine security 
action and should not be misconstrued for any other motive (Nigerian Tribune 
Editorial 2014a). 
What is, however, unclear about this military action is the civilian authority that 
ordered this particular action. Based on media reports, the office of the 
presidency, through the president’s senior special assistant on public affairs, Dr. 
Doyin Okupe, denied that President Goodluck Jonathan ordered the clampdown 
on the press (Nigerian Tribune Editorial 2014a; Fabiyi 2014). We must ask the 
following question in response: Is a new form of military authoritarianism 
emerging in Nigeria, given that the military have been heavily involved in the 
civilian process since 1999? While the old form of military authoritarianism in 
Nigeria was achieved by a coup d’état, and was characterised by, military 
dominance of civil society (even though some level of civil society was allowed, 
but not guaranteed), rule by decree, a culture of impunity (human rights abuses 
unpunished), a lack of accountability on the part of appointed officeholders, 
political instability—fear of counter coups and a lack of public accountability of 
the military as an institution. The new form of military authoritarianism 
conceptually manifests as a largely unrestricted military role within the polity, one 
that is devoid of significant civilian oversight. 
 
I will suggest that the Nigerian military post-1999 may have first developed its 
own distinct ‘quasi-ethnic identity’ among its officers and troops within the 
context of mutually accommodating and possibly antagonistic ethnic identities 
simultaneously co-existing in Nigeria (Zirker et al. 2008; Bah 2013); second, just 
as under military rule, the military since 1999 appears to have a monopoly over 
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national security. This is evidenced in several internal engagements where the 
military have been called upon to maintain law and order in the polity; third, there 
is an appearance of a culture of impunity for military officers, as occurred under 
military rule, in the current civilian process in Nigeria; and lastly; it is assumed 
that as Nigeria is in a political transitional phase toward democratic consolidation, 
it is also logical to assume that the military, which for decades dominated the 
political process in Nigeria, may have instituted several institutional rights and 
privileges for itself on the eve of  the formal handover of political power. These 
may pose a challenge to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.  
 
The literature on Nigeria’s Fourth Republic can be analysed in different phases. 
Initially, some studies were sceptical about the transition programme of the 
military to hand over political power based on General Ibrahim Babangida’s 
(1985-1993) transition programme that failed to usher Nigeria into the Third 
Republic (Diamond et al. 1997; Mustapha 1999; Ojo 2000). With the eventual 
emergence of a former military ruler as president on 29 May 1999 most of the 
discussion in these studies has focussed on either the role of high ranking retired 
military officers in a civilian dominated era, or whether the civilian elite could 
achieve adequate civilian control of the military (Adekanye 1999; Ntiwunka 2012; 
Akinrinade 2006; Fayemi 2003). Other studies have also discussed how the legacy 
of military rule in Nigeria seems to be at least partially responsible for the 
militarised nature of the Nigerian state post-1999 (Obi 2007; Ajayi and Ayodele 
2004; Fayemi 2002). The following thesis contributes to the existing literature by 
analysing the Nigerian military in the processes from military authoritarian rule to 
democratization, and the continued role that the military seems to be playing in 
constraining democratic consolidation in Nigeria. It will attempt to identify and 
examine whether a new form of military authoritarianism has been emerging in 
Nigeria since 29 May 1999. Six hypotheses arise from this for examination. 
 
The first hypothesis: The military in Nigeria has retained significant military 
prerogatives. It examines Alfred Stepan’s (1988) Latin American concept of 
military prerogatives as applied to Nigeria. ‘Military prerogatives’, according to 
Stepan (1988), are defined as: 
those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution 
assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise 
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effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra military 
areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the 
state and political or civil society (Stepan 1988: 93).  
Stepan (1988) argues that societies in a transitional phase with a long history of 
military authoritarian rule have military legacies that are powerful obstacles to   
extension and consolidation of democratic rule (Stepan 1988: xi,xii). In the case 
of Nigeria, such military prerogatives may include the military’s mission, the role 
of the National Assembly in civilian oversight of the military, the military’s role 
in the defence sector and, lastly, its role in intelligence. 
 
The second hypothesis: The military has intervened in politics post-1999. The 
military have had a significant role expansion since 1999, especially in areas that 
pertain to internal security duties, and this has had the effect of increasing military 
power vis-à-vis civilian authorities. The military is involved in internal 
engagements such as guarding oil installations in the Niger-Delta area, 
maintaining law and order in areas of ethnic and religiously driven crises and, at 
times, aiding or substituting for other security agencies in riot control or guarding 
sensitive government buildings. It seems, during these internal engagements, that 
the military has significant latitude in decisions determining when and how to 
carry out its duties. 
 
The third hypothesis: Retired military officers are gaining influential political 
and economic positions. High ranking retired military officers are running for and 
holding public offices both at the federal and state level, thus possibly extending 
military influence into the civilian political era since May 29 1999. Such notable 
office holders have included the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the 
Minister of Defence, the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Senate President, 
key strategic decision makers in positions in political parties, members of the state 
and federal legislative bodies, and many others. Also, the patterns of leadership 
style exhibited by retired officers, especially those at the federal level, evince 
comparisons with periods of overt military rule in Nigeria. Perhaps the most 
egregious example is that of former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who 
throughout his tenure in office (1999-2007) appeared to violate the rule of law 
repeatedly with no legal consequences. 
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The fourth hypothesis: Autonomous military involvement in human rights 
abuses since 1999. There is a culture of impunity for military personnel engaged 
in internal security duties. That culture, which was significantly prevalent under 
military rule, seems not to have abated during the current civilian era. Noteworthy 
examples include the alleged ‘Odi massacre’ in 1999 by soldiers in retaliation for 
their colleagues having been ambushed and killed while on security patrol, as well 
as several alleged cases of human rights violations as reported by organizations 
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International in which the military 
served as security police in volatile spots across the federation. 
 
The fifth hypothesis: Civilian government oversight remains weak, and this 
facilitates military authoritarianism. The new (post-1999) civilian institutions are 
weak and unable to control the military, and this in itself may facilitate a new 
form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. The two primary institutions that 
should limit the activities of military are the civilian-led Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), and the federal National Assembly. The level of expertise in military 
matters within the MOD and the National Assembly is less than would be desired 
to assure on-going civilian control over the military. 
 
The sixth hypothesis: Increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new 
form of military authoritarianism. Military expenditures post-1999 have increased 
beyond reasonable limits appropriate to civilian dominance. Since the return to 
civilian rule, there has been a significant rise in the cases of ethnic and religiously 
driven conflict across the country. Under this condition of political unrest and 
instability, the annual budgetary allocation to the military has increased 
significantly. In 2012, for example, the government allocated approximately US 
$5billion to defence and national security as a means to limit the activities of these 
violent militia groups (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2013b; 
Adebakin and Raimi 2012). However, these increases in monetary allocation to 
the military have not significantly reduced the activities of these violent militia 
groups and none of the allocations appear to have been accounted for by the 
military. We must assume, based upon this, that the military is acquiring increased 
power vis-à-vis the civilian authorities. 
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As mentioned earlier, the new form of military authoritarianism is conceptually 
defined as one that manifests as largely unrestricted military rule within the polity, 
one that is devoid of significant civilian oversight. Table 1.1 (below) presents 
some of the most potentially important manifestations of this new form of military 
authoritarianism in the democratising phase. It indicates what would constitute as 
‘low’, ‘emerging’, and ‘high’ levels of a new form of military authoritarianism. It 
should be noted that ‘Low’ is classified as having an inadequate civilian 
institutional framework that limits military activities in the polity. It denotes a 
complete dominance of the military in areas of its activities. ‘Emerging’ are 
classified as those areas where there are certain degrees of civilian oversight of the 
military, but the institution can decide not to comply with certain directives or to 
informally disengage from a procedure if sanctioned by the civilian institution(s). 
‘High’ denotes an appropriate civilian institutional framework that limits military 
activities in a democratising regime.  
 
As Stepan (1988) noted when discussing the concept of military prerogatives, 
there are two possible approaches for the civilians to adapt as regards to such 
prerogatives. These are similarly applied to one’s understanding of the six 
dimensions of a new form of military authoritarianism. In the first, civilians can 
significantly reduce the levels of military authoritarianism in a civilian era without 
significant contestation from the military. This suggests the presence of genuine 
civilian oversight. The second approach assumes that low levels of civilian control 
in any of the six dimensions identified might not be challenged by the civilian 
political elite, likely because there have been no articulated policy alternative 
tabled by the civilians. This situation may cause the political elites to 
accommodate these dimensions. Overall, for the case being explored, a new form 
of military authoritarianism is thought to be present in the democratising process 
if all the six arenas are classified as ‘Low’. 
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Table 1.1: Dimensions of a New Form of Military Authoritarianism in a Democratising Regime 
1) Arena: Military prerogatives  
Indicator: level of military influence over these four institutions 
 Military mission Role of national 
assembly 
Coordination of 
defence sector 
Role in 
intelligence 
D
eg
re
e 
o
f 
ci
v
il
ia
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
Low  Constitution is not 
explicitly clear on 
the military’s 
mission and 
provides the 
institution   
significant role 
expansion without 
adequate civilian 
oversight 
No legislative 
tradition of detailed 
hearings on military 
matters. Especially 
in internal security 
engagement. 
Legislature simply 
approve or 
disapprove the 
military budgets 
Active-duty 
military officers fill 
almost all top 
defence sector 
roles. Civilian 
participants 
normally do so as 
employees of the 
three military 
services 
Intelligence 
agencies are 
controlled by 
active-duty 
officers. No 
independent 
review boards 
Emerging  Constitutional 
provisions allow 
the executive 
unlimited powers 
to engage the 
military. Some 
informal military 
participation in 
the political 
process 
 Military has some 
authority over the  
coordination of the 
defence sector and 
the process of 
designing and 
implementing 
national security 
policy 
Military has the 
ability 
informally to 
engage its 
intelligence unit 
outside of the 
narrowly 
defined cases of 
internal military 
discipline 
High  Constitution is 
clear on the 
military’s mission 
and provides an 
appropriate 
framework of 
engagement that 
include the 
executive and the 
legislature 
Most major issues 
affecting the 
military including 
weapons 
procurement are 
monitored by the 
legislature. Cabinet 
officials routinely 
appear before 
legislative hearings 
Highly informed 
civil servants and 
policy-making 
civilian political 
appointees play a 
major role in the 
coordination of the 
defence sector and 
designing and 
implementing 
national security 
policy 
Intelligence 
agencies are 
controlled by 
civilian chain of 
commands. 
Strong civilian 
review boards. 
2) Arena: Media perception of military internal engagement  
Indicator: media commentaries on the level of military internal engagements 
 Media commentaries of the military 
D
eg
re
e 
o
f 
ci
v
il
ia
n
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
Low  Almost all media commentaries reports unconstitutional internal engagements of 
the military. No civilian sanctioning of autonomous conduct of operations 
Emerging   
High  No evidence of media commentary report of unconstitutional internal engagement 
by the military. There are institutional framework to monitor and sanction 
unjustified military operations 
3) Arena: Retired military officers 
Indicator: retired military officers influence on the rules of political competition and the economic sector 
 Retired military officers in politics Retired military 
officers in the 
economic sector 
D
eg
re
e 
o
f 
ci
v
il
ia
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
Low  Retired military officers dominate rule setting, process 
and outcomes of civilian elite selection. There is a 
formal/de jure alliance of retired military officers with 
active duty officers 
Retired military 
officers head or have 
influence over key 
state and private 
enterprises and use that 
to channel funds to the 
military 
Emerging    
High  Retired military officers have no influence on the rules 
of political competition and elite selection. No 
informal/de jure alliance of retired military officers with 
active duty officers 
Even if retired military 
officers head or have 
any influence on state 
and private enterprises, 
they have no informal/ 
de jure alliance or 
obligation with the 
military 
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4) Arena: Human rights  
Indicator: civilian oversight of military in internal security engagement especially in alleged cases of human 
rights abuses 
 Military attitudes towards allegations of human rights abuses 
D
eg
re
e 
 o
f 
ci
v
il
ia
n
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
Low  No institutionalised framework or oversight to sanction inappropriate military 
conduct in internal security duties. 
Emerging  Civilian oversight to monitor and sanction military operation is limited 
High  Institutionalised framework to sanction and monitor military internal security 
engagements 
 
5) Arena: civilian military expertise 
Indicator: civilian institution influence on articulation and aggregation of military activities 
 Civilian expertise on military matters 
D
eg
re
e 
o
f 
ci
v
il
ia
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
l Low  Military activities are not subject to civilian monitoring. Civilian branches lack 
military expertise 
Emerging  Military has the ability to selectively withdraw itself from some civilian oversight. 
The institution can intentionally refuse civilian inputs or mis-inform them on some 
military matters  
High  All civilian branches that are constitutional mandated over the military are able to 
monitor military activities. These branches have adequate civilian military experts 
 
6) Arena: Military budget  
Indicator: military influence on defence budget  
 Control of budget 
D
eg
re
e 
o
f 
ci
v
il
ia
n
 
co
n
tr
o
l 
Low  Military allocates less of expenditure for itself under the period of military rule 
due to legitimacy crisis. Military dominance over its budget after military rule. 
Emerging  The military have certain de facto prerogatives over its budgetary process 
High   Institutionalised civilian participation in the allocation of expenditure to the 
military 
Adapted from (Stepan 1988; Croissant et al. 2010) 
 
In sum, it is logical to assume that a new form of military authoritarianism may be 
emerging in contemporary Nigeria. Over four decades ago, Samuel Finer (1966) 
discussed the idea of military disengagement in politics. He posited that the only 
way to prevent the continuous cycle of military interference in the civilian 
political process was to produce a successor government that neither needs the 
military nor is needed by it. In a more contemporary study, similar views to Finer 
were argued by Rollin Tusalem (2013). He stated that societies in which there are 
highly politicised military institutions or military institutions with a culture of 
coup d’état tend to have the challenges of democratic consolidation and, in some 
cases, democratic reversals (Tusalem 2013: 13-14). 
 
I have used the ‘single-country studies as comparison’ case study research design 
in the broader subfield of comparative politics to examine the research question. 
The combination of research methods used to explore this research question is 
what John Creswell (1994, 2003) calls “mixed methods procedures” (Creswell 
2003: 208-225). According to Creswell (2003), a mixed methods approach 
provides: 
the researcher [the] base knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds (e.g., 
consequence-oriented, problem-centred, and pluralistic). It employs strategies of 
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inquiry that involve collecting data either simultaneously or sequentially to best 
understand research problems. The data collection also involves gathering both 
numeric information (e.g., on instruments) as well as text information (e.g., on 
interviews) so that the final database represents both quantitative and qualitative 
information (Creswell 2003: 18-20).  
The main qualitative data collection strategy is that of a field research conducted 
in 2011 (elite interviews), where the author interviewed serving and retired high 
ranking military officers. In addition, a quantitative approach was also employed 
in which a cross-national analysis of the military expenditure of Nigeria, Ghana 
and Cameroon was undertaken. The data collection involved data from reputable 
and recognised organizations such as the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 
 
My focus upon Nigeria, aside from my own subjective interests as a native-born 
Nigerian, is principally because in comparison with other African countries, the 
incidence of military interference in politics is obviously very high in Nigeria. It is  
hoped that the findings on Nigeria will shed light on African civil-military 
relations in general, and, in subsequent studies, be used more comparatively to 
analyse civil-military relations across Africa. 
Nigeria’s Military History in Brief: From Inception to a Culture of Political 
Intervention 
The modern military in Nigeria traces its roots to the British incursion into what is 
now called Nigeria in the Nineteenth Century. Prior to that, there were pre-
colonial empires in this geographical area. Some of these autonomous and semi-
autonomous empires, like modern states, were mindful of the power that 
institutions responsible for territorial defence could have over the political system, 
and thus had some semblance of modern political institutions with limited powers. 
An example of this was the Oyo Empire, whose territory occupied much of what 
is now modern-day south-western Nigeria. In Oyo, the Aare-ona kankanfo (a title 
given to the general military commander of Oyo) never resided in the same city as 
the Alaafin, who was the spiritual and administrative head of the empire. This was 
done as a way of limiting the powers of the Aare-ona kankanfo and also ensuring 
that the Aare could not easily nurture the idea of overthrowing the Alaafin 
(Johnson and Johnson 1970; Akinjobin 1971; Ajayi and Crowder 1971).  
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The first seed of what later became known as the Nigerian Army, however, could 
be found in 1862 when Lieutenant Glover, of the Royal British Navy and 
governor of the colony of Lagos, organized a group of 18 armed Hausas into a 
militia known as the “Glover Constabulary” and the “Glover Hausas” (Momoh 
2000: 443-444). The militia’s initial responsibility was to mount punitive 
expeditions to protect British trade routes around Lagos. This small force of 
militia went through several expansions and re-organizations and, in 1897, 
metamorphosed into the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). By 1940, WAFF 
was conferred with the royal charter to become the Royal West African Frontier 
Force (RWAFF). This was in recognition for the gallant performance of this force 
in previous British wars (Ubah 1998; Falola 2009, 1999).  
 
The visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Nigeria in 1956 led to the renaming of the 
Northern and Southern Regiments as the ‘Queen’s Own Nigerian Regiments’ 
(QONR). Later that same year, the British granted military autonomy to their 
dependencies and, therefore, the QONR was re-designated the Nigerian Military 
Force (NMF). At Independence in 1960 the name was changed to the Royal 
Nigerian Army (RNA). The present name, Nigerian Army (NA), came into use 
when Nigeria became a Republic in 1963. Likewise, other branches of the 
Nigerian Armed Forces came into existence at different phases. First, the Royal 
Nigerian Navy in 1959 later changed its name to the Nigerian Navy when Nigeria 
became a Republic in 1963. In 1964, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) was formally 
established by an Act of Parliament and immediately became functional (Momoh 
2000: 445-446; Omotoso 1988). 
 
The pre-eminence of the military in Nigerian politics, however, started in 1966 
when the military first directly intervened into civilian administration. Since 1966, 
the military have not only had a significant influence in all transitional processes 
to civilian rule, they have also become a significant factor in Nigerian politics. In 
sum, Nigeria’s military dominance in politics is well illustrated by Ben Nwabueze 
(1989), who categorized Nigeria’s political history into five pre-1989 phases: 
 
1. Era of British colonial military-like autocracy and absolutism. This was 
characterized by the British using the coercive apparatus of the state (the 
military and police) to maintain law and order. This period of formal 
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colonialism started in the 1800s and ended 1 October, 1960 when Nigeria 
gained her independence from the British. 
2. Emergence of constitutional democracy, which was based on a modified 
British Westminster parliamentary model. This lasted from 1960-1966. 
3. Military authoritarian rule, 1966-1979. 
4. Return of constitutional democracy, with the change from the Westminster 
model to the American presidential model of political system. This lasted from 
1979-1983. 
5. A return to military authoritarian rule, 1983-1989 (Nwabueze 1989; 
Nwabueze 1992). 
In addition to Nwabueze’s five phases of Nigeria’s political history, the country 
has also added another three phases to its political history: 
 
1. Failed democratic transition by the military from 1989-1993, and the 
inauguration of a civilian as head of an Interim National Government (ING). 
2. A return to military authoritarian rule, 1993-1998. 
3. The ushering in of the Fourth Republic in May 29, 1999, after a relatively 
successful military lead transition to civilian rule. 
 
In all, it can be argued that Nigeria has witnessed six successful military 
interventions in politics. First was the January 1966 intervention by Major Kaduna 
Nzeogwu (Ademoyega 1981). This intervention led to the killing of several 
prominent politicians of the first republic, including Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa (the prime minister at that time), Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (the premier of the 
Northern Region and sardauna of Sokoto at that time), Chief Ladoke Akintola 
(premier of the Western Region at that time), and Chief Okotie-Eboh (the federal 
minister of finance at that time). Because Nzeogwu’s coup was partially 
successful, the head of the army, General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi was eventually 
made head of state (First 1970: 286; Ademoyega 1981; Muffett 1982; Diamond 
1988). The counter-coup of July 1966 followed the perception that the first 
intervention of 1966 was ethnically based to favour the Igbos (Siollun 2009; 
Luckham 1975; Panter-Brick 1970). Eventually, the counter-coup of 1966 saw the 
killing of two prominent military officers, General Aguiyi Ironsi (head of state) 
and Lieutenant Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi (military governor of the Western 
Region): Lieutenant Colonel Yabuku Gowon was subsequently made head of 
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state. This regime lasted until 29 July 1975, when the Gowon regime was 
overthrown in a bloodless coup d’état and Brigadier General Murtala Mohammed 
was made the head of state. On 13 February 1976, Lieutenant General Olusegun 
Obasanjo became the head of state following an unsuccessful coup led by Colonel 
Bukar Sukar Dimka. This attempted change of regime had led to the assassination 
of Murtala Mohammed, a significant event in the context of African coups as 
observed by Ruth First (1970). Obasanjo eventually ushered Nigeria into the 
Second Republic when he handed over power to Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1979 
(Oyediran 1979; Panter-Brick 1978). 
 
On 31 December 1983, Major General Mohammed Buhari overthrew Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari in a bloodless coup that ended the Second Republic (Diamond 
1984). Similarly, Major General Ibrahim Gbadamosi Babangida overthrew Major 
General Mohammed Buhari in August 1985 in another bloodless coup (Diamond 
1985). Babangida held on to power for eight years, eventually ‘stepping aside’ on 
27 August, 1993, after the cancellation of the 12 June, 1993, presidential election 
that was presumed to have been won by Chief Moshood Abiola. Babangida 
however, handed over power to an Interim National Government (ING), headed 
by Chief Ernest Shonekan (Diamond et al. 1997; Agbaje et al. 2004; Siollun 
2013). On 17 November, 1993, General Sani Abacha overthrew the Interim 
National Government (ING) of Chief Ernest Shonekan thus ending the Third 
Republic. Upon the death of Abacha in 1998, General Abdulsalam Abubakar took 
over later, handing over power to a democratically elected government on May 29 
1999. 
 
Nigeria has had four unsuccessful coups d’état as well: the first was that of 
Colonel Bukar Sukar Dimka of February 1976, an attempt to topple the regime of 
General Murtala Mohammed (Panter-Brick 1978; Oyediran 1979); second, the 
August 1985 attempt led by Major General Mamman Vasta to overthrow the 
regime of General Ibrahim Babangida; third, another attempt by Major Gideon 
Orkar on the regime of Babangida in 1990 (Babarinsa et al. 1990); and last, the 
1995 attempt on General Sani Abacha. The attempted overthrow of the Abacha 
regime is still very controversial because General Oladipo Diya (then Abacha’s 
second in command) and other officers later indicted for the coup attempt claimed 
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that the allegations brought against them were ‘a setup’ (Useh 1995; Anyanwu 
2002; Njoku 2001). 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
Research Question 
Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria? 
 
Hypothesis One 
The military in Nigeria has retained significant military prerogatives. 
 
Hypothesis Two 
The military has intervened in politics post-1999.  
 
Hypothesis Three 
Retired military officers are gaining influential political and economic 
positions. 
 
Hypothesis Four 
Autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 1999. 
 
Hypothesis Five 
Civilian government oversight remains weak, and this facilitates military 
authoritarianism. 
Hypothesis Six 
Increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military 
authoritarianism. 
Older Forms of Authoritarianism in Nigeria: A Literature Review 
Most studies on authoritarianism in West Africa, and especially in Nigeria, from 
the 1960s to the late 1990s, focused primarily on military intervention in politics 
as the main cause of authoritarianism in Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa 
(Mwakikagile 2001; McGowan 2006; Johnson et al. 1984; McGowan 2003). 
Several studies have questioned why it is that military intervention is so prevalent 
on the continent and, in particular, in West Africa. These studies can be divided 
into two main areas. The first explores the reasons or causes for military 
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intervention in sub-Saharan Africa; the second investigates the processes for 
attaining civilian supremacy or control over the military.  
 
As regards the former, it is well-established that in post-colonial Africa, military 
intervention has been a successful avenue for changing government. Since 1963, 
Africa has had some ninety military interventions, not counting unsuccessful 
attempts (Howe 2001: 2; McGowan 2003). Various reasons have been postulated 
as to why military intervention is so prevalent in Africa, and these, according to 
Kposowa and Jenkins (1993), can be categorized under four main themes 
(Kposowa and Jenkins 1993: 127; O'Kane 1983: 28): political development 
theory; military centrality; ethnic antagonisms; and world systems/dependency 
theories. 
 
Political Development Theory 
The basic assumption is that military intervention follows from weak institutions. 
Political and social institutions that are weak are therefore vulnerable, and create a 
high likelihood that the military will intervene in the polity. This approach 
suggests that countries in Latin America and Africa, are confronted with 
participatory crises stemming from the tension between an increasingly mobilized 
citizenry and weak political institutions (Deutsch 1961; Huntington 1968; Binder 
et al. 1971). Researchers note that state building and industrialization that have 
been occurring in these countries since gaining political independence from 
colonialism, coupled with increased social mobilization and, with it, more mass 
participation in the polity, have tremendously increased demands on the political 
system. However these countries lack strong social and, most especially, strong 
political institutions, such as broad-based political parties that are not affiliated 
with ethnic cleavages, and dynamic legislatures with sufficient strength to 
articulate and regulate mass participation. As a result, this causes participatory 
overload that generates political unrest and civil-disobedience, and this provokes 
direct military intervention in the political processes (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993: 
129). 
 
Military Centrality  
The main argument of military centrality theorists is that resourceful and cohesive 
militaries are more likely to intervene in the polity (Andreski 1968; Janowitz 
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1977; Finer 1975). It is argued that since colonial and early post-colonial times, 
the military institution was the only agent of modernization for a largely 
underdeveloped society that was still characterized by primordial loyalties (Enloe 
1980; Pye 1962). It was argued that the reason for this was the military institution 
in new nations had access to advanced technologies, meritocracy was 
institutionalized, army discipline and esprit de corps among its officers was 
manifest, and lastly, it had a well-articulated and defined organizational structure. 
The military institution was confronted with the failure of civilian institutions and 
the reckless excesses of the political office holders, and had no choice but to 
intervene and help salvage the anarchy created by the civilians, while continuing 
to participate and even ‘drive’ the modernization of  society. However, others 
have argued that factionalized militaries are more prone to military interventions 
(Kposowa and Jenkins 1993). They argue that inter-service rivalries, training 
school loyalties, and ethnic tensions stemming from colonial staffing policies 
have created conflicts within the military that have ultimately caused military 
interventions. Morris Janowitz (1964: 40) illustrates further that factionalized and 
recently ‘professionalised’ militaries are more likely to engage in plots, while a 
more cohesive officer corps is more likely to mount successful seizures of power. 
Others, like Wells (1974), Johnson et al. (1984), Wells and Pollnac (1988), and 
Jenkins and Kposowa (1990), have further argued that the larger the military 
budget and number of troops, the greater the likelihood of military intervention.  
 
Ethnic Antagonisms There are three perspectives to this approach: ethno-politics 
in deeply divided societies, the ethnic dominance thesis, and ethnic competition.  
Ethno-politics in Deeply Divided Societies: One branch of this body of literature 
posits that, for developing countries, if there are fewer ethnic groups within a 
society, it tends to create large and dominant ethnic identities. Such societies tend 
to have greater domestic ethnic tensions, and the less ability to form political 
coalitions, arguably the essential component of democracy. Hence, this creates a 
tendency for military intervention (Rabuskha and Shepsle 1972).  When there are 
several major ethnic groups within a large system, there is greater vulnerability to 
inter-ethnic competition, tension, and ultimately conflict. 
Ethnic Dominance Thesis: The proponents of this theory argue that a large and 
politically hegemonic group in a developing system tends to provoke conflict and 
through this, military intervention. Jackman (1978) argues that large and 
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politically powerful groups provoke military intervention, usually because they 
exclude smaller groups from power. They fall into this by monopolizing access to 
political offices.  Such monopolizing acts include fostering single ethnic 
domination of key cabinet posts in government, in the military and in state-owned 
public enterprises. Such acts stir up ethnic hostilities and provoke military 
intervention from the less dominant groups who are being marginalized. 
Ethnic Competition: The central theoretical argument of this aspect of ethno-
political theory is that state building and economic development simultaneously 
increase the competition between groups and provide greater resources (Melson 
and Wolpe 1970; Bates 1983; Olzak 1983). With the end of colonialism, diverse 
ethnic groups that were geographically and traditionally isolated, some of them 
because of their lack of Western education and modernisation suddenly became 
competitors for jobs, housing, schools and social services. State-building thus 
created a centre point for political competition as well as an arena for ethnic 
mobilization. Rapid urbanization and industrialization in post-colonial societies 
tended to bring different groups into greater competition, simultaneously creating 
more proximity and intra-ethnic political mobilization (Kposowa and Jenkins 
1993). National level competition in these societies had never been fair or 
democratic, and thus political tensions and, ultimately, bloody conflicts, between 
these groups escalated in many cases.  Unresolved competition of this kind has 
been used in many cases in Africa, and in Nigeria in particular, to justify military 
intervention. 
 
World Systems/Dependency Theories 
This body of somewhat diverse theories focuses on “neo-colonialism”, often 
defined as export dependence and foreign capital penetration. One prominent 
theorist of the 1970s (Wallerstein 1979) describes the basis of these theories as 
‘unequal exchange’.  Export dependence centres on the persistence of colonial 
trading patterns, especially export concentration, and the continued reliance on the 
exporting of (inexpensive) primary products and the importing of expensive 
manufactured goods (Migdal 1988; Mamdani 1996; Amin 1977). This 
dependency creates low and unstable returns for the developing country, 
economic stagnation and poverty, and thus provides the basis for political turmoil 
and social instability. This pattern is also frequently linked to a coercive labour 
system that requires a strong military, and involves an ethnic division of labour 
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(Wallerstein 1979; Rodney 1972). Since there are few economic opportunities for 
the educated middle class in most developing countries, and specifically in 
Nigeria, economic competition is focused on the state, and this also   encourages 
military intervention and corruption as vehicles of upward social mobility 
(Thomas 1984). 
 
Civilian Supremacy over the Military 
Our understanding of the dynamics of establishing civilian supremacy over the 
military comes originally from the classic works of Samuel Huntington (1995, 
1957) and Morris Janowitz (1960). Huntington argues that only military 
professionalism can guarantee “objective civilian control” over the military 
(Huntington 1957: 83-85).  He further states in later works that the main features 
of civilian control over the military are: 
A high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of 
the limits of their professional competence; 
The effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who 
make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; and 
The recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional 
competence and autonomy for the military (Huntington 1995: 9-10). 
The consequence of military professionalism, according to Huntington (1957: 83-
85), is that it provides an avenue for the military to be systematically weakened 
politically (keeping it out of political matters), while ensuring at the same time 
that it is strengthened militarily. This thus assures both civilian control and 
military effectiveness. 
In contrast, Janowitz (1960) argued that as the distinction between war (the 
‘orthodox’ military mission) and peace (largely relegating the military to ‘police’ 
functions) was becoming increasingly blurred. With the former declining in 
frequency, modern world military forces were increasingly becoming 
‘constabulary forces’ rather than the traditional war fighters of old. This, he 
argued, led the professional soldier to become politically involved with corporate 
(military) interests, while remaining uncomfortably dependent upon civilian 
politicians and budgets.  Janowitz (1960) argued that as this sense of corporate 
solidarity within the military grew, and military professionalism in developing 
countries increased, so did the likelihood of military intervention. The common 
characteristic of both scholars as regards civil-military relations is that civilian 
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control of the military is affected in some way by military professionalism. For 
Huntington, this is assured through civilian non-interference in the military realm; 
while for Janowitz, submission of the military is based only on shared 
institutional, cultural and social values (Baker 2007: 118), and in developing 
countries the corporate solidarity that accompanies military professionalism 
actually intensifies the tendency to intervene politically.  
 
In more recent times, works by Feaver (2003), Desch (1999), Cohen (2002), and 
Howe (2001) have also sought to explain the dynamics of civilian supremacy over 
the military, and how this might be achieved. These studies are relatively similar 
although they suggest diverse means of achieving civilian control. Feaver (2003), 
however, suggests a more comprehensive means of how this can be achieved, 
what he terms ‘agency theory’. The central theme of this theory is a monitoring 
technique by the civilians over the military. According to Deane-Peter Baker 
(2007), this monitoring has six elements: restricting the scope of the delegation of 
authority to the military; contractual incentives; screening and selection 
mechanisms; fire alarms; police patrols; and revocation of delegated authority. 
 
1. Restricting the scope of the delegation of authority to the military: This 
requires that the civilians devise strategies, operational plans and provide 
essential equipment and operational budgets to ensure the smooth running of 
the military institution. The military, in this approach, has very limited 
political authority, but is adequately provisioned and thus has no obvious 
cause for collective antagonism. 
2. Contractual incentives: This less intrusive approach ‘builds in’ incentives to 
the contract between the principal and the agent. In economic terms, profit 
sharing is perhaps the best analogue. Even though economic ‘profit’ should 
not exist in civil-military relations, Feaver notes  that the military’s desire for 
institutional autonomy is analogous (Baker 2007: 127). Feaver contends that:  
since monitoring mechanisms vary in their degree of intrusiveness, and assuming 
that the military prefers less intrusive means, civilians have a powerful incentive 
with which to influence military behaviour: offer to use less intrusive means to 
monitor military agents. Indeed, this is how traditional civil-military relations 
theory treats autonomy (Feaver 2003: 78). 
3. Screening and selection mechanisms: Such mechanisms (known as 
‘accession policy’ in a military context) enable civilians to address the adverse 
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selection problem, and also provides (in a relatively non-intrusive manner) 
information that can help the civilian in predicting the future behaviour of the 
military agent selected (Baker 2007: 127). 
4. Fire alarms: In a civil-military relations context, defence-oriented think 
tanks, the media, civil society and so on can ensure that excesses in military 
behaviour are challenged or questioned, and properly reported for appropriate 
sanctions or actions. 
5. Police patrols: This essentially involves civilian scrutiny or in-depth 
investigation of the military institution as frequently as warranted. Feaver 
(2003) states that:  
Police patrols include regularized audits and intrusive reporting requirements 
designed to turn up evidence of agent wrongdoing and, through regularized 
inspection, to deter moral hazard. Public investigative hearings and specific 
mandated reports are staples of congressional oversight and represent one of the 
more visible avenues of political control (Feaver 2003: 84).  
6. Revocation of delegated authority: This involves the partial or total 
withdrawal of some delegated authority (if need be) by the civilian authority. 
Such withdrawal could either be given to another coercive apparatus of state, 
for example, the police or an intelligence unit or organization. For the case of 
military planning and operations, the civilian authority could take 
responsibility. Virtually none of these mechanisms are currently in place in 
Nigeria.   
In summary, the research on civil-military relations has sought to explain military 
intervention in politics (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1964; Nordlinger 1977; 
McGowan 2006; Mwakikagile 2001). These studies have tended to focus on the 
role of the military in democratic transitions, since in most regions of the world 
over the past 30 years the transition from autocratic military regimes to civilian 
administrations has been a continual process. However, there have been far fewer 
studies on the role of the contemporary African military in the democratization 
process.  The literature, rather, has tended to focus, where it focuses at all, on 
Africa, on past African military regimes—their justification for intervening in 
politics and the asymmetric relationship between colonialism and military regimes 
(First 1970; Kolawole 2005; Olurode 2004; Olurode and Anifowose 2004a; 
Bruneau and Matei 2008). Since the demise of the bi-polar world, and especially 
in the past fifteen years, the emphasis in literature, rather, has been on how to 
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achieve civilian political supremacy over the military (Feaver 2003; Kieh and 
Agbese 2004; Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Hutchful 2004; Houngnikpo 2010). 
 
There are a number of lacunae in the studies on African civil-military relations 
and this thesis has sought to address part of them using Nigeria has its central 
focus of analysis. First, there is little attention paid to democratic consolidation 
and civil-military relations, especially in relation to acceptable military roles, the 
cost of the military, their effectiveness and efficiency, and the implications of 
their roles and missions for democracy (Bruneau and Matei 2008; Harris 2004). 
Second, there is also the persistence of military prerogatives, particularly as they 
interfere directly with civilian administration, and whether such prerogatives 
endanger these emerging democracies (Stepan 1988; Croissant et al. 2010). Third, 
little attention is paid to what the military should do beyond national defence, 
their ‘orthodox role’,  because in the modern world, there is a very low likelihood 
that a country’s military will actually wage war against another country (Bruneau 
and Matei 2008; Weiss 2011). Furthermore, in emerging and newer democracies, 
little attention is paid to the fundamental need for the military to be transparent 
and accountable to legislative oversight and citizens’ scrutiny (Hutchful 2004; 
Omitoogun and Hutchful 2006). Fourth, little systematic attention is paid to the 
political activities of high ranking retired military officers and their apparently 
increasing influence within the civilian administration, as well as the simultaneous 
influence that they retain in the military institution from which they have retired 
(Adekanye 1999; Akinrinade 2006). 
Methodology  
The overall research methodology used in this thesis is categorized under the 
‘single-country studies as comparison’ case study research design, in the broader 
subfield of comparative politics (Landman 2008; Hopkin 2010; Lijphart 1971). A 
case study is defined “technically as a phenomenon for which we report and 
interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable” (Eckstein 1975: 124; 
Yin 2003). Harry Eckstein (1975) regarded single-country studies as the 
equivalent of clinical studies in medicine, where the effects of certain treatment 
are examined intensively. He argues that the case study method is valuable for the 
theory building process, especially in: 
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the subfield of comparative politics most associated [with] macro-political 
phenomena, that is, units of political study of considerable magnitude or 
complexity such as nation-states and subjects virtually coterminous with them 
[for example], party systems or political cultures (Eckstein 1975: 119-120).  
In addition, single-country studies provide a contextual description, develop new 
classifications, generate hypotheses, confirm, contextualise, and rebut theories, 
and explain the presence of deviant countries identified through cross-national 
comparison (Landman 2008: 28-29). 
 
According to George and Bennett (2005), there are six types of theory-building 
research objectives in case study method. These are outlined below. 
Atheoretical/configurative-idiographic case studies provide good descriptions 
that might be used in subsequent studies for theory building, but by themselves, 
such cases do not cumulate or contribute directly to theory. 
Disciplined-configurative case studies use established theories to explain a 
case. The emphasis may be on explaining a historically important case, or a study 
may use a case to exemplify a theory for pedagogical purposes. 
Heuristic case studies inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal 
mechanisms, and causal paths. ‘Deviant’ or ‘outlier’ cases maybe particularly 
useful for heuristic purposes, as by definition their outcomes are not what 
traditional theories would anticipate. Also, cases where variables co-vary as 
expected but are at extremely high or low values may help uncover causal 
mechanisms. Such cases may not allow inferences to wider populations if 
relationships are nonlinear or involve threshold effects, but limited inferences 
might be possible if causal mechanisms are identified (just as cancer researchers 
use high dosages of potential carcinogens to study their effects). 
Theory testing case studies assess the validity and scope conditions of single or 
competing theories… to identify whether the test cases are most-likely, least-
likely, or crucial for one or more theories. Testing may also be devised to 
identify the scope conditions of theories (the conditions under which they are 
most- and least-likely to apply). 
Plausibility probes are preliminary studies on relatively untested theories and 
hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is 
warranted. The term ‘plausibility probe’ should not be used too loosely, as it is 
not intended to lower the standards of evidence and inference and allow for easy 
tests on most-likely cases. 
Building block studies of particular types or subtypes of a phenomenon identify 
common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose. These studies 
can be component parts of a larger contingent generalizations and typological 
theories (George and Bennett 2005: 75-76; Eckstein 1975; Landman 2008; 
Lijphart 1971; Gerring 2007). 
This thesis uses the disciplined-configurative case study method. It allows the 
author to “impugn established theories if the theories ought to fit it but do not” 
(Eckstein 1975: 99). Another important attribute of this type of case study is that 
it can serve heuristic purposes by allowing a researcher to highlight the “need for 
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new theory in neglected areas” (Eckstein 1975: 99). Overall, there are basically 
four steps used in theory building in case study method. The following four steps 
guided the author in his research, and are outlined below. 
The process of theory building, needless to say, always begins with questions 
about experience for which answers are wanted…. 
Questions, to be answered by theories, must usually be restated as problems or 
puzzles… and it consists essentially of stating questions so that testable rules can 
answer them…. 
The next step is hypothesis: formulating, by some means, a candidate-solution of 
the puzzle that is testable in principle and sufficiently plausible, prima facie, to 
warrant the bother and costs of testing…. 
…. After that, of course, one searches for and carries out an appropriate, and if 
possible definitive, test. Such tests are rarely evident in hypotheses themselves, 
especially if questions of practicability are added to those of logic. [Therefore], 
testing is, in a sense, the end of the theory building process…. (Eckstein 1975: 
127). 
The specific methodological approach used for this thesis is the ‘new institutional’ 
approach to political science (March and Olsen 1984: 734). New institutionalism 
derives from the traditional institutional analytical approach, although it differs in 
several significant ways. According to Fox and Miller (1995: 92), new 
institutionalism differs from the traditional institutional approach because in the 
former, political institutions are no longer equated with political organizations. 
Rather, they are seen as sets of ‘rules’ that guide and constrain the behaviour of 
individual actors. Furthermore, the new institutionalists are concerned with the 
informal conventions of political life as well as the formal constitutions and 
organizational structures. Attention is paid to the way in which institutions 
embody values and power relationships, and to the obstacles as well as the 
opportunities that confront institutional design. Crucially, new institutional studies 
tend to be concerned not only with the impact of institutions upon individuals, but 
with the interaction between institutions and individuals (Lowndes 2010: 61). 
 
In a nutshell, new institutionalism seeks to shift the analysis in six main themes. 
Specifically, it shifts: 
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From a focus on organizations to a focus on rules; 
From a formal to an informal conception of institutions; 
From a static to a dynamic conceptions of institutions; 
From submerged values to a value-critical stance; 
From a holistic to a disaggregated conception of institutions; and 
From independence to embeddedness (Lowndes 2010: 66).  
The quantitative and qualitative research technique is used to investigate the thesis 
hypotheses. The combined model design used in this thesis is what John Creswell 
(1994) termed the ‘dominant-less dominant design’. This design basically allows 
“the researcher [to] present the study within a single, dominant paradigm with one 
small component of the overall study drawn from the alternative paradigm” 
(Creswell 1994: 177). A quantitative research strategy for this thesis is viewed as 
the provision of valid and objective description, which views social science as 
analogous to natural science with the aim to produce causal explanations, and 
preferably scientific laws about the relationship between the social phenomena 
being studied (Read 2002: 232). However, because it is practically impossible to 
apply fully a quantitative research strategy to a full range of problems in the 
behavioural science/political science, the qualitative method will also be used. 
Qualitative research strategy is a generic term that refers to a range of techniques 
including observation, participant observation, intensive individual interviews and 
focus group interviews which seek to understand the experiences and practices of 
key informants and locate them firmly in a context (Lareau and Shultz 1996: 3). 
According to Ariadne Vromen (2010), it has four core attributes: 
Inductive analysis, premised on discovering categories and being exploratory, 
with open-ended questions, in contrast to testing theoretically derived hypotheses 
through deduction. 
A holistic perspective that seeks to understand all of the related phenomena and 
their complex interdependence in issues of interest, rather than reducing analysis 
to a few discrete variables. This also demonstrates sensitivity to the context as 
analysis is located in the social, historical, and temporal context from which data 
has been gathered. 
Qualitative and adaptive data collection based on detailed ‘thick’ descriptions 
and depth. For example, qualitative analysis uses direct quotation to capture 
unique perspectives and experiences. Furthermore, the research process is not 
locked into rigid requirements but is adapted to changing situations and has the 
ability to pursue new paths of discovery as they emerge. 
Recognition of, and compensation for, empathy in the research process. This is 
important because, as most qualitative researchers affirm, complete objectivity in 
social sciences research is impossible. The researcher’s agenda is to understand 
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the complex social world with empathy, while also attempting to be non-
judgemental (Vromen 2010: 257). 
 
Primary Data Sources: These can be defined generally as the original work(s) of 
the researcher, raw data without interpretation or pronouncements that represent 
an official opinion or position (Cooper and Schindler 2003: 282). The main data 
sources for this thesis are primarily two: the first, elite interviews conducted in 
2011 where the author interviewed serving and retired high ranking military 
officers; and the second, archival materials also collected in 2011 in Nigeria.  
 
An elite interview is based upon an ‘instrument’, an oral questionnaire. When an 
interviewer asks an elite interviewee a set of questions, the responses, including 
wider volunteered commentary, represent a primary data set (Goldstein 2002). 
The difference between elite interviews and random behavioural interviews in 
political science is that elite interviews are non-random, subjective, open-ended, 
and response-seeking, rather than narrow and response-limiting. They are usually 
targeted at political elite, or key actors, especially those who have participated in 
particular event (Berry 2002; Tansey 2007; Richards 2007; Aberbach and 
Rockman 2002). There are three basic goals that researchers have when 
conducting elite interviews. They are: 
Gathering information from a targeted group of interested and knowledgeable 
actors regarding the wider topic of the research; 
Discovering primary information about the central thesis, including, if possible, 
obtaining a particular piece of information or getting hold of a document; and, 
Informing or guiding work that uses other sources of data (Goldstein 2002: 669). 
The structured elite interview technique was used in this research. In this method, 
the researcher had a planned (and research committee-approved) series of 
questions to ask the interviewees. The questions were derived from the research 
question and hypotheses. The researcher, however, gave each interviewee the 
opportunity at the end of the session to air their personal opinions regarding 
particular events or questions. The author was able to get access to some of these 
officers through local contacts, and at the end of each interview, the author asked 
the interviewee whether he could recommend other officers who would be willing 
to be interviewed for this research. Some officers interviewed made such 
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recommendations, while others did not.  By the end of the interviews, the 
researcher achieved the three basic goals of elite interviews highlighted above. 
The following broad themes aided the interview questions: 
1. The military and human rights abuses; 
2. Military prerogatives in Nigeria; 
3. Legislative and civilian oversight of the military institution; 
4. Civilian expertise on defence matters in Nigeria; 
5. Jurisdiction of military courts; 
6. Corporate interest of the military in Nigeria; 
7. The constitutional roles of the military; and, 
8. The influence of retired high ranking military officers on the current civil rule 
process. 
The military ranks of the officers contacted or interviewed are: 
1. Vice Admiral (retired); 
2. Major-General (serving); 
3. Commodore (serving); 
4. 2 Brigadier-Generals (serving and retired); 
5. Air-Commodore (retired); 
6. 3 Colonels (serving); 
7. 2 Lieutenant-Colonels (serving); and  
8. Major (serving). 
The selection criteria used by this author included interviewing only officers who 
were enlisted in the military prior to the start of the Fourth Republic and officers 
who held or are holding important departmental positions within the military. 
Last, for the retired officers, the author interviewed officers who held very top 
positions prior to retirement and who, under military rule, held important political 
position. Overall, the author contacted 18 respondents, and 12 accepted the 
invitation to be interviewed for the research. 
 
Archival research is a means of evaluating and the systematically interpreting and 
analysing sources found in archives (McNabb 2004: 451). The archival materials 
collected for this thesis include old newspaper articles and editorials, news 
magazines, official government documents and past Nigeria constitutions. The 
author used the National Archives (University of Ibadan) in Ibadan, Oyo State. 
Other primary data sources used in this thesis include data from the Stockholm 
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International Peace Research (SIPRI), and the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS). 
 
Secondary Data Sources: These can be defined as re-analysing data that have 
already been collected for some other purpose (Saunders et al. 2003: 188). The 
author used the document analysis technique to supplement the primary sources 
used in this thesis. Document analysis, according to David McNabb (2004) is 
defined as, “the study of documents and archival data [that] is usually undertaking 
to supplement the information the case study researcher acquires by interview or 
by observing in a situation” (McNabb 2004: 365). The selection criteria used in 
the collection of documents in this thesis is guided by Tim May’s (2001) four 
main criteria in approaching and utilising  a document in social research: 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. 
Authenticity: to identify whether a document is genuine, look for factors such as 
internal consistency of presentation of style, soundness of the origins of the 
document and recognized authorship. 
Credibility: to identify whether the document is accurate, and is a reliable 
relaying of events. 
Representativeness: to find whether the document is typical of the genre or, if it 
is ‘untypical’, to understand how a particular interpretation of an event sits 
among or excludes others. 
Meaning: this refers to the document’s clarity and comprehensibility, and what 
its meaning is in the social and political context within which it was produced 
(May 2001: 189-190). 
The main secondary data sources used in this thesis include: 
1. Relevant journal articles and textbooks on civil-military relations, democracy 
and democratization, comparative politics, Nigerian history and military 
intervention in Africa. 
2. Contemporary news articles and editorials from reputable magazines and 
newspapers such as, The Economist, Nigerian Tribune, Guardian Newspaper 
(Nigeria), Punch Newspaper (Nigeria), Vanguard Newspaper (Nigeria) and 
others. 
 
Validity and Reliability of Data Analysis 
Validity, the determination that we are measuring what we think we are 
measuring, is concerned with whether our findings are really what they appear to 
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be (Saunders et al. 2003: 101). Reliability, on the other hand, can be assessed by 
posing the following three questions:  
Will the findings be same when we use similar instruments (test/retest)? 
Will similar observations be reached by other observers? 
Is there transparency in how sense was made from the raw data? (Easterby-Smith 
et al. 2002: 53). 
The validity and reliability for the data analysis include: triangulation of data; 
validity and reliability of the elite interview; the provision of detailed 
descriptions; and data collection and analysis strategies being reported in detail. 
 
1. Triangulation of data: the data is collected through multiple sources using 
both qualitative and quantitative methods. It includes elite interviews, and 
other primary sources. It also includes secondary data sources such as, 
relevant texts, journal articles, media reports and so on. 
2. The validity and reliability of the elite interview is based on only high ranking 
military officers being interviewed (ranks of Major and above). The officers 
interviewed also had stringent selection criteria, that is, only officers who had 
been enlisted in the military before the start of the Fourth Republic were 
interviewed. Also, some of the officers had held or were holding top positions 
in the military, and as for the retired officers, some had held political positions 
such as, military administrators, during military rule. 
3. There is the provision of rich, ‘thick’, detailed descriptions so that anyone 
interested in transferability will have a solid framework for comparison. 
4. Finally, data collection and analysis strategies are reported in detail in order 
to provide a clear and accurate picture of the methods used in this thesis. 
Thesis Chapters 
Chapter One: This is the introductory chapter of this thesis; it presents a general 
overview of this thesis and research methodology. It discusses the rationale of this 
research beginning with the fundamental research question, the hypotheses 
derived from the question, the general scholarly literature that relates to the main 
aim of the thesis, and the gaps within that literature. It further describes the 
methodology used in this research and the validity and reliability of the data 
analysed. Finally, it discusses the significance of the research to the current body 
of knowledge in civil-military relations in Nigeria.  
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Chapter Two: This chapter presents the background to our understanding of 
authoritarianism in Nigeria by examining the extent to which multi-ethnic states, 
such as Nigeria, may be prone to authoritarian systems. The analysis of this 
chapter is largely based upon result the responses derived from the research 
interviews. Although this consideration was not formally part of my interview 
questions, some of my interviewees volunteered that ethnicity is an important 
factor in the military. The chapter also discusses the several theoretical 
underpinnings regarding multi-ethnic states and authoritarian practices within 
such societies. In addition, it examines some pre-colonial, semi-autonomous and 
autonomous kingdoms in present day Nigeria before colonialism. It discusses how 
the merging of these culturally distinct identities by the British in 1914 has 
impacted negatively on the country’s development post-independence. Finally, the 
chapter examines how ethnic factors became prevalent in the military, and 
discusses whether the military post-1999 has developed a distinct quasi-ethnic 
identity for itself within the context of the various ethno-religious cultural 
identities co-existing in Nigeria. 
 
Chapter Three: This chapter examines whether there is a new form of military 
authoritarianism in Nigeria by analysing three hypotheses. The first hypothesis, 
that the military has retained significant military prerogatives, basically applies 
Alfred Stepan’s (1988) Latin American concept of military prerogatives to the 
case of Nigeria. It also discusses whether such prerogatives may facilitate a new 
form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. To test this hypothesis, the author 
relies primarily on the responses of his interviewees. The second hypothesis, the 
military has intervened in politics post-1999, investigates the level of military 
involvement in the democratising process in Nigeria. The level of involvement 
analysed centres mainly on the military’s activities in internal security duties. It 
further investigates whether this might facilitate a new form of military 
authoritarianism. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on key 
security-related media reports (mostly newspapers editorials) on the military after 
1999. Lastly, the hypothesis that retired military officers are gaining influential 
political and economic positions, examines whether the sheer number of high 
ranking military officers contesting and winning important political positions may 
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facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. The examination of 
this hypothesis relies primarily on the responses of my interviewees. 
 
Chapter Four: This chapter examines key institutions that should limit any 
excessive military activities within a civilian dominated era. It examines two 
hypotheses. The first hypothesis, autonomous military involvement in human 
rights abuses since 1999, discusses whether the military has significant latitude in 
determining how they engage in internal security duties without what is generally 
perceived to be inadequate civilian oversight, and whether this is a contributing 
factor to allegations of human rights violations against the military. Furthermore, 
it analyses whether these factors (civilian oversight and alleged human rights 
abuses) against the military facilitates a new form of military authoritarianism in 
Nigeria. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on the responses of 
my interviewees. The second hypothesis, civilian government oversight remains 
weak, and this facilitates military authoritarianism investigates whether 
institutions constitutionally and legally empowered by law have weak military 
oversight, and whether this may facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism 
in Nigeria. The examination of this hypothesis relies primarily on the responses of 
my interviewees.  
 
Chapter Five: This chapter examines whether there is a link between the military 
budget and military dominance in civilian politics. It examines one hypothesis, 
that increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military 
authoritarianism. To test this hypothesis, the military expenditures of Ghana and 
Cameroon are investigated and compared to those of Nigeria to determine if there 
are regional trends in military spending. A time-series graph is used to present the 
empirical findings for this hypothesis. The examination of this hypothesis relies 
primarily on data of military expenditures from two reputable organisations: the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).  
 
Chapter Six: This forms the concluding chapter of this thesis. The chapter 
presents the general summary of this thesis by restating the main objectives of this 
study. It briefly re-emphasises the research methodology used in this thesis and 
presents the main conclusions of each of the hypotheses analysed in this study. It 
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also presents a general conclusion based on the empirical findings of each of the 
hypotheses discussed and, lastly, states areas of further research, bearing in mind 
the limitations encountered during the course of this research. 
Significance of this Research 
In theoretical terms, and to my own knowledge, there has been no systematic 
theoretical discussion of the military in Nigeria applying Alfred Stepan’s (1988) 
concept of military prerogatives to interpret the behaviour of the Nigerian 
military. While several authors on civil-military relations in Nigeria agree that 
insufficient civilian control over the military in some way affects the quality of 
democratic governance, virtually all of the literature has tended to focus more on 
its potential to lead to military intervention if not adequately addressed. This 
thesis approach offers what may be the first comprehensive theoretical argument 
as to exactly how military behaviour in a transitional phase can affect the civilian 
process in Nigeria. It is advanced through detailed analyses of the current 
institutional framework that the military currently operates within the polity. 
By disaggregating the issue areas of this thesis into six core areas (my 
hypotheses), this research reveals the complexity of civil-military relations in 
Nigeria, and this has allowed for differentiated empirical analyses and findings. 
While most recent studies on civil-military relations in Nigeria tend to be quite 
vague in interpreting civilian control of the military, the approaches used in this 
study go beyond the existing conceptions used by other scholars. The framework 
used in this research is built around a common question: Is a new form of military 
authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria? In addition, the application of Stepan’s 
(1988) concept to Nigeria points to a clear set of institutional indicators. This 
allows for detailed empirical analyses of each of the hypothesis, how they might 
be measured, and how they assist in interpreting the fundamental research 
question. This analytical framework therefore, provides an empirical tool for 
assessing in detail the case of Nigeria in its most recent democratic period, and 
also for longitudinal, cross-national comparisons with other similar cases within 
West Africa. 
Last, by explicitly framing this analysis within the broader field of civil-military 
relations, it has provided a basis for a stringent scholarly debate of contemporary 
Nigerian politics. An approach of this sort allows for a systematic discussion of 
32 
 
the impact of unrestricted military political autonomy on the democratisation 
processes. Furthermore, as all the hypotheses and arguments are deductively and 
inductively derived every step of the conceptual and theoretical endeavour can be 
logically and empirically traced back to this basic theoretical foundation. This, 
then, is a significant contribution to the body of knowledge in civil-military 
relations in Nigeria. My approach is pointedly contemporary, and should offer the 
most relevant insight into contemporary Nigerian politics. 
In practical terms, stable civil-military relations in Nigeria would, in part, resolve 
issues that are germane to the continual survival of the country. Such pressing, 
multi-faceted issues include the appearance of the misuse of the coercive 
apparatus of the state to maintain law and order, and the leadership style of the 
country that seems to have a semblance to the military’s rulership style.  
Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter has presented a general overview of the main aim of this 
thesis, its justification, significance and the research methodology. The following 
chapter introduces the concept of authoritarianism in Nigeria within the context of 
the different ethnic and religious identities co-existing in the country. It is, 
important for this thesis to first discuss authoritarianism within the context of the 
ethnic configuration of the country because authoritarianism in Nigeria cannot be 
discussed without first understanding how the different autonomous and semi-
autonomous ethnic identities merged into a single political entity. This 
understanding, therefore, provides an important background for how ethnic 
factors affect (positively or negatively) the entire political process and all the 
institutions in the country. Accordingly, authoritarianism in the following chapter 
is explored within the context of whether multi-ethnic states, such as, Nigeria, 
tend to have authoritarian political systems. 
  
33 
 
Chapter Two 
Authoritarianism, Ethnic Factors, and the Nigerian 
Political Process 
Introduction 
Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914, Nigeria 
has existed as one country only on paper... We do not want our Southern 
neighbours to interfere in our development... But I should like to make it clear to 
you that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage; the Northern people 
would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea.
1
 
Do multi-ethnic states like Nigeria tend to have authoritarian systems? This 
chapter will present the various scholarly arguments of whether there is a link 
between multi-ethnicity in a state and authoritarianism. It first examines various 
studies on ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in societies. It then investigates these 
studies within the Nigerian context, and considers whether there is a link with 
authoritarianism; it then analyses the impact of colonization on the autonomous 
and semi-autonomous kingdoms of present day Nigeria, and the reason for 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates by the British in 1914; 
it describes the political development of the young nation, and the various 
constitutional developments from 1922 until independence in 1960; it analyses 
how ethno-politics, initially a problem of the political sphere, later impacted on 
professionalism within the Nigerian military in the 1960s; it analyses key ethno-
politics issues from 1967 to contemporary times in the country; and lastly, it 
discusses the possible development of a distinct quasi-ethnic identity within the 
military post-1999. 
 
In general, there seems to be no consensus among scholars on whether multi-
ethnic states are prone to a continuous cycle of high and low intensity conflicts. 
The literature on this subject can, however, be divided into two types. The first 
type is presented by researchers who suggest that societies that are highly 
fragmented along ethnic and religious lines tend to have dominant ethnic groups 
that terrorize their citizens, especially minorities, and deny them their basic rights 
of expression (Osaghae 2002; Reilly 2006; Ukiwo 2003; Agbese 2001; Horowitz 
1994; Reynal-Querol 2002). Researchers who support this argument appear to 
conclude that there seems to be a connection between ethnicity, authoritarianism 
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and high/low intensity conflicts in multi-ethnic states (Agbese 2001; Nmoma 
1995; Horowitz 1994; Berman 1998; Kifordu 2011; Reynal-Querol 2002; 
Osaghae 2003). The second is presented by researchers who argue that ethnic and 
religious diversity appears not to lead to high or low intensity conflicts (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Krain 1997; Walker and Poe 2002). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
have argued along this line and found no significant correlation between civil 
wars and ethnic diversity. They state that: 
Ethnic and religious diversity tends to make a society safer, societies with many 
groups, none of which is large enough to be ‘dominant’, have substantially lower 
risks of conflict than homogeneous societies… because in diverse societies the 
organization of rebellion becomes more difficult (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 4; 
Walker 2007). 
It is, however, crucial to note that even though researchers on ethnic conflict seem 
not to agree on what leads to high and low intensity conflicts in multi-ethnic 
states, there seems to be consensus amongst researchers on one central point. That 
is, of a need for multi-ethnic states to fashion a political system that adequately 
caters for, and respects, the rights of all, no matter what ideological, religious or 
ethnic differences may exist in such plural societies. In a sub-Saharan context, 
most of the literature tends to posit that the failure of sub-Saharan states to adopt 
Western style democracy, within their cultural and contextual elements, is 
partially responsible for these states’ inability to properly articulate and aggregate 
diverse ethnic demands on the political system (Nnoli 1995, 1994; Bah 2005; 
Dahl 1971; Mbaku et al. 2001; Agbaje et al. 2004). Other researchers have argued 
otherwise, stating, for example, that one of the key reasons why autocracy and 
democratic reversal is endemic in most sub-Saharan African states is that 
democracy promotes subnational ethnic demands that are capable of pitting 
different ethnic groups against each other, and this produces ethnic conflicts and 
authoritarian tendencies (Nnoli 1994: 10; Adejumobi 2010). Donald Horowitz 
(1994) argues that: 
Democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power, about the 
privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion. In 
severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who 
will be included and who will be excluded. Since the lines appear unalterable, 
being in and out may quickly come to look permanent… most Africa countries 
remain severely divided, and ethnic divisions have proved a major impediment to 
the attainment of stable democracy all over the continent (Horowitz 1994: 35-
36). 
Using Horowitz’ concept of democracy and its inter-play in multi-ethnic societies, 
it is useful to explore further how African political elites have used ethnic identity 
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to exclude competing ethnic groups within the polity. In a number of African 
states, whether or not in a process of democratization, the central government is 
the main source of employment and provider of basic social amenities. This is 
partly due to a lack of an indigenous bourgeois class. Under this condition, 
opportunities—economic, political and educational—can be bureaucratically 
patterned in such a way that they permanently favour a particular ethnic group 
(Osaghae 2002; Agbese 2001).  
 
The Nigerian Variant 
Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, is a conglomeration of over 250 
different ethnic groups and approximately 300 languages, with almost an equal 
representation of the two dominant religious beliefs in the world: Christianity and 
Islam. This ethnic diversity and, more importantly, the tensions that it creates, can 
be observed in all spheres of socio-political life. This is particularly evident today 
in employment opportunities, sports, schooling, and commerce. Each of these are 
impacted on by ethnic divisions, whether by the perceived historically and 
politically grounded preferential hiring of northerners in the public services, or the 
perception of ethnically based selection of national sports representatives, 
particularly in widely followed, and hence profitable, sports such as football 
(soccer), athletics and table-tennis. Even admission into federal government-
owned secondary schools and universities is subject to ethnically-based quotas 
that favour educationally backward states in the federation—all of which are 
northern states. Finally, business relationships at the local level are often primarily 
based on ethnic affiliation, frequently witnessed in the form of ethnically based 
cooperative societies, most of which cluster around the various commercial cities 
in the federation (Abutudu 2010; Achebe 2012, 1983; Nnoli 1995). Tables 2.1 and 
2.2 (below) highlight these ethnic tensions by presenting the ethnic composition 
of two important political institutions in the country: the federal cabinet and the 
National Assembly. The two tables clearly highlight the problems of selection into 
political institutions, especially into the federal cabinet. The impact of this on the 
state has been one of constant ethnic animosity and authoritarianism. 
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Table 2.1: Ethnic Composition of Nigerian Cabinets, 1960-2004 (per cent)
2
 
Regime Hausa-
Fulani 
Igbo Northern 
Minorities 
Yoruba Southern 
Minorities 
Balewa 1960 60 13.0 0.0 20.0 6.7 
Gowon 1967 21 0.0 21.0 36.0 21.0 
Murtala 1975 25 0.0 35.0 35.0 5.0 
Shagari 1983 38 8.8 20.5 14.7 17.6 
Buhari 1984 35 10.0 25.0 20.0 10.0 
Obasanjo 2004 30 15.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 
Sources: Adapted from (Osaghae 1989: 21; Nigeria Army Education Corps and School 1994; Mustapha 2006). 
 
Table 2.2: Ethnic Composition of the National Assembly, 1999-2003 (per cent) 
Ethnic 
Group 
Population (1963 
Census) 
Senate House of Representative 
Hausa/Fulani 29.6 28.4 30.3 
Igbo 16.6 14.7 13.8 
Yoruba 20.6 20.1 21.3 
Southern 
Minorities 
9.5 15.6 13.8 
Northern 
Minorities 
24.0 21.2 20.8 
Sources: Information on National Assembly members computed from data on 109 senators and 356 members of the House 
of Representatives (Anyanwu 1999; Mustapha 2006). 
 
In political terms, the link between ethnic diversity and authoritarianism is caused 
by the emergence of modern bureaucratic states and capitalism. Hutchinson and 
Smith (1996) argue that in old empires, such as the Ottoman empire, ethnic 
communities were recognized but passive because of the existing mode of 
production and structure of society. But in the modern ‘rational’ state, and the 
new ideologies of political nationalism, all component units of a nation-state are 
required to be united and homogenous. This, in turn, has produced conflicts of 
interests across many ethnic communities in the modern state (Hutchinson and 
Smith 1996: 11). As for Nigeria, state formation and the mode of production were 
based on external rather than internal factors and Nigeria, as a product of the 
colonial (British) imperialistic imagination, did not even exist in name until 1914, 
when the Northern and Southern protectorates of the Niger Area and the colony of 
Lagos were amalgamated into one single political entity (Muffett 1978; Burns 
1963). Historically, the diverse ethnic groupings in Nigeria did not have a single 
political administration. Also, the mode of production in Nigeria, typical of other 
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colonized territories, was exploitative and served only the interests of the 
colonialists. This economic structure forced the subjects to produce goods (cotton, 
cocoa, rubber, and precious minerals—gold, tin, limestone, coal) that were greatly 
in demand in factories across the metropoles of Europe and the Americas. Such 
products were bought from the peripheries at cheap prices based on the cheap 
labour costs in these territories, and processed into finished products in factories 
across the metropoles. These products were later resold at exorbitant prices to the 
colonies (Mamdani 1996; Rodney 1972; Amin 1976). Therefore, Nigeria, like all 
former colonies at independence, was involuntarily linked to a global economic 
system that was created by a few countries of the world. These economic 
institutions created a system that tended to foster economic dependence, unequal 
exchange and underdevelopment for countries that were former colonies (Amin 
1976, 1977). In an African context, Bade Onimode (1988) described this 
economic crisis of unequal exchange and underdevelopment not entirely as an 
economic crisis based on ideological orientation—Marxism African socialism, 
capitalism—but rather, as an economic crisis that had further fostered massive 
unemployment, growing deficits and debts, poverty and sluggish economic 
development. These multi-layered problems, added to ethnic diversity in several 
African societies, have, according to Onimode, contributed to political instability 
and the many non-democratic regimes that the continent has witnessed over the 
years (Onimode 1988: 1-10, 1978; Frank 1979; Chew and Denemark 1996). 
 
At independence in 1960 two core factors primarily exacerbated ethnic 
competition in Nigeria and further increased authoritarian tendencies in the polity. 
The first was a lack of an indigenous bourgeoisie or economic class, which could 
fully capitalise the factors of production. The effect of this was to make the state 
the sole originator, provider and adjudicator of the allocation of scarce resources 
in the country. The second was caused by the ethnic groupings that were 
forcefully merged into a single political unit by the coloniser. This strange 
bedfellow’s arrangement invariably created a culture of ethnic competition at the 
federal level because the various ethnic groups in the country saw the capturing of 
political power at the centre as a means of allocating resources in a way that could 
be disadvantageous to opposition ethnic groups. As a result, a sense of constant 
mutual fear and suspicion was created among the various ethnic groups. There 
was a perception, if not always the reality, of ethnic domination. It is, therefore, 
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unsurprising that political contests in Nigeria became inherently problematic 
(Sanda 1976; Onimode 1988; Young 1986; Fatton 1988; Sklar 1979). In this 
context, it is often easier for campaigning parties to attract voter support by 
appealing to ethnic allegiances rather than issues of class or ideology (Reilly 
2006). Political contest of this matter was the major flaw of the First Republic 
(1960-1966), because party formation, politics and competition were based along 
the three major ethnic groups of the country. In the South-West of the country, the 
dominant party of the region initially started as a socio-cultural group for the 
Yoruba’s Egbe Omo Oduduwa, but later transformed into the Action Group (AG), 
a political party in 1951. The party’s initial objective, after formation, was to 
forestall an Igbo lead party (NCNC) from controlling the Western Region House 
of Assembly. Similarly, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was formed in 
1949 from a socio-cultural and religious group in the North (Jam’iyyar Mutanen 
Arewa). The party also believed, like the AG, that only the northerners could 
effectively articulate and solve the problems affecting the region, and that this was 
preferable to allowing other political organizations from other parts of the country 
to rule them politically (Coleman 1963; Mackintosh 1966; Falola 1999).  
 
In view of the mutual mistrust by the political elites of the three dominant ethnic 
groups in Nigeria, the three major parties (NCNC, AG, and NPC) sought political 
alliances with those minority ethnic groups and parties within the regions that 
shared similar ideological views, with the sole aim of trying to weaken the 
strength of the dominant party of a particular region. For example, there was the 
NEPU/NCNC alliance, while the AG formed alliances with minority parties in the 
North and Eastern Region. Also, the elites of each region tried to consolidate their 
regional base by mobilising followers along ethnic and, in the North, religious 
lines. Party candidates who utilised the ethnic card were rewarded with electoral 
success, and as rival parties responded in kind, a process to outbid became the 
political norm, pushing the locus of political competition toward extremes. As a 
result, the democratization experience of the First Republic collapsed under 
immense ethno-politically driven demands which ultimately led to the military 
taking over the reins of power in 1966 (Siollun 2009; Sklar 1963; Ademoyega 
1981). 
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While it is perceived that ethnic conflicts were instrumental in the collapse of the 
First Republic, ethnicity as a dominant factor in Nigerian government and politics 
seems to remain a key variable. Even though ethnicity was not part of my 
interview questions during the course of my field research, some of the serving 
and retired military respondents spoke of, or at least acknowledged, that religion 
and ethnicity played a role in the military. However, while such opinions 
expressed by these respondents were not elaborated in detail, perhaps due to the 
sensitive nature of ethnicity in Nigeria, the comments provided a little more 
understanding of the general workings of the military. One serving officer stated 
that things were much better in the military now, unlike before, when one’s ethnic 
group and the language spoken fluently (Hausa, in this case), determined success 
in the military.
3
 Similarly, a retired officer opined that the military was much 
better under civilian rule, and gave credit to President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-
2007) for his ability to stabilize the military. He attributed this stabilizing factor to 
Obasanjo’s promotion of northern minority officers (Middle-Belt officers) to key 
military positions upon assumption of office in 1999. The retired officer stated 
that even though Middle-Belt officers had contributed significantly to the military, 
and were known for their professionalism and loyalty, they have been 
marginalized for some time. He attributed this marginalization to the failed coup 
attempt by Major Gideon Orkar, a Middle-Belt officer, in 1990 against the regime 
of General Ibrahim Babangida. This officer then asked the writer to read the coup 
speech of Orkar, in order to gain a better understanding of what he was talking 
about (Babarinsa et al. 1990).
4
 The retired officer went on to state that as long as 
successive governments after Obasanjo could limit certain ethnic interests in the 
military, there would be more stability in the political system in Nigeria.
5
 Another 
retired officer gave an example of how ethnicity and religion affected military 
engagements, arguing that: 
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… Sometimes, [when] the military [are engaged in internal security duties], they 
do not even come out with the mandate to do their [constitutional] roles. I was 
once in Kaduna when [there was ethno-religious conflict in the state] and [none 
of the political elites in the state] could call [on] the state security council [to 
address the situation at hand]. Is it that they didn’t know? They know, but [did] 
not give the order to quell it [until the civil unrest had caused serious havoc on 
non-indigenes of the state]. But [when] those of us who [were] aggrieved 
[started] getting angry about how the situation was handled, [soldiers] and top 
officers from that region of the country confronted us. [They told us to] be quiet 
[and not to question] how the military handled the conflict…6 
Based in part on this anecdote, it is logical for this thesis to look into ethno-
politics in Nigeria, as it appears to be a key variable in understanding 
contemporary happenings in the country.  
Ethnicity as a Political Concept in Nigeria 
Ethnicity has been defined within several academic disciplines (for example, 
cultural anthropology, political science and sociology) to mean different things. A 
conceptual definition of ethnicity is, therefore, a debated topic because there is no 
single theory of how ethnic groups are formed. Hutchinson and Smith (1996: 4-5) 
posit that the term ‘ethnicity’ is relatively new, and first appeared in the Oxford 
English Dictionary in 1953. Its English origins are connected to the term ‘ethnic’, 
which has its roots in the Greek term ‘ethnos’, which was used to reference a 
band, tribe, race, a people, or a swarm. Overall, ethnicity according to Hutchinson 
and Smith (1996: 6-7), consists of six main features: 
1. A common proper name, which identifies and expresses the essence of a 
particular community; 
2. A myth of common ancestry that includes the idea of common origin in 
time and place, that gives an ethnic group a sense of fictive kinship; 
3. A sense of shared historical memories, of common pasts, including heroes, 
events, and their commemoration; 
4. One or more elements of common culture, which need not be specified but 
normally include elements such as religion, customs and language; 
5. A link to a specific geographical homeland; and 
6. A sense of solidarity (Baumann 2004; Hutchinson and Smith 1996). 
 
The political concept of ethnicity appears to manifest itself in three different 
academic understandings or approaches: primordialist, instrumentalist and 
constructionist. The primordialist view is that ethnicity is the primary causal 
variable in human interactions, and suggests that kinship, common descent, state 
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of origin, place of birth, language and religion, call forth emotional attachments 
and ethnic solidarity from the members that provide a basis for their 
‘consciousness’ (Seol 2008; Hale 2004; Geertz 1963). Primordialists argue, then, 
that ethnicity is an independent variable, one which is the primary cause of key 
political outcomes in multi-ethnic states (Cohen 1969; Geertz 1963; Shils 1957; 
Barrows 1976). These political outcomes arise in the struggle for political power 
and allocation of resources and this is an important observation as regards multi-
ethnic states such as Nigeria. Ethnic groups tend to see control over political 
power and resources as crucial (Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Eder et al. 2002; 
Fenton 2003; Reynal-Querol 2002).  
 
There seem to be several cases in which it appears that the primordialist idea of 
ethnicity being the causal variable in conflicts is noticeable in Nigeria. Two 
political events, however, stand out. First is the first coup in 1966, where there 
was an appearance of a particular ethnic group, Igbo, who wanted to exploit its 
significant number in the officer corps of the military and public institutions to 
dominate other ethnic groups in Nigeria (Coleman 1963; First 1970; Sanda 1976; 
Diamond 1988). Second, the Biafra war of 1967-1970 appears to manifest 
primordialist ideas, since the primary cause of the conflict was based on ethnic 
mistrust, especially by the three dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria (Jorre 1972; 
Siollun 2009; Achebe 2012). 
 
The second major approach to ethnicity is instrumentalist. This does not regard 
ethnicity as the causal variable to key political outcomes in multi-ethnic states. 
Rather, the instrumentalists posit that it is the politicisation of ethnicity by elites, 
and it use as a vehicle to gain and retain power and resources, that is the primary 
cause of key political outcomes of ethnic conflicts and authoritarian outcomes in 
multi-ethnic societies (Barrows 1976; Reynal-Querol 2002; Hutchinson and Smith 
1996; Brass 1991). Instrumentalists argue that the political elite compete for 
resources and use ethnicity as a means to manipulate politics to their advantage. 
During the period of the 1959 general elections that were to usher in Nigeria as an 
independent nation, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sarduna of Sokoto, was an example of an 
instrumentalist, using ethnicity as a means of protecting the Northern Region from 
what was termed the invasion of ‘southern parties’ into the conservative North. In 
so doing, he not only preserved the idea of ‘one North, one destiny’ but was able 
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to consolidate his political power base beyond his region. In one of his electoral 
campaign speeches in Kano, he stated that, 
 
There is no need for me to do any election campaign here. In the old days, the 
Emir of Kano was known as the chief warrior of the Sultan of Sokoto, and today 
I regard all people of Kano as the warriors of the Sarduna of Sokoto (CBS 
Reports c.1959). 
The constructionist view of ethnicity maintains that ethnicity is socially 
constructed, and consists largely of social inventions. Individuals have the ability 
either to associate with, or disassociate from, diverse ethnic heritage and cultures 
so as to forge their own individual or group identities (Seol 2008; Rothschild 
1981; Hutchinson and Smith 1996). Support for this thesis includes showing how 
ethnic identities wax and wane, and how ethnic boundaries are porous, shifting 
and unsustainable. This makes ethnic markings arbitrary, and the so-called 
common past and traditional values on which members of ethnic groups anchor 
their identity have often very little to do with any historical realities, and more to 
do with social invention or creation (Ake 2000: 95). An example of the 
constructionist approach has to do with an individual’s identity in the global 
world. An African, for example, depending on social context and religious 
orientation, may be perceived to be a member of a particular dialect-speaking 
group or larger language group. Such an individual in another social context could 
be identified as a citizen of a particular country or a region of Africa, Anglophone 
West Africa or a person from Africa (especially if the individual is overseas), a 
‘black person’ and so on. Each of these possible ties can be strong, depending on 
the context. The primordial nature of the individual’s ties tends to evaporate in an 
unfavourable situational context, and may be reconstructed in a favourable one 
(Zirker et al. 2008: 319-320). 
 
In sum, at least some of the problems associated with authoritarian tendencies in 
Nigeria are linked to ethno-politics and ethnicity in their various approaches. This 
ethno-politics effect is evidenced in all political institutions of the Nigerian state. 
The military, for example, aspires to be a cohesive unit, but has, in the past, been 
subject to the nation’s deep ethnic divisions. Ethnic relations continue to shape the 
attitudes and behaviours of members of the military, from combat soldiers to 
administrators, and at all the ranks (Ekeh and Osaghae 1989; Ekeh 2004; Ubah 
1998; Anugwom 2001), although this may be changing in the post-1999 era, 
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where the military is compelled to engage in national ethno-politics at a distinct 
disadvantage. 
 
It should be noted that even though ethno-politics has been blamed in part for the 
authoritarian practices in Nigeria, this is not always the case. Over the decades, 
elite competition at the federal level has witnessed several compromises in 
Nigeria. To a significant extent, such compromises have created a certain level of 
political stability and conflict management in Nigeria. Some of the important 
compromises that have provided political stability for the country are: 
 
1) Creation of states—Nigeria moved from four regions in 1966 to 36 states in 
1996, as an attempt to limit ethnic marginalization (Sklar 2004; Ekeh 2004; 
Bah 2005); 
2) Granting of political amnesty to all who fought in the Biafra civil war, 1967-
1970 (Ojeleye 2010; Gould 2012); 
3) Adoption of an ethnic quota system in the recruitment of personnel in all 
federal government institutions—this also includes the military (Sanda 1976; 
Ekeh and Osaghae 1989); 
4) Adoption by the ruling political party at the federal level since 1999, the 
People's Democratic Party (PDP), of zoning in the selection of presidential 
candidates for the party
7 
(Adejumobi 2010; Campbell 2011, April 25, 2011); 
5) Adoption by the civilian transition of 1999 of two main candidates, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo and Chief Olu Falae, both of whom were Yoruba and 
Christian. This political gesture was made by the predominately northern 
military elite as a way of pacifying the Yoruba’s after the presumed winner of 
the 12 June 1993 presidential elections, Chief Abiola, a Yoruba, was not 
allowed by the military elite to claim his electoral mandate
8 
 (Adekanye 2005); 
and 
6) Since the start of civilian rule in 1999, the federal government has approved 
13 per cent oil derivation to the oil producing states of the federation
9  
(Peel 
2010; Maier 2000). 
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Administration and the Economy: The Impact of Colonialism 
Nigeria, like most countries in Africa, is a colonial creation and, in the words of 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the most prominent Yoruba politician of the First 
Republic, Nigeria is ‘a mere geographical expression,’ rather than a nation 
(Awolowo 1947: 47). Similarly, Chris Anyanwu describes Nigeria as: 
not a nation-state rather it is an amalgam of states, a nation of nations. Its beauty 
as well as its weakness lies in the variety and contrasts among the peoples, 
traditions, and norms, even their physical attributes, hair texture and complexion 
(Anyanwu 2002: 1xii). 
The country is a product of the Berlin Conference of 1884/85, which was, in 
effect, an expression of blatant colonialism that involved the great colonial powers 
of the day, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and Germany 
(Asiegbu 1982; Flint 1960). The delegates of these countries sat around a table 
and literally carved up Africa, creating states without any African representation 
and without taking into consideration the diversity of the different nationalities 
that were going to be grouped together as unified geographical entities. 
Colonialism was, therefore, not for the purpose of fusing Western values and 
civilization with new national identities claimed at the time, but rather, 
colonialism was forged as an essential tool for the further economic and social 
exploitation of the Africans. It was to the immediate advantage of the commercial 
centres in Europe that were in the later stages of industrialization. The colonialists 
saw an Africa rich with natural resources, many of which were needed as raw 
materials for the industries in Europe and the Americas (Rodney 1972; Falola 
1999; Carland 1985). 
 
The trade patterns that followed created an outcome that strongly favoured the 
colonialists. Raw materials were bought at cheap prices, processed in these 
commercial centres, and then sold back to the colonies at exorbitant prices. At the 
heart of colonialism was trade, investment and enterprise, all for the benefit of an 
alien society. All political and economic power, in effect all decision-making and 
thus beneficiaries of those decisions, lay outside the colonies. Indigenous African 
enterprises and African trade were not encouraged, and African partners who were 
permitted to operate, tended to do so only as very junior partners and as, at the 
most, a petite bourgeoisie (Rodney 1972; First 1970; Mamdani 1996). 
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The foundation of ethno-politics in Nigeria began in 1914 when the governor of 
the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of the Southern Niger Area, Lord 
Fredrick Lugard, amalgamated the Northern and Southern Protectorates into one 
single entity (Nmoma 1995; Falola 1999; Isichei 1983). The name ‘Nigeria’ was 
credited to Lugard in 1914 by the colonial editor of the Times of London, Flora 
Shaw, who was reportedly Lugard’s mistress. Shaw later married Lugard, who 
went on to become the first Governor-General of Nigeria (Campbell 2011: 1-2; 
Crowder 1966). The intent of amalgamation was for administrative purposes 
rather than as a process of state-building. No regard was given in the process to 
the ethnic diversity of the area. The Northern Protectorate was economically poor 
when compared to the Southern Protectorate, in part because it had no seaports, 
but had been useful in colonial times to generate revenue from customs duties. 
This lack of adequate revenue from the Northern Protectorate made colonial 
administration difficult to operate: the Northern Protectorate needed revenue to 
operate the colonial civil service, fund educational institutions and importantly, 
the railway project that linked principal Northern commercial cities such as Kano, 
Kaduna and Zaria, to the port in Lagos. As a result of this lack of adequate 
revenue, the Southern Protectorate and the Imperial Treasury had to render 
financial aid to the Northern Protectorate (Falola 1999; Carland 1985; Sagay and 
Wilson 1978). 
 
Amalgamation was another means whereby excess revenues generated in the 
Southern Protectorate were used for important social infrastructure projects that 
the Northern Protectorate could not afford alone. It should be noted again that this 
almost solely benefitted the metropole, and the region’s native population was 
largely excluded. The other primary benefit of amalgamation for the metropole 
was the streamlining of administrative departments in the amalgamated 
Protectorate (Carland 1985; Falola 1999). This was to reduce the duplication of 
tasks and duties in a region of Africa where highly skilled Europeans were less 
likely to settle. The heat and humidity of Nigeria (and West Africa in general) and 
the high likelihood that personnel from Europe would contract malaria severely 
discouraged European settlement (Crowder 1966; Sagay and Wilson 1978; 
Umoren 1996; Christy 1928). Amalgamation, however, did not establish the bases 
of nation-building in Africa. The North and the South continued to administer 
themselves separately, largely because of profound ethnic differences and the 
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policies put in place by the British. Lugard and his successors strongly believed 
that it was beneficial to separate these two regions administratively, mostly 
because of the successful indirect rule scheme that Lord Lugard had implemented 
in the North when he was the High Commissioner of the Northern provinces 
(Okafor 1997: 21; Nwabueze 1982). This was a system that the British had 
devised and implemented successfully in Imperial India where Lugard had 
worked before being posted to the Northern Protectorate.  
 
Indirect rule worked well in the Hausa-Fulani area of Northern Nigeria due to the 
highly centralized traditional political system that operated in the North (which 
also had a well-organized taxation system), and the impact of Islam—the 
predominant religion in that area. Islam created societal cohesion through which 
the Emirs, the Sultan and his associates ruled as God’s representatives on earth 
and were, therefore, above question and without challenge from the general 
populace. Furthermore, indirect rule made British administration very easy in the 
North because it was a system where the colonial officers passed instructions and 
ruled through the indigenous political authorities to maintain a facade of 
continuous indigenous rule (Okafor 1997: 21; Umoren 1996; Isichei 1983; 
Crowder 1966).  
 
The system of indirect rule was, however, a failure in the Southern part of Nigeria 
when it was introduced after the amalgamation of 1914. The Yoruba traditional 
political structure did have a stratified social system based on class and title like 
that of the Hausa-Fulani’s in the North, but the fundamental difference between 
the two political structures was that the headship in Yoruba land (Alaafin) was not 
an absolute ruler like the Emirs and Sultan in the North. The Yoruba political 
system was more like a constitutional monarchy, where the Alaafin had checks 
and balances from the Oyomesi, the Council of Chiefs (Johnson and Johnson 
1970; Eades 1980). This council ensured that edicts pronounced by the Alaafin 
were fair and just. If, by chance, the Alaafin decided to act in an autocratic 
manner, the Oyomesi could dethrone the Alaafin by presenting him with an empty 
calabash or a parrot egg, which meant that the Alaafin, his eldest son, and a 
member of the Oyomesi were required to commit suicide to renew the vitality of 
the government (Akinjobin 1971; Eades 1980; Ajayi and Crowder 1971).  
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For the Igbo speaking people of South-East Nigeria, the indirect rule scheme was 
a total failure because the traditional political system of the Igbo was acephalous 
in the classic Athenian city-state sense. There was no clear hierarchical structure 
as in the other two regions, where individuals and certain families stood above the 
others in society. In Igbo country, policies and decision-making were by 
communal consensus and through the age-grade to which one belonged. Although 
the colonial officers appointed warrant chiefs as a means of creating a stratified 
society, these warrant chiefs were the targets of resentment and uprising by the 
Igbo people. The most notable uprising of that time was the Aba women’s riot of 
1929, which erupted after a rumour circulated that the warrant chief had 
announced that women in that region would be taxed. This would have violated 
the tradition and culture of the Igbo people
 
(Afigbo 1992; Chukwuezi 2001; 
Isichei 1976).
10
 
 
The colonial creation of the Nigerian state from 1914 became the basis of 
subsequent ethno-political crises that would later haunt the country, especially 
after the process of constitutional development began in earnest in 1922. 
Deliberate efforts by the colonial officers to integrate the diverse ethnic 
nationalities socially and politically were rare or non-existent. Colonial officers 
continued a policy of balkanising the three major ethnic groups in the country 
right up to independence. Western democratic institutions were established 
immediately after amalgamation when the Nigeria Council was constituted in 
1914. This council was never fully representative of the people of Nigeria. It was 
made up mostly of colonial officers, and the laws it passed required consent from 
the Governor-General who also had the power to issue proclamations in respect of 
Northern Nigeria (Nwabueze 1982; Burns 1963; Crowder 1966). 
 
Becoming a Nation 
The first constitution for Nigeria was adopted in 1922 when the successor of 
Lugard, Sir Hugh Clifford, initiated what became known as the Clifford 
Constitution of 1922. The Nigerian Council and the Lagos Legislative Council 
were abolished and a new administrative body was instituted for the colony of 
Lagos and the protectorate of Nigeria which was called the Legislative Council. 
The council comprised 46 members, made up of 27 officials and 19 unofficial 
members, 10 of which provided seats for Nigerians/Africans. Four of these 
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unofficial members were elected, three from the colony of Lagos and one from 
Calabar (Okafor 1997: 24; Nwabueze 1982). The major flaw of the Legislative 
Council was that it did not have the power to legislate for Northern Nigeria but it 
could discuss fiscal issues regarding the region. Northern Nigeria was, therefore, 
cut off from mainstream political development in Nigeria until a new constitution, 
the Richard Constitution of 1946, was adopted. This constitution brought, for the 
first time, the Northern Region into the political and constitutional development of 
Nigeria. The initial policy adopted by the colonial officers prior to 1946 enforced 
the notion of separate development for the regions. Other pre-independence 
constitutions adopted after 1946 were the Macpherson Constitution of 1951, the 
Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, and the Independence Constitution of 1960 
(Mackintosh 1966; Coleman 1963). Table 2.2 presents all of Nigeria’s pre-
independence constitutions, their key provisions and major flaw. 
Table 2.3: Main Provisions of Pre-Independence Constitutions in Nigeria
11
 
Constitutions Year Key Provisions Major Flaw 
Clifford 
Constitution 
1922 Started political development in 
Nigeria. 
 No provision for the 
administration of the 
Northern Region.  
 Result, Northern and 
Southern Regions were 
administered differently. 
Richards 
Constitution 
1946 Provided central legislative 
council incorporating the 
Northern Region. 
Recognized the three 
administrative regions—North, 
East and West (created by 
Governor Bernard Bourdillon in 
1939). 
 Failure to consult 
Nigeria’s elite before 
being passed in the 
British Parliament. 
Macpherson 
Constitution 
1951 Strengthened regional federal 
structure for Nigeria. 
 Created several ethnic 
conflicts along regional 
lines. 
 Anthony Enahoro (Action 
Group (AG) moved a 
motion for self-
government in 1956. 
 Northern elites, afraid of 
southern domination, 
moved against the motion 
Lyttelton 
Constitution 
1954 Attempted to correct the 
existing constitutional 
problems. 
Strengthened the central 
government. 
Started the process of 
independence, and the election 
of the first generation political 
elites for the country. 
 Did not address the 
concerns of minority 
ethnic groups in the three 
regions. 
Sources: (Okafor 1997; Nwabueze 1982; Schwarz 1968). 
 
None of the pre-independence constitutions adequately provided for national 
integration and development. Rather, they separately strengthened the regions. 
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The political power within these three regions was given to the three major ethnic 
groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba. Minority agitations for the creation 
of more regions were left aside by the British during the constitutional debates for 
independence (Coleman 1963: 384-396). These agitations were meant to balance 
the lopsided federal structure that favoured the dominant ethnic groups and the 
Northern Region in terms of allocation of seats to the Federal parliament in Lagos 
(Oyediran 1979; Coleman 1963). 
 
The mechanism for electoral competition to the Federal parliament was ethnically 
based: there were no national political parties, only regionally based ones. At 
independence in 1960, Nigeria had three regions: the Western Region (Ibadan was 
the capital), the Eastern Region (Enugu was the capital), and the Northern Region 
(Kaduna was the capital), Lagos was the Federal capital. The Action Group (AG) 
political party controlled the Western Region under the leadership of Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, who was also the leader of the opposition party in the Federal 
parliament in Lagos. The National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons 
(NCNC) party controlled the Eastern Region under the leadership of Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) party controlled the Northern 
Region under the leadership of the Sarduna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello. His 
deputy, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, became the country’s Prime Minister 
(Mackintosh 1966; Isichei 1983). 
Ethno-Political Crises of 1960-1966: Precursors and Events of the Time 
Nigeria’s federal structure at independence was rooted in ethnic divisions, and this 
greatly affected the workings of the political institutions that emerged post-1960. 
The emphasis on regionalism along ethnic lines was not inevitable (Peel 2010; 
Schwarz 1968; Falola 1999). At independence, the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo ethnic 
groups (Northern and Eastern regions) controlled political power at the centre. 
This strange bed-fellow alliance between the NCNC and the NPC party was, 
however, short-lived and ended when disagreements over several issues that were 
germane to both parties and the Nigerian state were not easily reconciled by the 
elite in the two parties. This, in turn, created conflicts that culminated in a military 
take-over in 1966. This alliance was bound to generate conflicts based on the 
ideological viewpoints and social cultures of the two parties. The Northern 
Region, relatively poor when compared to the two regions in the South, had a 
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political system that was controlled by a mostly feudal oligarchy with an agrarian 
economy, wherein traditions and Islam were the unifying factors. It also had a 
comparatively higher proportion of people who did not enrol in or seek to acquire 
Western-style education; therefore, the majority of people in the Northern Region 
were not literate in English. The Eastern Region, like the Western Region, had a 
higher proportion of literate people who sought Western education. The region 
was also commercially competitive and was beginning to industrialise; its elite 
were composed more of individuals who came from a peasant background but had 
acquired Western education and through that were able to move up the social 
ladder. The clear difference between the regions and the mind-sets of the elite 
created ethno-political crises that Nigeria witnessed immediately after 
independence (Omotoso 1988; Bah 2005; Mackintosh 1966; Schwarz 1968). 
 
The first test for the NPC/NCNC coalition government occurred in 1963 when the 
first independence census was conducted. The census in pre- and post-
independence Nigeria was deeply rooted in ethnicity because governments used 
these figures to forecast capital and public infrastructure expenditures 
(Mackintosh 1966; Umoren 1996). The census figures were also used to 
determine the number of seats each region would be allocated in parliament. The 
pre-independence census figures greatly favoured the Northern Region and they 
held more seats in the parliament than the other two regions combined. The 
census figures enabled the Northern Region to introduce an ethnic quota system in 
the recruitment of staff to the public service, and especially the officer corps in the 
army. The 1963 census was a means by which the Southern elite could rectify the 
lopsided federal structure through a reduction of the number of parliamentary 
seats in the Northern Region. The Northern counterparts saw the 1963 census as a 
means of consolidating their seats in parliament and of further increasing the 
number of people from the region in the federal public service institutions. The 
initial results of the census revealed a tremendous increase in the population in the 
South, with the Western and Eastern Regions having a combined population 
greater than the Northern Region. These results were, however, rejected by the 
Prime Minister and NPC even though the coalition party (NCNC) accepted the 
results in principle (First 1970; Ademoyega 1981; Siollun 2009). The Prime 
Minister, dissatisfied with the results, ordered verification, after which an 
additional eight million people were added to the Northern Region. The 
51 
 
verification and acceptance of the census figures by the North re-affirmed the 
political dominance of the Northern elite and contributed to the souring of the 
relationship between the NCNC and the Southern part of the country. In general, 
each region accused the other of massively distorting the census results (Siollun 
2009: 15-16; Bah 2005; Sklar 1963).  
 
The ethnic rivalry motivated by political interests was not limited to the federal 
level. No region in Nigeria was mono-ethnic.  There was significant ethnic rivalry 
within the regions, the most notable being the case of the Western Region. The 
leading political figure of that region was Awolowo, Premier of the Region from 
1952 to 1959 and leader of the opposition party in the federal parliament at 
independence. Though loved by many in the South-West, he had problems within 
his party, with some factions finding him egocentric, stubborn and someone who 
never took advice from his aides (Oyediran 1979). The rivalry was partly driven 
by ethnicity and the ideological stance of the two contenders in the Action Group 
party (AG).  
 
Awolowo was from the Ikenne district (Ijebu), and was leftist in ideological 
orientation, while Chief Ladoke Akintola, his rival and deputy in the party, hailed 
from Ogbomosho and was more to the right in economic orientation (Coleman 
1963: 228). Awolowo favoured maintaining the party as an effective opposition 
against what the Southern elite, perceived as a conservative federal government 
that was content with the British offering advice on critical domestic and foreign 
issues. Akintola, at that time the Premier of the Western Region, was not 
impressed with the liberal socialist ideology of his party’s leader and his 
supporters. He favoured the party forging closer links with the NPC at the federal 
level and saw no benefit in being an opposition party member (Siollun 2009: 
15,16; Sklar 1963; Crowder 1966; Schwarz 1968; Falola 1999). This 
disagreement between the Awolowo and Akintola factions led a faction loyal to 
the party leader to attempt to remove Akintola as Premier of the Western Region 
during a session in the Western House of Assembly in 1962. The house session 
ended in a free-for-all fight and the police were called in to restore order.  
 
The aftermath of these chaotic events in the Regional House of Assembly led the 
federal government to impose a state of emergency in the Western Region and the 
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appointment of a sole administrator, Dr. Moses Majekodunmi. At the end of the 
state of emergency rule, the Awolowo faction in the party was restricted in 
parliamentary seats, while the Akintola faction increased due to disloyal members 
within the Action Group. It also included members of the regional opposition 
party (NCNC), who crossed the carpet to join Akintola after they were promised 
ministerial appointments (First 1970: 151). The move established a minority 
government in the Western Region without any general elections. It received the 
support of the NPC/NCNC coalition federal government, which sought to end the 
political career of Awolowo and his loyal supporters (Nwabueze 1982; Coleman 
1963; Bates 1983; Mackintosh 1966; Omotoso 1988). 
 
The crises in the Western Region worsened when, in 1962, Awolowo and other 
AG leaders were put on trial on the allegation that they were plotting to overthrow 
the federal government. Awolowo, it was alleged, had lost confidence in the 
federal parliamentary political system because it routinely delivered an absolute 
majority for the Northern Region. As a result of this, Awolowo had sent men to 
train in Ghana in guerrilla-like warfare who were then to come back to Nigeria 
and take over the federal government. In their defence of these allegations, 
Awolowo and his associates acknowledged that they did have some men 
undergoing military training in Ghana, but that they were to be used to counter-
balance the autocratic style of governance of Akintola in the Western Region 
(First 1970: 152; Siollun 2009). At the end of a nine-month trial, in which most of 
the incriminating evidence came from accomplices turned state’s witnesses, all 
but four of the twenty-five accused were found guilty, and Awolowo was given a 
ten-year prison sentence. The incarceration of Awolowo and his accomplices, and 
the perpetuation in the Western Region of an unpopular political leader, led to 
numerous instances of political violence and instability which only ended after the 
military intervention of 1966 (Ademoyega 1981; Muffett 1982; First 1970; Sklar 
1963). 
 
The first general election in independent Nigeria took place in 1964 at a time 
when the young nation’s political system was tense following the conflicts that 
had occurred during the trial of Awolowo, the census figures controversy and the 
installation of an unpopular premier in the Western Region. The institutions put in 
place by the British did not have the capacity to handle all the many ethnically-
53 
 
driven political demands (Crowder 1966; First 1970; Wunsch and Olowu 1990). 
The weakness in the political system made it impossible to conduct free and fair 
elections because of the political antecedents witnessed after 1960. By the time of 
the 1964 general elections, the political alliance between the NPC/NCNC had 
crumbled. Initially, it was expected that the Eastern Region-backed NCNC would 
be able to out-manoeuvre the NPC because of the calibre of the politicians who 
were members of the NCNC. In the end, the elite within the NCNC found 
themselves out-manoeuvred by the NPC. The idea that the NPC elite could not 
grasp the art of politics did not occur. Rather, the crisis in the Western Region 
provided the NPC with the opportunity to install a premier who they could trust. 
As a result, the NCNC was in danger of being displaced as a coalition partner by 
Akintola’s party machinery in the Western Region. Ironically, the NCNC had, in 
partnership with the NPC, helped to install Akintola in the West
12 
(Nwabueze 
1982; Bah 2005; Mackintosh 1966). The NPC, therefore, found a new ally that 
would help it consolidate political power at the centre. As the election 
approached, the NPC/NCNC coalition collapsed and new alliances were formed 
to capture the government from the NPC. In theory, the NPC did not need any ally 
to form the government because the census figures of 1962 consolidated the 
Northern Region in terms of representation of seats in parliament (Falola 1999; 
Okafor 1997; Omotoso 1988; Ademoyega 1981).  
 
The 1964 election witnessed the formation of two alliances from the various 
political parties in the country. On one side, there was the NPC with Nigerian 
National Democratic Party (NNDP) and some minor southern parties, and 
together they formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). On the other, there 
was the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), composed of the NCNC, the 
remnants of the AG and the opposition parties of the North, the Northern 
Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle-Belt Congress 
(UMBC).
13 
After a few months of campaigning by UPGA, it became clear to the 
party elite that it was not possible for them to win seats in the Northern Region. 
The NPC had an iron grip on its constituencies and intimidated opposition 
candidates and their supporters. Guaranteed of an outright defeat in the Northern 
Region as well as the intimidation of its candidates in the Western Region, UPGA 
called for the postponement of the elections (First 1970: 154; Sklar 1963, 2004; 
Siollun 2009). 
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The ploy by UPGA to postpone the general elections of 1964 was not successful 
and the NPC government went ahead with the elections. The election was largely 
a political farce: 67 candidates of the NPC in the Northern Region had been 
returned unopposed. On Election Day, voting did not take place in the Eastern 
Region, and the Mid-West Region decided to go ahead with the elections at 
midday. In the Western Region, the supporters of the AG and UPGA did not go to 
the polling stations as instructed by their party leaders because the polling booths 
had been destroyed by political thugs employed by these same party leaders; this, 
therefore, made voting in Lagos practically impossible. Voting, however, went on 
unhindered in the Northern Region and the NPC won 162 of the 167 seats, 
enabling it to run the Federal House of Representatives without any allies from 
the Southern part of the country (Omotoso 1988: 227; Schwarz 1968; Isichei 
1983; Nwabueze 1982). The opposition immediately criticised the election, which 
they said was full of severe irregularities and therefore not free and fair. The 
President of Nigeria, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, prepared a dawn broadcast in which 
he voiced his concerns about the election.  
The independence of Nigeria was like a flame that consumed my political 
ambition.... I would rather resign than call upon any person to form a 
government.... This should release my conscience from the chains of power 
politics.... (First 1970: 154-155).  
Azikiwe never delivered this speech, however. He hesitated during the five-day 
deadlock with the Prime Minister. The text of this speech was, however, released 
to the press. The aftermath of the five-day deadlock witnessed the President 
announcing that he had reached a decision to re-appoint Tafawa Balewa as Prime 
Minister “in the interests of national unity” (First 1970: 155). The dramatic 
change by the President came after it was clear he would not get constitutional 
support from the service chiefs of the army, navy, and the Inspector-General of 
Police if he decided to take over as the head of government. Balewa was re-
appointed Prime Minister on the morning of 4 January 1965 for another term of 
five years after the victory of his party, the NPC, in the general elections of 
December 1964. The NCNC again went into coalition with the NPC, and the AG 
party made no political gains. The Akintola-led NNDP was also now in the 
federal governing coalition and Azikiwe continued as President of Nigeria (First 
1970: 155; Omotoso 1988: 229-230; Forsyth 1982). 
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The last significant political crisis that occurred before the intervention of the 
military in 1966 was the crisis in the Western Region in 1965, commonly referred 
to by Nigerian commentators as the Wild West Crisis of 1965 (Siollun 2009: 19; 
Omotoso 1988; Schwarz 1968). The crisis started as a result of the Western 
Region election which was to determine the political party that was to dominate 
the politics of the region for some years to come. Prior to the elections, the 
government of Akintola had used its years in office to destroy the remnants of the 
AG and had created its own alternative network. This was not a new network 
model foreign to the Western Region; Akintola had used the method employed by 
the AG when they were in office. It was based on traditional patron-client 
relationships that included local chiefs, traditional rulers (Obas), local government 
officials, contractors, petty bourgeoisie and professional men who had moved 
from the AG party to the NNDP. The involvement of the network ensured its 
members had the means of financial survival. This was guaranteed by the 
network’s patronage of the government of the day (Smith 2007; Mbaku 1996; 
Sklar 1963; Siollun 2009). The Election Day was marked by the use of blatant and 
unrestrained thuggery and ingenious trickery by both political parties, bent on 
winning the elections at any cost. A dichotomy was evident in the Western Region 
populace by the election of 1965. There were clients who needed the patronage of 
their patrons to maintain their lavish lifestyles and social prestige. They supported 
the Akintola-led NNDP. Popular opinion maintained that the AG party and 
Awolowo were still very popular among the masses of the Western Region 
despite Awolowo’s imprisonment in 1962. The polarisation in the society of the 
Western Region created a great deal of tension as events before and after the 
election showed.  
 
Unsurprisingly, when reports of the election results began to emerge on the radio 
announcing that the NNDP had won the elections, there was uncoordinated and 
uncontrolled rioting and chaos. The protesters attacked anyone who they 
perceived to have had any connection with the NNDP, burning their farms, 
properties, vehicles, and, in some instances, murdering them. What had begun as 
political violence designed to defeat a rival political party in an election turned 
into a Hobbesian state of nature where life was soon solitary, poor, nasty, brutish 
and short. The law enforcement agencies, primarily the police and army, were 
brought in to put down the revolt, but were clearly unable to do so. The NPC-led 
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government at the federal level had the option of declaring a state of emergency, 
as it had done in the 1962 crisis in the Western Region, but refused to go ahead 
with it. Despite the crisis of 1965 being greater than that of 1962, the NPC was 
worried that if they did declare a state of emergency, it was going to hurt the 
cordial relationship that they had fostered with the NNDP and Akintola (Siollun 
2009). Akintola was thus very instrumental, through the NPC, in reducing the 
influence and power of the AG party in the Western Region and ultimately the 
political career of Awolowo (Omotoso 1988; Panter-Brick 1970; Ademoyega 
1981; Muffett 1982; Mackintosh 1966).  
1960s Ethnic Relations in the Military 
The ethno-political conflicts of the latter years of colonial rule and the various 
crises of the first republic highlighted in this chapter shaped the ethnic 
relationship between the military and the political elite (First 1970; Siollun 2009; 
Miners 1971; Luckham 1975). The elite sought to maintain their power through 
the appointment of officers from their own ethnic origins into key positions in the 
army (Fayemi 2002; Miners 1971). The political elite reckoned that officers who 
shared their ethnic origins were going to be loyal to their government and ensure 
that military actions that could threaten the government would be contained from 
within. If factions within the military planned to take over the government, the 
army officers of the same ethnic origins as the political leaders would act to 
ensure that this did not happen (Bah 2005; Siollun 2009). 
 
Ethno-politics in the Nigerian military was probably an accidental rather than a 
deliberate policy of the elites because of their own indifference to the new 
political realities. This is because the perception of the military profession was 
negative, and unattractive to elite, especially in the Southern part of the country. It 
was frowned upon and less desired than other sought-after professions like 
medicine, law, and engineering. The recruitment process was such that regular 
combat soldiers did not have specific educational requirements, and this fostered 
the general belief that officer recruits were school drop-outs, unlikely to gain 
university entrance qualification, and certainly not from the class of people whose 
parents could afford educational expenses (Ubah 1998; Miners 1971). In contrast, 
the colonial military structure inherited by Nigeria was one that based its officer 
recruitment policy on merit, and in which promotion from one rank to the next 
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entailed fulfilling all of the rigorous academic and military requirements that were 
needed to function effectively in that rank or department. As a result, the Southern 
part of the country had attained higher levels of educational achievement in their 
military officers than those of their Northern counterparts, and this created an 
unhealthy dichotomy in the army structure. Although rooted in education, this 
educational dichotomy quickly came to reflect a division primarily based on 
ethnicity (Luckham 1975; Miners 1971). In the twilight of colonial rule, educated 
Southern elite joined the army at the officer corps level. Most were of Igbo ethnic 
origin, while in the North, those from the Middle-Belt area (Plateau and Benue) 
who were historically known for their war-like tradition, joined the combat units 
of the army. At independence in 1960, the army’s officer corps was 60 per cent 
dominated by Southern officers, most of whom were from the Igbo ethnic group 
(Siollun 2009: 28). 
  
Prior to and immediately after independence in 1960, the Northern-controlled 
NPC government sought to limit this imbalance in the army and therefore, with 
the approval of the British, introduced a quota system into the Nigerian army. The 
quota system not only specified the number of recruits that could enter the army 
from the Eastern and Western Regions, it also lowered the educational 
qualification for admission to the officer corps. The quota system gave the 
Northern Region 50 per cent of army recruits, officers and soldiers, while the 
Eastern and Western Region got 25 per cent each (First 1970: 161; Siollun 2009: 
28). The principle of regional balance was also applied to the selection of military 
officers for training overseas. The recruitment of combat troops also became 
subject to provincial allocations in order to prevent any particular region from 
being over represented. There were concerns among the Northern political elite 
that the Middle-Belt part of the Northern Region had the bulk of the combat 
troops. The Middle-Belt, even though at that time part of the Northern Region, did 
not represent the true North, that is, the Hausa-Fulani. Historically, the Hausa-
Fulani followers of Uthman dan Fodio Jihad did not achieve the kind of successes 
that they had experienced in other pre-colonial Northern ethnic areas of Nigeria 
because their influence was resisted by the various ethnic groups in the Middle-
Belt area. As a result, the Hausa-Fulani political elite were very conscious and 
suspicious of Middle-Belt officers in the Nigerian army (Ubah 1998; Panter-Brick 
1978).
14 
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The quota system effectively ratified ethno-politics in the army. This became 
highly noticeable in 1965 when the government’s policy of the Nigerianisation of 
the army was completed. Hitherto, the key positions in the army had been manned 
by British officers.
15
 The quota system did provide a little ethnic balance in the 
upper echelons of the army’s organizational structure, although half of the officer 
corps was still from the Igbo ethnic group. Within the highest levels of command, 
there was a careful sprinkling of regional representation: two of the five brigadiers 
came from the Western Region; two came from the Eastern Region and one from 
the Northern Region. Among the battalion commanders, two were from the 
Northern Region, one from the Western Region, one from the Mid-West Region 
and two from the Eastern Region (First 1970: 162,163; Siollun 2009: 27-29). 
Even though Igbo officers still dominated the middle level ranks, especially at the 
level of major, officers from the Northern part of the country were favoured for 
promotion and pushed upwards faster than their Southern counterparts. The quota 
system, particularly for officers, in the 1960s Nigerian army was designed to 
favour the Northern Region, often to the detriment of officers apparently more 
qualified for promotion from other parts of the country (Miners 1971; Ubah 1998; 
Siollun 2009). 
 
There were also tensions surrounding issues of eligibility for overseas training, 
and specific overseas training venues. Tension and rivalries also arose among 
university graduates who joined the military, and were easily commissioned as 
officers, and those who lacked the proper educational qualifications and rose 
through the ranks via service and experience. Early noteworthy army officers 
included Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, who was the first master’s 
degree holder to join the army after he graduated from Oxford University. Other 
educated officers included Lieutenant Colonel Victor Banjo, and Majors Olufemi 
Olutoye, Adewale Ademoyega, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Emmanuel Udeaja and 
Oluwole Rotimi. All of the initial university graduates were from the Southern 
part of the country: three were Igbo, the remaining four were Yoruba (Siollun 
2009: 30; Luckham 1975; Anugwom 2001). The Northern political elite became 
so suspicious of the entrance of Southern graduates into the army that the Premier 
of the Northern Region and leader of the NPC, Sir Ahmadu Bello, requested the 
Defence Minister, Inuwa Wada, to stop the recruiting of graduates of Southern 
origin into the Nigerian army (Osuntokun 1987: 101). 
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The army was not immune to internal ethnic crises, and several occurred prior to 
the 1966 military intervention. A significant number of middle-level officers 
indirectly participated in political events during this time. Their political 
involvement was comparable to that of the political elite; supporting or opposing 
any political elite depended on one’s ethnic affiliation. Invariably, Igbo officers 
supported the Southern elite, especially the Igbos and the NCNC. Yoruba officers 
tended to support the AG, while officers from the Middle-Belt and ‘Core North’ 
tended to support the NPC-controlled federal government and the Akintola-led 
NNDP in the Western Region.  
 
An example of note was the way in which the political elite used the army to 
frustrate their political opponents during the Western Regional electoral crisis of 
1965. The fourth battalion, whose initial base was in the Northern Region, spent 
most of its active duty during this time in the Western Region due to the various 
crises that had occurred there since independence in 1960; the first of these was 
the crisis in the Western Regional assembly. This 1965 crisis erupted when 
Akintola’s NNDP was declared the winner of the Western Regional elections 
even though the electorate had apparently voted for the AG party (Schwarz 1968; 
Mackintosh 1966; First 1970; Siollun 2009; Sklar 1963). The fourth battalion was 
used extensively by Akintola’s government to quell the looting and violence that 
occurred. Young officers resented being used to legitimatise an unpopular 
government. The battalion commander, Colonel Largema, was publically 
excoriated for giving secret military support to the ruling party, the NNDP, at the 
expense of peace, stability and the apparent wishes of the electorate for a change 
in government. When a soldier was court-martialled for military misconduct, for 
example, during the course of his trial, he itemized his commander’s acts of 
partiality, and included harbouring Akintola in his official quarters, bringing 
politicians into the army barracks to sign for self-loading rifles, and inviting them 
to practise firing at the forty-five yard range. Colonel Largema, the soldier 
claimed, had personally supervised Akintola during target practice (First 1970: 
166,167; Siollun 2009; Omotoso 1988). 
 
The plan and execution of the first military intervention in the early hours of 15 
January 1966 revealed ethnic bias in that the notable personalities who were killed 
were mostly politicians and army officers whose ethnic origins were the Northern, 
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Mid-Western and Western Regions. Many concluded that the first military 
intervention was an Igbo coup, a means of political domination by the Igbos 
(Nmoma 1995: 318; Jorre 1972: 78-80). A majority of the officers in the army at 
this time were of Igbo ethnic origin. It is likely that Major Kaduna Nzeogwu 
easily convinced his fellow officers in the rank of major to intervene politically 
because the majority of them where Igbos or of Southern origin. Had the 
composition at the officer corps level been more ethnically balanced (especially at 
the rank of major), however, Nzeogwu would likely have had far greater difficulty 
in discussing his plot, and convincing fellow majors to participate (Siollun 2009; 
Ademoyega 1981; Obasanjo 1981; Forsyth 1982; Achebe 2012; Amadi 1973). 
 
The aftermath of the political turmoil and events that followed this intervention 
was the counter-coup of July of 1966, and the subsequent and unprecedented 
killing of Igbo officers by Northern officers in the army. This spilled over into the 
wider society, as Igbos, who at that time dominated clerical positions and 
commercial trading posts in the Northern cities, were killed in large numbers. This 
culminated in a civil-war that lasted from 1967 to 1970. Between five hundred 
thousand and one million people, mostly Igbo, were killed (Panter-Brick 1970; 
Obasanjo 1981; Jorre 1972; Forsyth 1982). The Igbos have never regained their 
earlier dominance of the officer corps. Rather, there has been an apparently 
deliberate effort over the years by the predominant Hausa-Fulani political 
oligarchy to prevent the return of this dominance. It was not until August 2010 
that another Igbo officer was promoted to the highest position in the Nigeria army, 
that of Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
16 
Ethnic Politics, 1967-1975 
Upon assumption of office on the first of August 1966, the immediate concerns of 
the General Yabuku Gowon regime (1966-1975) were twofold. The first was to 
officially abolish the ill-conceived Decree No. 34, which led to the ousting of the 
regime and the killing of Ironsi during the coup. This decree officially abolished 
the federal structure and established a unitary system of government for the 
country. The second had to do with the violent and indiscriminate killings of 
Igbos in the Northern Region following the successful counter-coup that brought 
Gowon to power. The inability of Gowon to stem the massive killings of Igbos 
and significantly limit the high wave of Igbo refugees, many of them badly 
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wounded and exhausted, from the North to East ultimately led to the secession of 
the Eastern Region from the federation (Achebe 2012; Jorre 1972; First 1970).  
Prior to this, there were numerous debates on the future of Nigeria and how the 
federal system should operate (Gould 2012; Jorre 1972). Initially, the North and 
East had suggested a confederal arrangement, while the West suggested the 
creation of states from within the existing regions. The Mid-West Region, which 
was the newest and smallest of the regions, however, favoured the existing 
structure, which was a strong central government. All of the ad-hoc conferences 
and meetings, however, failed to provide a consensus agreement acceptable to the 
three major ethnic groups. At the last of such meetings, held in Aburi, Ghana, the 
Aburi Accord, on the invitation of the Head of State of Ghana, General Ankrah, 
offered a way of resolving the crises within Nigeria. This initiative was led by 
Yabuku Gowon and the military governor of the Eastern Region, Emeka Ojukwu. 
At the end of the meeting in Ghana, Ojukwu travelled back to the Eastern Region 
capital, Enugu, and announced that Gowon had accepted confederation in 
principle. Gowon on the other hand, on arrival in Lagos, was told by senior 
federal civil servants, on seeing the documents and communique which was 
issued in Aburi, that he had unintentionally signed the disintegration of Nigeria 
(Siollun 2009; Omotoso 1988; Gould 2012). Subsequently, Gowon back-tracked 
on earlier statements on the success of the Aburi meeting. Ojukwu in defiance, 
stated that he stood by the communique from Aburi and started the process of 
secession. Gowon, in a counter move to end the secession bid, announced the 
creation of twelve states in 1967 as a way of breaking up the monopoly of the 
three major ethnic groups in the federation. Although this did not stop the eastern 
part of the country from declaring itself the Republic of Biafra, it clearly started 
the process of state creation in Nigeria (Jorre 1972; Gould 2012; Forsyth 1982; 
Oyediran 1979).  
It is, therefore, crucial to recognize that state creation in Nigeria was done so as to 
minimise the problems associated with ethnic domination in the four regions in 
Nigeria, pre-1967 (Bah 2005; Nmoma 1995). One of the reasons why the Biafra 
secession attempt did not materialise was that minority ethnic groups, like those in 
the riverine area of the Eastern Region, did not want Biafra, and sabotaged its 
cause throughout the civil war (Amadi 1973; Achebe 2012). Rather, they 
supported a united Nigeria after the Gowon regime had created a rivers state, an 
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idea that minority ethnic groups in the four regions had agitated for during the 
constitutional conferences for independence. A rivers state invariably granted the 
riverine people of the Eastern Region the political autonomy they wanted from the 
Igbos, who, they feared, wanted to dominate them. State creation ensured that “no 
one state should be in a position to dominate or control the central government” 
(Panter-Brick 1970: 203).  
State creation in Nigeria had the following aims: 
1. No one state should be in a position to dominate or control the central 
government; 
2. Each state should form one compact geographical area; 
3. Each state should be based on administrative convenience, history and the 
wishes of the people; 
4. Each state must be in a position to discharge effectively the functions 
allocated to regional governments; 
5. The new states should be created simultaneously; 
6. Each new state should bring the government nearer to the people; 
7. State creation should bring forth more even development across the 
federation; 
8. New states must preserve the federal structure of government; 
9. Each state must provide peace and harmony within the federation; and 
10. The new states must cater for minority problems within the federation 
(Nmoma 1995: 319-320; Osaghae 2001; Sklar 2004). 
The Gowon regime also decided after the war to create an institution that would 
give the Nigerian youth a sense of unity which was not based on an individual’s 
creed, religious affiliation or ethnic group. Thus, on May 22, 1973, the National 
Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was established. The initial aim of this para-
military organization was the encouragement and development of common ties 
among the youth of Nigeria and the promotion of national unity. Based on this 
aim, all Nigerian graduates of higher institutions below the age of thirty by law 
are required to be enrolled in this scheme for one year after graduation. The 
scheme also made it mandatory that participants in this scheme must be posted 
outside of the individual’s geographical and ethnic enclave (National Youth 
Service Corps 2013). 
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The Gowon era can be described as a period in Nigerian political history when 
conscious efforts were made to create a sense of patriotism and nationalism. This 
was very critical for the regime after leading the country through a civil war and 
so many human casualties (Ojeleye 2010; Panter-Brick 1978; Gould 2012; Jorre 
1972). 
Ethnic Politics, 1975-1979 
On 25 July 1975, General Yakubu Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless coup 
while he was attending an (OAU) Organization of African Unity summit in 
Kampala, Uganda. The coup was staged by junior military officers who had 
become critical of the regime. The grievances of the junior officers included 
charges of procrastination in economic reforms, corruption, the over-reliance on 
federal permanent secretaries in the civil service rather than members of the 
Supreme Military Council (SMC) before critical political and economic issues 
were decided upon, and the absence of a set date to return the country to civilian 
rule (Panter-Brick 1978; Siollun 2009; Nmoma 1995). From an ethnic point of 
view, there have been allegations that the Gowon regime was overthrown by some 
Northern junior officers who felt left out by the regime. Even though Northern 
Hausa-Fulani military officers were instrumental in the counter-coup of 1966, 
they decided to make General Gowon, a Christian from a minority ethnic group in 
the Northern Region, Head of State. However, the Northern junior officers alleged 
that Gowon instead promoted officers from his Lantang ethnic group into key 
principal military positions, and that these were the only officers who had direct 
access to him (Panter-Brick 1978; Siollun 2009). 
So as to avoid the mistake of Kaduna Nzeogwu in 1966, the Northern junior 
officers in 1975 needed a close ally of Gowon who was also someone from his 
plateau area of the Middle-Belt to support a planned coup. The officers were able 
to solicit the support of Major General Joseph Garba, who was the commander of 
the Brigade of Guards—the Head of State’s personal security unit. Even though 
Garba only reluctantly accepted this role, which also meant that he was the officer 
that went on the radio and announced the overthrow of Gowon on July 29, 1975, 
Garba’s involvement in the coup ensured that the ousting of Gowon was bloodless 
and was not perceived, at least, to have any ethnic or religious implications (Ajayi 
2007; Peters 1997; Siollun 2009). 
64 
 
With the ousting of Gowon, General Murtala Mohammed became the Head of 
State. He promised to tackle the various challenges facing the nation and also 
restore the country to civilian rule on October 1, 1979. After Mohammed was 
assassinated in an unsuccessful coup plot in February 1976, his successor, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo, continued the policies of his predecessor in office and created 
a timetable for the restoration of civilian rule in 1979. During his period in office, 
new states were created in 1976 and a Constituent Assembly was established with 
the primary aim of framing a new constitution for Nigeria. The elected assembly 
members were advised by the regime to draw up a constitution for Nigeria which 
was devoid of the bitter political experiences of the First Republic (Oyediran 
1979; Nwabueze 1982; Oyovbaire 1983). 
One of the essential features of the constitution framed by the Constituent 
Assembly (the 1979 Constitution), was that it made a major effort to regulate the 
future activities of political parties and elections. The 1979 Constitution stated 
that: 
 
Membership in political parties must be open to every citizen of Nigeria 
irrespective of place of origin, sex or religion or ethnic grouping; 
Names, emblems and mottoes of parties must not contain ethnic or religious 
connotations or give the appearance that the activities of the parties are limited to 
a particular geographical area of the country; 
The headquarters of parties must be located in the country’s Federal Capital 
Territory (FCT), Abuja; 
The constitutions of political parties must ensure that members of the executive 
committee or other governing body reflect the federal character of the country; 
The programs, aims and objectives of parties must conform to the provisions of 
the constitution on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy; 
No parties must retain, organize, train or equip any person or group of persons 
for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use of physical force or 
coercion; 
No association of any kind shall function as a political party unless registered by 
the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO); 
The conduct of elections to the offices of President and State Governor and the 
National and State Assemblies shall be supervised by FEDECO, and the 
elections to local government councils by State Electoral Commissions; and 
Members of the executive committee or other governing body shall be deemed to 
satisfy the requirement of the federal character only if the members belong to 
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different states not being less than two-thirds of all the states comprising the 
federation (Nmoma 1995: 319-320). 
Ethnic Politics, 1979-1999 
The next two decades in Nigerian political history witnessed several transitions to 
civilian rule (Diamond et al. 1997; Ojo 2004). The Second Republic (1979-1983) 
failed to deal with the problems of political corruption and ethnic politics in the 
polity. Even though the 1979 Constitution framers provided several provisions 
that could limit ethnic politics, in the end, political alignments and politics were 
similar to those of the First Republic. For example, a significant number of old 
party members of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) joined the National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN) and became the dominant party in the country. The party 
also produced the first executive president of Nigeria, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, and a 
Muslim from Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. Also, core members of the Action 
Group party (AG), who were predominately Yoruba, reconstituted and formed the 
United Party of Nigeria (UPN). The party was under the leadership of Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, and as in the First Republic, the party became the dominant 
party in the South-West and a formidable opposition to the NPN. Similarly, 
former members of the National Congress for Nigeria and the Cameroons 
(NCNC) formed the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) and had Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe 
as their leader (Ojukwu 1989; Diamond 1984, 1987). 
On December 31, 1983, three months into the second term of President Shagari, 
the military intervened. The official justification for this bloodless coup led by 
Major General Muhammadu Buhari stated that: 
… The last general elections were anything but free and fair. The only political 
parties that could complain of election rigging are those parties that lacked the 
resources to rig. There is ample evidence that rigging and thuggery were relative 
to the resources available to the parties. This conclusively proved to us that the 
parties have not developed confidence in the presidential system of government 
on which the nation invested so much material and human resources. While 
corruption and indiscipline have been associated with our state of under-
development, these two evils in our body politics have attained unprecedented 
height in the past few years. The corrupt, inept and insensitive leadership in the 
last four years has been the source of immorality and impropriety in our society 
(Omojuwa 2013; Daily Times 1984). 
The regime, however, did not last long, partially because it could not address the 
perceived ethnic, regional and religious tensions that followed the coup. There 
were accusations that the Buhari’s regime was dominated by Muslim northerners, 
chiefly the Hausa-Fulani. Also, unlike the Second Republic where the President 
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was a Muslim from the North and his Vice-President was a Christian Igbo, 
Buhari’s deputy, Major General Tunde Idiagbon was also a Muslim like the Head 
of State from the Middle-Belt of Nigeria. Likewise, the regime promulgated two 
Decrees that caused serious resentment in the country. The first, Decree No. 2 
authorized the government to detain without trial any one deemed a threat to the 
regime. The second, Decree No. 4 forbade any publication or broadcast that 
would embarrass the government. These two laws led to the arrest and detention 
of many journalists (Diamond 1985; Ajayi 2007; Peters 1997). 
On August 27, 1985, Buhari was overthrown in another bloodless coup by his 
Chief of Army Staff and third-in-command, Major General Ibrahim Babangida. 
The justification of the coup was that Buhari had lost the confidence of key 
military officers who felt that the regime ruled in a very harsh and draconian 
manner. Also, that the regime had not announced any time table for transition to 
civilian rule. Thus, the new regime abolished Decrees 2 and 4, and released all 
political detainees held on corrupt charges from the Second Republic. The 
excitement over the new regime was, however, short-lived, as Babangida 
continued to rule in a similar fashion to that of his predecessor. After several 
failed civilian transitions by the regime, this included a new constitution in 1989, 
local councils, gubernatorial and state assembly elections in 1990, and cancelled 
presidential primaries in 1992, the regime finally picked June 12, 1993 for the 
presidential elections. The contest in this election was between Chief M.K.O 
Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim from the South West, and Alhaji Bashir Tofa, a Hausa-
Fulani Muslim from the North (Diamond 1987; Diamond et al. 1997; Mahmud 
1993; Lewis 1994; Okoroji 1993). 
Before all the election results were announced, with Abiola already leading, 
Babangida cancelled the election. The official explanation was that the elections 
were laced with fraud even though several local and international electoral 
observers who monitored the election stated that it was the freest, fairest and most 
peaceful in Nigerian electoral history. There have been several explanations why 
the June 12 1993 election was cancelled. The most frequently re-occurring is that 
the Northern elite did not want political power to shift from the North to the 
South, because there was a perception by the Northern elite that the Southern elite 
would never allow the north to produce another president (Okoroji 1993; 
Diamond et al. 1997). Whatever the case, by the time General Abacha staged a 
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palace coup against the Interim National Government (ING) of Chief Ernest 
Shonekan in 1993 (a body to which the regime of Babangida had handed over 
power after eight years of military rule), several key supporters of June 12, 
especially those from the North, became federal minsters in the Abacha cabinet. 
The most prominent was Abiola’s running mate from the North, Alhaji Baba 
Gana Kingibe (Abdulsalami ; Lewis 1994). 
With Abacha’s mysterious death in 1998 after five years of draconian rule which 
witnessed several human rights abuses and international sanctions, the Northern 
elite, especially those in the military, were eager to return the country to civilian 
rule based on the economic predicament with which the country was faced with. 
With another mysterious death after Abacha, this time that of Abiola, who had 
been under detention under Abacha and was about to be released from 
incarceration, there were several calls for secession, especially from the Yorubas 
who felt that they were cheated by the North over the office of the presidency 
(Ukiwo 2003; Ojo 2000). Given this tense condition of ethnic conflict and the 
possibility of another civil war, the Northern military elite decided to hand-over 
power to the civilians (Williams 1999; Olurode and Anifowose 2004a). These 
elite officers tried to show the genuineness of their political power shift from 
North to the South when, for the first and only time in Nigerian political history, 
the two presidential candidates for the election were Yoruba. They were Chief Olu 
Falae of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) party, and former military Head of 
State, General Olusegun Obasanjo of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and 
the preferred candidate of the military. Obasanjo won the election and the Fourth 
Republic was ushered in (Ojo 2000; Olurode and Anifowose 2004b; Williams 
1999). 
A Rise in Ethnic and Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Civil-Military Relations, 
Post-1999 
One of the striking features of the civilian rule in Nigeria since 1999 has been the 
rise of several ethnic and ethno-religious groups in the polity. These groups 
appear to be primarily responsible for the unprecedented rise in ethnic conflicts in 
the country (Maier 2000; Hill 2012) and appear to be crucial to an understanding 
of why authoritarian tendencies persist in Nigeria post-1999. Basically, these 
groups are not entirely the same in terms of individual goals or aspirations, as 
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each group has its own characteristics that are unique to itself. These can be 
categorised into three types: groups that seek to preserve, expand or consolidate 
their political gains; ethnic associations that use ethnic solidarity to demand a 
change in the revenue allocation formula; and religiously inspired ethnic 
associations that emphasise accountable leadership and good governance are not 
being provided. 
The groups that seek to preserve, expand or consolidate the political gains of their 
ethnic group are the oldest of such groups in Nigeria. They are similar to socio-
cultural associations that were formed in the 1940s and 50s which were later 
transformed into political parties in pre-independence Nigeria (Coleman 1963; 
Cunliffe-Jones 2010). Groups such as this usually rely on ethnic solidarity and use 
this to rally members with the sole aim of ensuring that their ethnic group is not 
marginalised at the federal level. Marginalisation for these ethnic associations 
usually means the number of that ethnic group who are federal ministers, the 
percentage of revenue allocated to that ethnic geographical area and which ethnic 
group should vie for the positions of president and vice-president. Examples of 
contemporary ethnic associations are the Igbo’s Oha neze Ndigbo, the Yoruba’s 
Oduduwa People’s Congress (OPC), and the North’s Arewa Consultative Forum 
(ACF) (Maier 2000; Campbell 2011). 
Some contemporary ethnic associations use ethnic solidarity as a rallying point to 
demand a change in the revenue allocation formula in the country. The ideological 
view of such groups is that geographical areas that have abundant natural 
resources that generate significant foreign exchange for the country should benefit 
from the royalties and taxes paid by these extractive companies. Most of the time 
these groups are very violent in articulating their demands on the political system. 
MEND and the NDPVF are examples of such ethnic associations operating in the 
Niger-Delta area of the country. Their activities have included attacking the 
country’s vital oil infrastructure (oil pipelines, pumping stations, oil wells, 
platforms and vessels), as well as participating in oil bunkering. Such vandalism 
usually puts pressure on the Nigeria federal government, as well as on Western 
countries—especially those that significantly depend on Nigeria’s crude oil and 
gas—and multinational corporations. The effects of such vandalism are usually 
some sort of financial settlement for these groups, which appear not to benefit the 
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people they claim to protect from exploitation (Ikelegbe 2006; Ekeh 2004; Peel 
2010; Oriola 2013). 
Some other ethnic associations are religiously inspired, and their leaders believe 
that the current secular political system in the country has failed to provide 
accountable leadership and good governance. Therefore, the only solution as a 
remedy to bad governance is to institute strict divine law, Sharia, as the solution 
for the diverse problems that Nigeria faces. It is, however, crucial to note that 
ethno-religious groups that believe in the strict Sharia code are not new to Nigeria. 
The first notable group that attracted media attention was known as Maitatsine, a 
name that has its origin from the group’s leader, Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa’s 
abusive sermons (the literal meaning of Maitatsine: the one who continues to 
curse). This group’s foundation dates as far back as 1962 when Marwa founded a 
group which preached against people who owned items of modernisation such as 
television, radio, wrist-watches, cars, bicycles and so on. It was the belief of 
Marwa that any Muslim who read any book other than the Quran was a pagan and 
should be killed as an infidel, or convert to Islam. Even though Marwa was 
eventually killed by security forces after the religious riot of Kano in 1980 and his 
loyal allies suffered the same fate or escaped, groups such as Maitatsine are the 
precursor of ethno-religious militant groups such as Boko Haram (literal meaning: 
Western education is evil or a sin). Currently, Boko Haram’s primary focus 
appears to threaten the existence of the Nigerian state in its current form as the 
group has vowed to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria (Okafor 1997; Hill 2012; 
Chothia 2012; Hashim et al. 2012; The Economist, 2011). 
In ideological terms, it can be argued that Boko Haram has undergone 
fundamentally different phases of evolution, and although its roots are local, it 
represents a distinctly new phenomenon in the context of Islamism and the 
presence of political Islam in Nigeria. The first phase in the development of Boko 
Haram was the implementation of a Missionary-Activist ideology, as emerged in 
2002. Its founder and original leader, Mohammed Yusuf, had belonged to both 
Ibrahim Zakzaky’s Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) and Abubakar Mujahid’s 
Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, Ja’amutu Tajidmul Islami (Movement for the Islamic 
Revival, MIR). Its main financial backer, Alhaji Buji Foi, had close ties with 
Sheikh Abubakar Gummi and Dr. Ahmed Gummi’s Jama’ atul Izalatul Bid’ ah 
Wa’ ikhamatul Sunnah (Izala). Initially, its primary goal was establishing an 
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autonomous Islamic community ruled by a radical version of Sharia Law (Islamic 
Law), something that Boko Haram sought to implement in the Northern state of 
Yobe (International Crisis Group 2005; International Institute For Counter-
Terrorism 2012).  
After late 2003, Boko Haram evolved into a Nationalist Jihadist Islamist 
organisation employing militant tactics and targeting politicians, members of the 
Nigeria Police Force, and other security agencies. From that point forward, Boko 
Haram sought the institutionalisation of Islamic Law throughout the twelve 
predominately Muslim states in the North, and in the longer term, to turn Nigeria 
into an Islamic state. This period represents the second ideological phase of Boko 
Haram. After 2009, following more than five years of clandestine activities and 
the establishment of a new leadership, the organisation appears to have re-branded 
itself. Boko Haram had further evolved into a militant terrorist organisation and 
begun targeting both combatants and civilians. Within this context, it appears that 
Boko Haram has begun to develop or possibly strengthen, strategic ties with other 
Jihadist groups in Africa, especially al-Qaeda, in the Islamic Maghreb and North 
Africa (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), 
Ansar Al-Dine (Defenders of the Religion) in northern Mali as well as with al-
Shabab in Somalia—all of which are al-Qaeda affiliates (Foxnews 2012; Ayoob 
2008; Hill 2012; Campbell 2011, April 25, 2011; Chothia 2012; The Economist 
2013). 
Nigeria’s Military and the Formation of a Distinct Quasi-Ethnic Identity? 
It seems that the Nigerian military post-1999 may have initiated the development 
of a distinct quasi-ethnic identity for itself within the context of the various ethno-
religious driven demands and conflicts that appeared to threaten the very existence 
of the Nigerian state (Maier 2000; Cunliffe-Jones 2010; Hill 2012). Historically, 
the military in Nigeria was dominated by the culture and religious identity of the 
Hausa-Fulani (Anugwom 2001; Mustapha 2006). Quasi-ethnicity is conceptually 
defined in a broad context that includes several developing countries (especially 
those with past/present military intervention) as: a distinctive (and separate) ethos, 
a language (broadly construed—a technical/military patois), a distinctive history, 
usually a separate mythology, a distinctive mind set (if only to justify a typically 
weak ‘orthodox military raison d’ etre), clear (and arguably ascriptive) 
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membership boundaries, and so on (Zirker et al. 2008; Bah 2013). In the post-
1999 era, it appears that the Nigerian military is compelled to engage in national 
ethno-politics as a means for competing for power and resources. 
The development of a distinct quasi-ethnic identity within the Nigerian military 
also appears evident considering that there has been no direct intervention by the 
military in the national ethno-political processes since 1999. William Ehwarieme 
(2011) explains further when he argues that the non-intervention of the Nigerian 
military post-1999 cannot be easily explained by what other studies on the 
Nigerian military post-1999 seem to explain as the reasons for its non-
intervention. According to Ehwarieme (2011), the studies on the non-intervention 
of the Nigerian military post-1999 in the political process can be classified under 
two broad themes: first, the internal characteristics of the military have 
necessitated its non-intervention; and second, the nature and character of 
democratic governance, are proposed to explain the unusual more than a decade 
long survival of civilian rule in Nigeria (Ehwarieme 2011: 500). Explaining 
further, Ehwarieme (2011) notes that the idea of internal characteristics of the 
military such as the compulsory retirement of all military officers that had held 
political office positions prior to 1999, the re-organization, re-training, and re-
professionalization through joint military training with other military advanced 
countries, and seminars which have been an on-going routine exercise since May 
29, 1999, cannot easily explain the military’s non-intervention. These measures, it 
is argued, cannot explain why there was an alleged coup plot uncovered by the 
government in 2004.
17
 Similarly, the argument that the nature and character of 
democratic governance in Nigeria appear to be a significant reason why the 
military has not intervened in the political process seems difficult to justify. This 
is because, despite improvements in certain areas of the Nigerian economy such 
as, retail, aviation, telecommunications and real estate, the core issues that have 
necessitated military intervention in the past, institutional corruption, decay in 
basic infrastructures and a general lack of a liveable income still persist in the 
country. Based on the foregoing, it is logical to assume that the Nigerian 
military’s lack of intervention, even though there have been several cases since 
1999 to justify its intervention, may be based on the development of a distinct 
quasi-ethnic identity for itself. The development of this quasi-ethnic identity for 
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the military may allow the institution to be more successful in its competition for 
resources in the ethno-political struggle. 
That is, however, not to say that there are no challenges in the military with 
forging a separate identity. This appears to be evident in the on-going security 
challenges in the northern part of the country where the state response to 
religiously-inspired terrorist groups has greatly favoured military solutions. This 
has required the Nigerian military, still dominated by the culture and religion of 
the predominantly Muslim north, to create an identity for itself that is devoid of 
any ethnic attachment. However, in 2013, a media report quoted the former Chief 
of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika, as stating that several 
soldiers and officers had been arrested for conspiring with Boko Haram in a 
military offensive against this group in northeast Nigeria. This brief mention of 
internal ethnic divisions, an admission that no military establishment would make 
lightly, underscores the commitment of the top echelon of the military to military 
professionalism and discipline (Soriwei). This is turn, appears to require the 
forging of an independent military identity, the ‘quasi-ethnicity’ that we have 
observed, albeit in inchoate form, as a vital concomitant of Nigerian military 
professionalism. 
Based on the author’s observation during his field research to Nigeria in 2011, it 
appears that there seem to be three main areas that the military establishment after 
1999 has emphasised internally, all of which point to the intent to forge a separate 
military identity. The first of these involves an emphasis on individual 
achievement in higher education as a key part of the recruitment and selection of 
officers; the second, an insistence on a level of discipline during internal 
engagements; and the third, an observable degree of military professionalism, 
including all of the corporate and closed social ramifications that this implies. 
A greater emphasis on higher education in the recruitment and selection of 
officers, while insisting that the selection process maintain equal representation 
from each state, has arguably created the beginnings of this separate identity, or a 
sense of quasi-ethnicity, within the military. As earlier mentioned, the creation of 
an ethnic balance within the military in the 1960s meant that merit had to be 
sacrificed in favour of creating a semblance of national unity. It also meant that 
the educational requirements for officers (especially from the North) had to be 
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lowered to achieve this goal. Since 1999, it also appears that there have been 
fewer conflicts in the recruitment and promotion of officers, and opportunities for 
overseas training. As Ehwarieme notes, 
Opportunities for training especially overseas, which depended so much on 
whether one was an Abacha or Babangida supporter are liberalized since 1999, 
permitting many more officers without special connections to benefit 
(Ehwarieme 2011: 506).   
A serving military officer reiterated a similar view on the required level of 
educational attainment, and noted that: 
…This is [a new] millennium. The kind of officers we have now are more 
learned and exposed…We keep learning by watching what is happening in the 
international community and [also] events occurring.
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The military, along with other security agencies, has been involved in recent years 
in a number of armed conflicts across the country. While there have been several 
allegations of human rights abuses committed by security officers in their 
offensive against such groups, it appears that the military has consistently tried to 
maintain a separate identity based upon discipline and accountability, and to make 
this especially evident during such engagements. An example of this was the 
author’s interview with a serving military officer. During the course of the 
interview, the discussion focused on accountability especially when some media 
report had alleged that there were cases of accidental weapon discharges of the 
security agencies. This officer noted that: 
We are not [like] the police… for us a single round is meant to kill and it must be 
accounted for… it must be accounted for and an express order must be given to 
fire so that it is extremely difficult for them to misfire.
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Finally, and as earlier stated, since 1999 there have been significant efforts taken 
by civilian governments to increase the level of military professionalism and 
hence the corporate unity of the military. In addition to both local and overseas 
training opportunities, it seems there has been a deliberate effort by governments 
since 1999 to significantly improve the general welfare of military personnel 
without the prejudice of ethnic factors that was prevalent under military rule. As a 
serving officer noted, beginning “immediately after 1999 we have fared better in 
terms of salary [and] resources. They give us more attention now”.20 we can 
surmise that they must eliminate (to a significant degree) the implication of ethnic 
favouritism to do so. 
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Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter discussed whether multi-ethnic states such as Nigeria 
tend to have authoritarian systems. The chapter discussed this notion within the 
various studies on multi-ethnicity and conflicts in states and also within the 
concept of political ethnicity in Nigeria. It then discussed how Nigeria came into 
political existence, and how ethno-politics have dominated the political process of 
pre to post-colonial Nigeria up to contemporary times. Lastly, it examined the 
possibility of the formation of a distinct quasi-ethnic identity for the military post-
1999 after the author’s observation of the military during his field research in 
2011. 
In all of the multi-ethnic challenges that have occurred in Nigeria, especially after 
the first military intervention of 1966, the military has played a crucial and 
multifaceted role. This is, however, partly due to the long years of military 
authoritarian rule. As Jonathan Hill (2012) notes, apart from the constitutional 
roles mandated for them, the military throughout the years has launched several 
political initiatives and economic programmes, restructured the federal system, 
became a dominant factor in Nigerian politics, and created social campaigns that 
emphasised the indivisibility of Nigeria. All these initiatives appeared to be within 
the military’s primary missions, especially after the civil war, when there was a 
need for Nigeria to celebrate its cultural diversity while still being seen as a united 
country. However, it seems that some of the policies that were initiated may have 
unintentionally created opposition to the outcomes that the military initially 
sought, and this appears to have encouraged authoritarian tendencies after 1999. 
Some of these perceived failures appear in the form of abuses perpetrated by 
officers in internal security duties, failure to pacify the various ethnic and ethno-
religious groups currently waging a war on the state, and the institutionalisation of 
military provisions that appear to provide the military with undemocratic latitude 
in their operations, without any significant civilian oversight. The following 
chapters investigate the military’s missions and roles after 1999, utilising the 
author’s interviews with high ranking and retired military officers to investigate 
whether or not there is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in 
Nigeria 
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Endnotes 
1) Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria’s first and only Prime Minister (1959-1966), a 
speech delivered to the Nigerian Legislative Council in 1953. 
2) Check Appendix No. 12 for a comprehensive list of names of federal cabinet 
ministers from 1960 to 2007. 
3) A serving Brigadier General made those statements but thereafter refused to be 
interviewed. He, however, called in a personal aide to assist with the interview. 
Serving Brigadier General, Zaria (April 7, 2011). 
4) Personal interview with a retired Vice Admiral, Lagos (May 30, 2011). Check 
appendix 14 for Major Gideon Orkar coup speech. 
5) Same officer 
6) Personal interview with a retired Brigadier General, Lagos (May 27, 2011). 
7) This informal zoning formula of political power moving from North to South was not 
followed by the PDP for the election of President Goodluck Jonathan, after the 
sudden death of Umaru Yar’Adua (PDP has won the presidency since 1999). The 
current crises in the North initially started after the result of that election(Campbell 
April 25, 2011). 
8) The 1999 elections that ushered Nigeria into the Fourth Republic were marred with 
electoral irregularities partially because key Northern military elites appear to have 
ensured that Obasanjo became the civilian president. The circumstances leading to 
the death of Abiola is still a mystery even though the autopsy conducted on Abiola 
after his death stated that he died of natural causes. There are several allegations that 
he was killed by the military who felt it was not in their best interest to hand-over 
power to Abiola after the sudden death of Abacha in 1998 (Olurode and Anifowose 
2004b; Diamond et al. 1997). 
9) The 13 per cent oil derivation formula was a massive victory for the states in the 
Niger-Delta area of Nigeria after several years of agitation against the federal 
government (even though they had requested the revenue formula return to the pre-
1966 days of 50% going back to Regions). Basically, the derivation formula refers to 
the percentage of revenue that oil producing states retain from taxes on oil and other 
natural resources produced in the state (Peel 2010; Maier 2000). 
10) The Aba women’s riot of 1929 occurred when Mark Emereuwa, a census official, 
wanted to count the animals of a widow called Nwanyeruwa (which is against Igbo 
tradition as women are not taxed). This particular census was related to taxation. 
They exchanged angry words and Nwanyeruwa went on to discuss this issue with the 
women at the village square. Believing that they would also be taxed, the women 
embarked on a riot (Isichei 1976). 
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11) The names of the pre-independence constitutions in Nigeria were named after the 
British Governor-Generals who were in-charge of Nigeria at that time. The only 
exception is Lyttelton. This was named after Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for 
the Colonies (1951-1954). 
12) The minority party and main opposition in the Western Region, the NCNC split off 
and joined Akintola to form a new majority party for the Western Region, the 
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). 
13) NEPU—Northern Elements Progressive Union. The leader of this party was Mallam 
Aminu Kano. The party stood for the ‘talakawa’ meaning the poor non-elitist people 
of the North. UMBC—United Middle-Belt Congress. The leader of the party was 
Joseph Tarka. The party basically represented the Middle-Belt/minority ethnic groups 
in the Northern Region, (predominantly non-Muslims/non-Hausa-Fulani). 
14) Middle-Belt states are Adamawa, Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau, Kogi, Kwara and 
Benue. Check appendix 13 for a map of Nigeria indicating the middle-belt states. 
15) The last British officer to leave the service of the Nigerian army in 1965 was the 
General Officer Commanding (GOC), Major General Welby-Everard. 
16) Lieutenant-General Azubuike Ihejirika was appointed the Chief of Army Staff in 
2010. 
17) The alleged coup plot of 2004, according to Tell Magazine (2004), was to involve 
retired military officers who were compulsory retired by President Obasanjo in 1999. 
Also see Emmanuel Ojo (2006) and Andrew Meldrum (2004). 
18) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011). 
19) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011). 
20) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011). 
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Chapter Three 
A New Form of Military Authoritarianism in Nigeria? 
Introduction 
Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria? This chapter 
focuses upon this question within the context of an understanding of military 
behaviour in a transitional phase, from prolonged military dictatorship to a 
civilian-dominated system. Alfred Stepan’s (1988) analysis of military behaviour 
during democratic transition in Brazil appears to provide a useful conceptual 
understanding of the potential conflicts that may arise between the military as an 
institution and a civilian government during re-democratization. Stepan notes that 
the military in post-authoritarian regimes in Latin America have 
Left legacies in civil-military relations that are powerful obstacles, both 
ideologically and practically, to the difficult tasks of extending and consolidating 
democratic rule (Stepan 1988: xi,xii). 
Such powerful obstacles could undermine civilian democratic control over the 
military, and are observed in areas such as the military’s mission, defence budgets 
and its role in the intelligence services (Stepan 1988). 
 
This chapter and the next chapters will present an examination of the retention of 
military prerogatives in Nigeria, using Alfred Stepan’s terminology (Stepan 
1988). The sources of data used in this study include interviews with high 
ranking, serving and retired military officers, and important political events 
concerning security-related issues as reported in key print media (mostly key 
newspapers editorials) since 1999. 
Three hypotheses shed light on whether there is a new form of military 
authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria based, as noted above, upon retention of 
military prerogatives as explained and enumerated below. The first hypothesis is 
that the military in Nigeria has retained significant military prerogatives. The 
second is that the military has intervened in politics post-1999. Third, it is 
hypothesized that retired military officers are gaining influential political and 
economic positions as a way to secure and retain Nigerian military prerogatives in 
a civilian dominated era. This third hypothesis is distinctively African, and thus 
seeks to test Stepan’s concept of military prerogatives in a Nigerian context.  
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There have been initial concerns in Nigeria over the role top military elite have 
played in the democratic transition process and the various key political outcomes 
that have been achieved ever since (Adekanye 2005; Badmus 2005; Ntiwunka 
2012). Kayode Fayemi (1999) argues that the sizeable number of high ranking 
retired military officers who initially joined the ruling political party, the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), at the start of the Fourth Republic in 1999, and the 
alleged controversial electoral outcome that produced a retired military head of 
state as the first civilian president, appear to reveal the retention of entrenched 
military interests in the re-democratization process in Nigeria (Fayemi 1999; 
Olurode and Anifowose 2004b). These entrenched interests, it seems, initially 
centred on high ranking retired military officers’ amnesty from punishment for 
human rights violations committed during decades of military dictatorship and 
their involvements in alleged corrupt practices under military rule (Agwuncha 
1999; Djebah 1999; Fayemi 1999; Ikpe 2000). 
 
Even though there is an appearance that the military in Nigeria has dis-engaged 
itself from directly intervening in politics and formally accepted the new political 
order
1
, the essential democratic principle that guarantees effective political power 
for elected representatives and other institutions in charge of defence appears to 
be lacking after 1999 (Fayemi 2002). In turn, this may provide the military with a 
significant degree of autonomy in what the military sees as its ‘internal affairs’, 
and appears to provide the military with great decisional latitude in determining 
when and how to carry out their responsibilities in the polity (Fayemi 2002; 
Stepan 1988). The problem this seems to create in the polity is weak political 
institutions, which ultimately may pose a challenge for democratic consolidation 
in Nigeria (Croissant et al. 2010; Njoku 2001; Migdal 1988). 
   
This chapter, therefore, suggests that a new form of authoritarianism may be 
emerging in Nigeria through the persistence of military prerogatives after the 
prolonged military dictatorship. Military prerogatives, as in Chapter One, are 
defined by Alfred Stepan (1988) in a Latin American context, although one that 
appears to be highly applicable to the case of Nigeria as 
Those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution 
assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise 
effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra military 
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areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the 
state and political or civil society (Stepan 1988: 65). 
It is crucial to note that even though numerous studies on democratic transition 
and democratisation in Africa, and Nigeria in particular, have omitted Stepan’s 
concept of military prerogatives in their analysis of democratization, some studies 
were at least in part influenced by Stepan’s concept, suggesting that his analysis 
of Brazilian transition may apply to the case of Nigeria. Scholars such as Eboe 
Hutchful (1997, 2004) and Mathurin Houngnikpo (2010) for example, have 
discussed the demilitarization and democratic control of the military in African 
contexts by applying Stepan’s (1988) concepts. Hutchful (1997, 2004) and 
Houngnikpo (2010), like Stepan, argue for the need to empower civilian political 
institutions responsible for military matters by educating a corps of civilian 
specialists in military and national security strategy.  
While Stepan’s concept of military prerogatives may not fully apply to most 
African countries, there are three important features that make it directly 
applicable to Nigeria. First, after almost three decades in power, the military as an 
institution is guided by what it perceives to be the ‘true nationalist mission’ of the 
Nigerian military (Abegunrin 2003). This military-crafted nationalistic mission 
initially developed during the start of the civil war in 1967, and appears to have 
been consolidated a decade after the war ended (Oyediran 1979). The central 
theme of this mission has emphasised the indivisibility of Nigeria, and appears to 
have placed the military as the principal focus for ensuring national unity (Frank 
and Ukpere 2012; Hill 2012; Ehwarieme 2011). Second, the military in Nigeria 
appears to have constructed a unique identity for itself after re-democratization, 
one set against a background of mutually accommodating and antagonistic ethnic 
identities in the country. This unique identity seems to be evidence of the degree 
of autonomy the military has maintained over its affairs. Third, in a Nigerian 
context, military prerogatives appear to highlight the potential conflicts that may 
arise between a ‘re-professionalized’ military institution and civilians. 
The foregoing empirical observations of the Nigerian state post-1999 appear to 
indicate that the military as an institution has acquired special rights or privileges 
within the polity (Ojo 2000; Ojo 2009; Ehwarieme 2011). Such privileges appear 
to be seen in the relationship between the military and democratic institutions that 
are tasked with ensuring effective civilian control, and this underscores the 
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analytical applicability of Stepan’s concept of ‘military prerogatives’ to the case 
of Nigeria.  
Some of the problems associated with a lack of civilian accountability for the 
military are evident in the military’s domestic engagements. For example, on 16 
April 2013 in the remote village of Baga, Borno State (North-East Nigeria), a 
group of military personnel were routinely patrolling the border area for Boko 
Haram. The event on this particular day is still a matter of political and media 
debate because there are several versions of what really happened. One version is 
that soldiers killed as many as 200 civilians and burnt several houses in retaliation 
for a suspected Boko Haram killing of one of their own in Baga (Nossiter 2013; 
Adepegba 2013). In another version, a preliminary report presented by the 
military high command and the National Emergency Management Agency to the 
president, only 36 persons died during the event. In addition, the report indicated 
that 30 terror suspects died in the town, while six corpses were recovered in 
neighbouring Lake Chad. Overall, the preliminary report not only contradicted 
various media accounts of this story, especially in regard to the level of civilian 
casualties, it also added that the number of houses razed in the confrontation was 
grossly exaggerated by the media (Adepegba and Adetayo 2013). The incident of 
April 16 is not a one-off case. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, there have 
been numerous media reports of soldiers involved in internal engagements that 
have led to the killing of civilians in retaliation for the deaths of soldiers. This has 
apparently occurred with impunity (Adepegba 2013; Agency Reporter 2012; 
Amnesty International 2012; Yusuf 2007).  
The Nigerian military has been significantly involved in internal security duties, 
including crime control, disaster management, and the guarding of installations, 
apparently with minimal civilian oversight (Fayemi 2003). These roles have 
moved this institution from an older form of military professionalism, which is 
characterized by a restriction in the roles, mission and function, especially in 
terms of internal security duties, to that of a new form of military professionalism, 
in which internal security duties are largely unrestricted. The major difference 
between the two is that the former is thought to render the military politically 
neutral, and to contribute to civilian control, while the latter appears to politicize 
the military and contribute to an expansion of its role (Punch Editorial 2013; 
Stepan 1988; Cawthra and Luckham 2003). This new professionalism, then, 
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involves the inclusion of the military in what should be the functions of other 
institutions responsible for law and order. This dynamic appears to have endowed 
the military with a dominant political position (Ojo 2000; Ojo 2006; Ehwarieme 
2011). The new professionalism discussed at some length in Stepan’s works 
(1971, 1988) assigns the military the duty of keeping the nation together, rather 
than relying upon the traditional civilian security apparatus to do so (Ehwarieme 
2011; Fayemi c.2012). The effects of this role expansion appear to be contributing 
to institutionalized authoritarian tendencies of the Nigerian state (Harris 2004; 
Hill 2012), as the following study seek to demonstrate. 
Alfred Stepan (1988: 15), writing at the end of a period of authoritarianism in 
Latin America, explicitly contrasted the old and new professionalism of the 
military within the state sphere, and the likely political outcomes of such role 
expansion. This analysis of Latin American military professionalism is transposed 
conceptually to apply to the Nigerian case in Table 3.1 below: 
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Table 3.1: Old and New Military Professionalism in Nigeria 
 Old New Current in Nigeria (2013) 
Function of 
military 
External 
security 
Internal 
security 
For most part of the Fourth 
Republic, the military has 
been engaged in internal 
security duties (through the 
Joint Task Force ‘JTF’) 
basically, the role entails 
limiting the rise of ethno-
religious militant groups. 
Civilian attitudes 
toward 
government 
Civilian accept 
legitimacy of 
government 
Segments of 
society 
challenge 
government 
Elections to all political 
positions are usually highly 
contested (especially at the 
federal level). 
Segments of society challenge 
the legitimacy of the 
government(s) 
Military skills 
required 
Highly 
specialized 
skills 
incompatible 
with political 
skills 
Highly 
interrelated 
political and 
military skills 
Military and political skills 
perceived as interrelated 
Scope of military 
professionalism 
Restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted 
Impact of 
professional 
socialization 
Renders the 
military 
politically 
neutral 
Politicizes the 
military 
Not politically neutral 
Impact on civil-
military relations 
Contributes to 
an apolitical 
military and 
civilian control 
Contributes to 
military 
political 
managerialism 
and role 
expansion 
Increasing expansion of role of 
military 
Sources: (Stepan 1988: 15; Ehwarieme 2011; Ojo 2009). 
Does it matter whether the military has retained significant prerogatives, 
especially when it comes to internal security duties for the military? It would 
appear to, even though some contemporary Western scholars, while analysing the 
current state of civil-military relations and the global security environment, have 
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posited a setting in which there should be a blurring of lines between the military 
and police in external and, especially, internal security duties (Edmunds 2006; 
Bronson 2002; Boot 2005; Andreas and Price 2001; Weiss 2011). Tomas Weiss 
(2011) argues that the world post-9/11 is increasingly unsafe due to the rise of 
terrorist groups, and it is therefore important that the military adapt to this 
changing environment so that “soldier[s]…coordinate and cooperate with police 
units and with civilians, sometimes even substitute for them” (Weiss 2011: 398). 
It might be argued that for Nigeria there is nothing wrong with the recurring 
involvement of the military in internal security duties, considering the rise of 
ethno-religious militant groups. There are, however, problems associated with this 
line of debate. It does not take into account contextual differences between 
countries that have civilian control and oversight over their military institutions, 
and those that do not. Also, it does not take into account the roles that ethno-
religious sentiments might play within military institutions in sub-Saharan African 
countries (Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Luckham 1998). Countries that do not 
have effective civilian oversight of the military might well tend to have 
authoritarian tendencies, it can be argued, because the military institution can 
operate in these circumstances with virtual impunity (De Waal and Mohammed 
2014). In the case of Nigeria, in addition to ineffective civilian oversight 
functions, the role that modified ethno-religious sentiments play within the 
military cannot be over emphasised (Luckham 1975; Mustapha 2006; Anugwom 
2001). In view of this, a direct application of Thomas Weiss’s (2011) thesis to 
Nigeria does not represent a suitable path to achieving stable civil-military 
relations. 
Causal explanations of the retention of prerogatives by the Nigerian military after 
1999 include the view that, after repeated interventions in politics between 1966 
and 1999, the military has been able to maintain and even increase its sphere of 
influence in the political arena; it is not significant in this regard that the military 
at the end of the transition to civil-rule was assured by the incoming elected 
government that certain ‘rights’, which amounted to prerogatives, would not be 
challenged (Ojo 2004; Abiodun 2000; Adekanye 2005; Fayemi c.2012).  
Ruth First (1970) had observed 43 years earlier that after an initial military 
intervention in sub-Saharan African countries, it was likely that a military would 
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move out of the barracks and into the government in successive phases. This was, 
she argued, primarily because of the continuing inability, well-documented after 
First’s 1970 work, of civilian governments in Africa to deal decisively with social 
and economic conflicts. The military, it was argued, steps in partly to mediate, 
partly to guard its own interests, and partly to reinforce a system that it supports 
and judges to be in its own interests. National military budgets are also important 
in this regard. Such actions are essentially the military prerogatives that Stepan 
described in a Brazilian context in 1988. 
Military prerogatives are said by Stepan to be characterised by: 
The constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military; 
The military’s special relationship with the chief executive; 
The retention of the military as the institution in-charge for the coordination of 
the defence sector; 
The guarantee of places in the civilian cabinet for active-duty military officers; 
A weak or non-existent role of the legislature in the oversight of the military; 
The special roles of senior career civil servants or political appointees in 
designing and implementing defence and national security policy; 
The active participation of the military in intelligence agencies; 
The operational command of senior active-duty military officers over the police; 
The exclusive role of the military in its internal promotions; 
The appointment of military officers to head state enterprises; and 
The role of the military court’s jurisdiction outside of the narrow internal 
offences against military discipline (Stepan 1988: 94-97). 
Ideally, in a broad context that includes Latin America as well as Africa, every 
prerogative retained by the military after its formal hand-over of power to 
civilians can, and should, be contested by the new civilian government. According 
to Stepan, there are two possible approaches for the civilians to adapt as regards to 
prerogatives. In the first, civilians can significantly reduce the level of 
prerogatives in a civilian era without much contestation from the military. It is 
assumed under this first possible outcome that there is a general consensus 
between the civilians and military for genuine civilian oversight of the military. 
The second approach assumes that the retention of high levels of military 
prerogatives might not be challenged by the civilian political elite, likely because 
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there has been no articulated or agreed upon policy alternative tabled by the 
civilian political elite. The situation may cause the civilian political elites to 
accommodate the military prerogatives, which may or may not be the 
consequence of military intervention (Stepan 1988: 98; Harris 2004). 
Hypothesis one: The military in Nigeria has retained significant military 
prerogatives.
2
 
The military in Nigeria, it is hypothesized, has retained significant prerogatives 
that are tied to authoritarian tendencies. Based on the application of Stepan’s 
central thesis of understanding military behaviour in post-authoritarian Latin 
America, these prerogatives can be observed in the institutional roles of the 
military in a civilian dominated era. 
Quest for a Military Mission 
In ensuring stable civil-military relations after military authoritarian rule, it is 
crucial for the political elite in Nigeria to articulate the military’s mission (Fayemi 
2002; Harris 2004). Ineffective articulation of roles of the military (excluding its 
primary role as the defender against external aggression), is said to pose a risk to 
the Nigerian state, especially when viewed from a historical perspective. The 
historical use and misuse of the military by the political elite is blamed for the 
polarization of the military along ethnic lines, and appears to be part of the reason 
why the military has intervened in politics (Anugwom 2001; Enloe 1980; Osaghae 
2003; Ademoyega 1981). 
The laws that govern the operational use of the military are basically derived from 
the 1999 Constitution, and the Armed Forces Act (Cap. A20), Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria (2004). Section 217(2) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria 
explicitly spells out the roles and functions of the military. It also provides a 
framework for the civilian use of the military, one that requires that the president 
must seek and gain approval from the National Assembly for all military 
engagements (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). However, 
there is little evidence that military missions have been subject to the approval of 
the National Assembly after 1999. The president apparently has unlimited powers 
to engage the military in internal and external duties, and has not been required to 
86 
 
seek the approval of the National Assembly (Punch Editorial 2013; Agbese 2004; 
Agbese and Udogu 2005).   
During the execution of the internal duties of the military, there appears to be 
great latitude in determining when and how to carry out missions, and these seem 
to have very limited civilian oversight. Military engagement in this sense appears 
to pose a challenge to the Nigerian state, given the nature of alleged authoritarian 
practices, e.g., alleged indiscriminate killings of civilians during military 
operations (Nossiter 2013; Smith-Spark 2012; Human Rights Watch 2012; 
Adepegba 2013). In addition, even though the Nigerian military have been heavily 
engaged in external missions since independence, the 1999 Constitution, like all 
other post-independence constitutions, does not explicitly specify peacekeeping 
operations as a constitutional role (Fayemi 2003; Adeleke 1995). In sum, it is 
perceived that potentially questionable expansions of the military’s mission have 
maintained the military’s political role within the state, and this seems to have 
authoritarian consequences. 
Role of the National Assembly 
There is little if any legislative tradition of civilian oversight of the Nigerian 
military (Houngnikpo 2010; Fashagba 2009).  Ideally, it is expected that most 
major policy issues affecting military budgets, force structure and new weapons 
initiatives should be closely monitored by the National Assembly. Also, top 
civilian appointees in charge of the military, such as the Minister of Defence, 
should routinely appear before legislative committees to defend and explain 
military policy initiatives and other issues such as alleged human rights violations 
committed by the military during internal engagements. 
The 1999 Constitution empowers the National Assembly with oversight functions 
as follows: 
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the National Assembly has budgetary control in allocation through the ministry 
of defence; 
the president cannot unilaterally engage the military in any internal or external 
duties without formal approval from the National Assembly; 
the National Assembly ensures that the composition of the officer corps reflects 
the federal character of the country; and 
the National Assembly has the power to make laws as regards the appointment, 
promotion and disciplinary control of the military (Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
For budgetary allocations to the Ministry of Defence, there are four phases 
according to the law: formulation, approval, implementation, and auditing and 
reporting (Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006; Omitoogun 2003). It is expected that 
during each process, the civilian Minister of Defence, the permanent secretary in 
the defence ministry and other civilian experts within the ministry will be 
significantly involved. Also, committees in charge of defence within the National 
Assembly are expected to scrutinize defence expenditures when the budget is 
submitted as a draft to them. After that, the Minister of Defence is invited to a 
public hearing of the committee to explain and clarify any issues regarding the 
anticipated or planned expenditure. The committee in charge of defence then 
evaluates the budget, and, it is subsequently debated in the National Assembly 
(House of Representatives and Senate) before being approved. 
Despite the appearance of being a rigorous process, it appears that the approval of 
defence expenditures in Nigeria is largely a ‘rubber stamping’ of the draft 
submitted to the National Assembly, with minor adjustments (Abiodun 2000; 
Fayemi 2003). This probably stems from a lack of civilian expertise in military 
matters in the National Assembly, which in turn arises from a general lack of 
understanding among civilians of what Nigeria’s defence priorities are, and how 
such priorities should be adequately funded (Fashagba 2009).  
Another issue that appears to hinder legislative oversight of the military budget is 
extra-budgetary spending, including funds allocated to the military directly by the 
presidency. Under military authoritarian rule, this method was effectively used to 
undermine the functions of the civilian Ministry of Defence (MOD). Additionally, 
peacekeeping allocations under the military were never channelled through the 
MOD, and were inadequately accounted for. Under present civilian rule, this 
method of allocation appears not to have changed. Funds are allocated to the 
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military under ‘security votes’ on the budget, and allocations for peacekeeping 
duties continue to come from funds outside of the MOD (Omitoogun and Oduntan 
2006; Gberie 2003; Saliu 2000; Egbo et al. 2012) 
Coordination of the Defence Sector 
The civilian political elite in charge of the defence sector in Nigeria have not been 
able to articulate policies that would assure the presence of civilian expertise in 
decisions regarding military matters (Agbese and Udogu 2005; Agbese 2004; 
Kieh and Agbese 2004). It is expected that the core of military expertise and the 
coordination of the defence sector would involve extensive participation by 
professional civil servants, politicians and civilian political appointees, all with 
expertise in military matters. At present, it appears that the Chief of the Defence 
Staff is empowered to have supervisory oversight of the three service chiefs 
(Army, Navy and Air force), even though each individual service chief, to a 
significant extent, has considerable operational and technical autonomy (Agbese 
2004; Hutchful 1997, 2004). 
Similarly, it is expected that a significant level of civilian expertise in the 
coordination of the defence sector will bring security structures under democratic 
control. The Department for International Development (DFID) in the United 
Kingdom lists principles which countries with decades of military interventions 
might adopt as a means of assuring democratic control. These can be summarized 
as follows: 
Security sector organizations, particularly in the security forces, are accountable 
both to elected civil authorities and to civil society; 
Security sector organizations operate in accordance with the international law 
and domestic constitutional law; 
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Information about security sector planning and budgeting are widely available, 
both within government and to the public, and a comprehensive and disciplined 
approach to the management of defence resources is adopted; 
Civil-military relations are based on a well-articulated hierarchy of authority 
between civil authorities and the defence forces, and a relationship with civil 
society that is based on the respect for human rights; 
Civil authorities have the capacity to exercise political control over the 
operations and expenditure of the security forces and civil society has the 
capacity to monitor the security forces and provide constructive input to the 
political debate; 
An environment exists in which civil society can be consulted on a regular basis 
on security policies, resource allocation, and other relevant issues; 
Security-force personnel are adequately trained to discharge their duties in a 
professional manner consistent with the requirements of democratic societies; 
and 
Fostering an environment supportive of regional and sub-regional peace and 
security has a high priority for policy makers (DFID 2000; Hutchful 2004: 122).  
At present, none of these security principles specified by the DFID appear to have 
been implemented. 
Role in Intelligence 
By law, Nigeria has three main intelligence agencies: State Security Services 
(SSS), Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA) and Defence Intelligence Agency 
(DIA). In addition, there is the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), tasked 
under military rule with both military and domestic intelligence (Mwalimu 2009). 
The primary function of the (SSS) is domestic intelligence gathering. It is headed 
by a civilian. Similarly, the (NIA) is responsible for overseas intelligence and is 
also headed by a civilian. Lastly, the (DIA) is responsible for intra-military 
intelligence and is headed by an active-duty military officer (Ashaolu 2012; 
Osamgbi 2006; Taiwo 2009). 
Historically, the main intelligence gathering in Nigeria was performed by the 
Special Branch of the Nigerian Police Force, and was modelled after the 
metropolitan arrangement in the United Kingdom (Ashaolu 2012). However, 
because this unit was blamed for its failure to uncover the failed coup attempt of 
1976, which eventually led to the assassination of the then Head-of-State, General 
Murtala Mohammed, and the entire intelligence unit was re-organized. As a result, 
in 1976 an independent agency outside of the Nigerian police was created, the 
Nigerian Security Organization (NSO) (Siollun 2009; Fayemi 2002). Its mandate 
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involved both external and internal intelligence and it was initially headed by an 
active-duty military officer. However, this position devolved to a civilian when 
the country transitioned from military authoritarian rule to civilian rule in 1979. 
During the Second Republic (1979-1983), three problems arose within the NSO 
that the political elite found difficult to address. First a conflict over the way in 
which the NSO was created in 1976 developed. Second, the initial composition of 
this organization involved the merging of the External Affairs Ministry’s 
‘research department’ with the military regime to form part of the NSO in 1976. 
Third, there was competition between the Directorate of Military Intelligence 
(DMI) and the NSO for dominance in intelligence gathering, which persisted 
throughout the Second Republic and into the regime of General Buhari (1983-
1985). By 1986, the regime of General Babangida (1985-1993) tried to address 
these concerns by creating the current intelligence framework. In 1988, the regime 
created the post of a coordinator for national security, National Security Adviser 
(NSA) for the three intelligence agencies. However, the DMI still appeared to be 
the dominant intelligence agency (Fayemi 2002; Ashaolu 2012; Hutchful 2004). 
The regime of General Abacha (1993-1998), mindful of the activities that these 
intelligence agencies (especially the DMI) had played in previous military 
regimes, sought to create an alternative para-military agency as a means of 
limiting the influence of the other intelligence agencies, and in order to 
consolidate his political power. Under Abacha, there were agencies such as the 
Special Bodyguard Services (SBS), created for the personal protection of Abacha, 
and the Strike Force and K-Squad, whose tasks are said to have involved state 
sponsored terrorism and assassinations (Useh 1995; Anyanwu 2002). 
The Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission, otherwise known as the 
‘Oputa Panel’, after the chair of the commission, Justice Chukwudifa Oputa, was 
set-up by President Obasanjo in 2000 to investigate cases of gross violations of 
human rights after 1966 and up to 1999 (Yusuf 2007). Part of what the 
commission discovered, from evidence gathered through research and petitions, 
involved the extent of the activities of the DMI as a gross violator of human rights 
during military rule (Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002b). 
The human rights commission concluded, based on evidence, that the DMI under 
military rule had become an agency where both the military, and other men and 
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women of influence outside of the military, sent those with whom they had a 
grievance, to be detained and often tortured. The commission, therefore, 
recommended in their final report that there should be an overhaul of the DMI, 
with its powers and functions placed under civilian rule. A key recommendation 
of the human rights commission called for the limitation of the activities of the 
DMI to military intelligence gathering (Yusuf 2007; Human Rights Violations 
Investigation Commission 2002a).
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In sum, it appears post-1999 that neither the recommendations of the human rights 
commission for the overhaul of the DMI, nor for the limiting its powers and 
functions to strictly military intelligence, were actioned. This lack of re-
organization of the DMI can be explained by the on-going ethno-religious 
tensions and conflicts occurring in various parts of the country. The military 
apparently feels the need to rely on the DMI for information. In addition, the 
inter-agency intelligence rivalry, which first occurred under military rule, has not 
diminished significantly, and affects the four intelligence agencies. Accordingly, 
the main intelligence agencies in Nigeria have remained highly independent, and 
tolerate no significant civilian oversight (Aghedo and Osumah 2012; Fayemi 
2002; Ashaolu 2012).   
As is commonly seen in transitions from military rule to civil-rule, the Nigerian 
military ruled for several years by military decree, and subsequently felt the need 
to repeal some of the decrees that were not compatible with the incoming 1999 
civilian constitution and existing laws. On the eve of the hand-over to the newly 
democratically elected civilian government, the military regime of General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1999) repealed some of the decrees that it had 
sought to guarantee major military prerogatives, and were thought to be 
incompatible with the 1999 Constitution. Other decrees left behind by the regime 
were considered to be Acts (laws) after the hand-over. Four key military decrees 
ceased to be in effect after May 29, 1999: Decree 2; Decree 29; Decree 5; and 
Decree 1. 
Decree 2, State Security (Detention of Persons). This decree was enacted during 
the regime of General Buhari in 1984. The decree gave the now defunct (NSO) 
powers to arrest and detain indefinitely without trial any individual or group that 
was considered a security risk to the regime (Diamond 1985; Adebanwi 2011). 
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Decree 29, Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree of 1993. This decree, 
enacted under the regime of General Babangida, gave the regime the right to seize 
any publication within the country that the regime deemed likely to “disturb the 
peace and public order of Nigeria” (Uko 2004: 196). Journalists who wrote 
articles that were considered offensive to the regime, or that might cause popular 
protests, were liable to the regime’s ‘treasonable felony’ charge. The punishment 
for such treasonable offences ranged from stiff prison sentences to death. 
Decree 35, Offensive Publications (Proscription). This decree, enacted under the 
regime of Babangida, empowered the regime to shut down or suspend the 
operations of media organizations that published articles that the regime deemed 
to be damaging or harmful to the Nigerian state. General Babangida’s successor, 
General Abacha, effectively used this decree in 1995 to convict journalists Kunle 
Ajibade, Chris Anyanwu, George Mba and Ben Charles Obi as “accessories after 
the fact to treason, for reporting on an alleged coup plot”. (Uko 2004: 195-196; 
Anyanwu 2002; Useh 1995). 
Decree 1, Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunals). This decree 
was initially enacted after the failed coup attempt by Lieutenant Colonel Buka 
Dimka in 1976 that killed General Murtala Mohammed, then Head-of-State. The 
Special Military Tribunal’s (composed of military officers) first assignment was 
to try all the officers who took part in the failed coup plot (Siollun 2009: 206; 
Panter-Brick 1978). Successive military rulers likewise used the special military 
tribunal to try abortive coup attempts, such as Major General Mamman Vasta’s 
(and other officers’) alleged coup plot against General Babangida in 1986 as well 
as that of Major Gideon Orkar (and other officers) against this same regime in 
1990 (Babarinsa et al. 1990). General Abacha, however, expanded the provisions 
of this decree and used this tribunal to try serving military officers and civilians. 
Notable civilians who were arraigned under the military tribunal included retired 
military officers involved in the alleged coup plot—Generals Olusegun Obasanjo 
and Musa Yar’Adua. Environmental activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other 
Ogoni leaders were executed by hanging after their murder cases were heard by a 
military tribunal (Mumuni 1995).  
It is important to note that of all the decrees repealed by the military before their 
handover of power to civilians in 1999, only four were directly related to the 
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military. These included: decree 13 of 1984 (the Federal Military Government 
Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers), which dealt with the method of 
operation and workings of the regime, is the free exercise of unlimited powers of 
policy articulation, direction and implementation. The other decrees have been 
discussed above. In addition, decree 63 of 1993—the National Guard Decree, was 
repealed. The National Guard was to be a parallel, quasi-military body that 
General Ibrahim Babangida (Head of State 1985-1993) established during his 
regime, even though its mission was never fulfilled. It was meant to guard 
Babangida and his closest aides (Babarinsa et al. 1990: 10-17; Diamond et al. 
1997).
4
 
Does it matter that only four decrees directly related to the military were repealed, 
and that the remainder were automatically considered Acts by the new 
constitution? Considering that virtually all post-1966 constitutional debates and 
conferences unsuccessfully sought to include constitutional provisions that would 
have made military intervention illegal, and allowed for the trial of military 
officers who plotted military take-overs (Panter-Brick 1978; Oyediran 1979; Ojo 
2000; Olurode and Anifowose 2004a; Fayemi 1999), it appears that this was 
significant. In the past decade there have been calls for security sector reform in 
view of increasing insecurity in Northern Nigeria and the Niger-Delta area 
(Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Hill 2012; Abiodun 2000; Ikelegbe 2006; Harris 
2004). The current institutional arrangement of military force in internal 
engagements appears to have failed to subdue the various ethnic and religious 
militia groups that are waging war on the Nigerian state. A closer examination of 
the current constitution will assess the current level of military prerogatives in this 
regard.  
Contrary to previous military transition programmes, the 1999 Constitution (as 
amended, 2011), which is the current law of the country, was not debated before it 
was promulgated in 1999. Rather, General Abubakar’s regime created a 
Constitutional Debate Coordinating Committee (CDCC), whose task it was to 
articulate public comments made on the 1995 draft constitution promulgated by 
Abubakar’s predecessor in office, Genera Abacha.5 Moreover, the regime gave the 
CDCC only two months to deliberate on this task, without public hearings with 
civil society, the political elite or academia, as had been the practice of other 
military regimes (Oyediran 1979; Ojo 2004; Olurode and Anifowose 2004a; 
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Fayemi 1999). After two months, the members of the committee discovered that 
the ruling military elite had established its own agenda. Several key 
recommendations made by the CDCC were ignored. The military’s ruling elite 
ensured that any constitutional provisions that might haunt them after their exit 
from political power were absent from the 1999 Constitution (Fayemi 2003: 66). 
It was only immediately after the swearing-in ceremony of the new civilian 
president in 1999 that media reports began describing the constitution as one that 
the military had ‘super-imposed’. Soon there were concerns expressed that the 
constitution did not meet the general expectations of Nigeria. In regard to the 
military and other security agencies, critics cited Section 315(5) c of the 1999 
Constitution,
6
 which states that the National Security Agencies Act (a body of 
principles, policies and procedures on the operation of the security agencies) is 
entrenched, and can only be repealed with the support of two-thirds of the 
National Assembly at both the state and federal level. Critics of this provision 
argue that the Act came into being via military decree; to argue that it still had 
legitimacy under civilian rule after 1999, they added, called into question the 
democratization process in Nigeria (Fayemi 2003; Ojo 2000; Ojo 2004). It was 
also said to expose Nigeria to the dictates of the security agencies, which 
continued to operate without effective civilian oversight. Fayemi (2003: 70) notes 
that this provision contradicts Section 1(2) of the 1999 Constitution, which states 
that: 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or 
group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part thereof, 
except in accordance with the provisions of this constitution (Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
Fayemi (2003) argues that the National Security Agencies Act can be interpreted 
as overriding Section1(2) of the constitution. An interpretation is thus possible 
that any person or group that successfully removes a constitutional government in 
accordance with the provisions of the National Security Agencies Act is acting in 
a constitutional, or at least a legal, manner (Fayemi 2003: 70). 
Also evident is that the constitutional composition of statutory members in a 
security-related organ in the Federal Executive Bodies (established by Section 
153), the bureaucratic organ of the office of the presidency. The National Security 
Council is a statutory federal executive body whose mandate is to advise the 
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president on matters relating to public security, including matters relating to any 
organization or agency established by law for ensuring public law and order in the 
country. Even though the 1999 Constitution does specify active-duty military 
officers as military ministers in the civilian cabinet, it constitutionally empowers 
the Chief of Defence Staff to be a member of the National Security Council 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
In sum, the constitutional sections highlighted above have provided the military 
with the means of searching for new missions within the country, especially 
within the context of the highly unstable political environment in which Nigeria is 
currently challenged (Stepan 2009: 87; Hill 2012; Smith-Spark 2012).  As one of 
the serving military officers interviewed in the course of this research boasted, in 
other parts of the world, civil society, or ‘the people’, was perceived to be the 
custodians of democracy. As far as Africa,  and especially Nigeria (as an aspiring 
democracy) is concerned, the military is the primary custodian of democracy.
7
 
This is an important point of comparison with Stepan’s analysis of Brazil, a 
country that was at least temporarily in a similar position after the promulgation 
of its 1988 Constitution (Stepan 1988). In this model, it is the military that is 
mandated to keep the nation together, not the civilians. One interviewee noted that 
the Nigerian military retained the capacity to topple the civilian government if 
they so desired, but had refrained voluntarily from such tactics during the last 
decade.
8
 Ostensibly, he based his view on the constitutional roles of the military, 
and the various internal military engagements after 1999 that had been 
implemented, it should be added, without significant civilian oversight. 
Interviewees Responses to Hypothesis One  
Most of the high-ranking, serving and retired military officers interviewed during 
the course of this research asserted that the military did not retain any prerogatives 
for itself after 1999. Rather, perceived prerogatives, especially those that related 
to the military’s constitutional role, were described by the interviewees as merely 
vehicles to minimise operational conflicts, or to allow for greater accountability in 
security issues in a society where virtually all things are politicised. Other serving 
military officers interviewed insisted that such provisions were necessitated by the 
profound ethnic rivalries present within Nigeria. 
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One serving officer explained that the constitutional provisions were added so that 
no ethnic group in the country could hold the country to ransom. The military 
leadership that ruled the country after the civil-war of 1967-1970 ensured that 
these security provisions (Section 315(5) c, National Security Council and Section 
217(2) c) were included as a way to ensure that ethnic disharmony would not 
recur.
9
 This officer argued that ethnic crises of the proportions witnessed in 
Nigeria pre-1966 had the potential to cause the disintegration of the country, were 
they to recur.
10
 
Other officers interviewed were of the opinion that these constitutional provisions 
were warranted to secure effective unity of command. They see Nigeria as 
significantly different from other countries, requiring the ability to frame a 
constitution and security establishments to meet its own peculiar challenges, 
particularly in matters of national security.
11
 these officers noted that such 
provisions were not explicitly written in the first two constitutions (1960, 1963) 
because:  
a) The army was not fully under Nigerian command until 1966, when the 
last high-ranking British officer, who was at that time Nigeria’s highest 
ranking military officer, handed over the position to a Nigerian 
commander; and 
b) Nigeria was not a fully independent country until 1963 because the last 
judicial appeal from 1960 to 1963 was directed to the Privy Council in 
London. Therefore, the country’s experience over-time (especially during 
the civil-war of 1967-1970) necessitated the inclusion of these provisions 
in later military-crafted constitutions.
12
 
A retired military officer who was interviewed in this study, however, categorized 
these constitutional provisions into three broad terms: first, the security of the 
nation; second, the territorial defence of the nation, and the internal security of the 
nation; and third, the role of Nigeria as a lead nation in regional peacekeeping 
operations, as agreed by successive governments after independence in 1960. 
The retired officer further stated that:  
…the territorial defence of the nation… is the major duty of the military [that is] 
to support the civil authority in maintaining a peaceful government that provides 
the total security of both the human, economic and total well-being of the nation. 
The internal security is a matter of providing assistance to the police [which is] 
supposed to be in charge of internal security. But in a developing nation where 
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you have things at times beyond police handling, the military is called in most of 
the time to assist [the police] so that the nation is secured. In that [sense], the 
recent happenings in Nigeria, if you recall to mind during the last [presidential] 
election of [2011], although it is the duty of the police to secure and ensure that 
things went peacefully… because of the nature of the politics in Nigeria, which is 
an emerging democracy, the military still have a role to play not directly as the 
police, but as a show of force… not that they are to arrest or intimidate anybody, 
it’s just… psychological warfare to keep miscreants at bay. The third major role 
is [that of] peacekeeping [which] is…consonant with the charter that [the] 
government entered with the United Nations.
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Another serving military officer commenting on these constitutional provisions, 
moreover, stated that:  
Looking at it holistically, by retaining some of these prerogatives as you rightly 
enumerated in some of the [constitutional] sections, if you recall, the military has 
been in power for quite some time and mostly then it governs with or uses 
decrees before they hand over power. [We] governed using decrees that the few 
members of the Supreme Military Council or Provincial Ruling Council [would] 
sit and come up with. Although, before they came up with some of these 
decrees… they still had [civilian] professionals because the military did not rule 
entirely in itself… you could say, for example, in a state you had just one 
military governor, his ADC and military assistant[s]. Who made the other 
[cabinet] composition of that state? The commissioners [and] other appointees? 
They are the civilians. But you would find out that some of this [things that 
where constitutionally retained]… one says to aid civil authority apart from 
defending the territorial integrity, which is our major function for Nigeria as a 
nation both by air, land and sea. We still have another role… who else when all 
political apparatus has been destroyed or fallen, who else can they [civilians] 
hand over the reins of power and who [is] going to ensure continuation of 
governance? It actually falls back to the military. [So that is why the military in 
Nigeria] had to retain those [constitutional provisions]. The key word [here] is 
security.14 
Virtually all of my interviewees acknowledged that the constitutional sections on 
security, and even in some respect the entire Nigerian Constitution, were heavily 
flawed in several ways. A serving officer gave an example of how the present 
Constitution was flawed when it comes to the security agencies by citing an 
incident that occurred during the 2011 general elections. According to him, the 
National Security Adviser and the Inspector-General of Police made sensitive 
pronouncements to the press with regards the 2011 general elections. Such 
statements should not have been tolerated because it is expected that individuals 
occupying such positions should be politically neutral and accountable to 
whichever political party wins election.
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Lastly, none of the respondents interviewed seemed to have a coherent 
interpretation of the military’s constitutional roles, except for Section 217(2) A 
and B,
16
 that is, the constitutional provisions that required the military to aid civil 
authority and to supress insurrection. This was diversely interpreted by my 
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interviewees, particularly with respect to the qualifying clause that states that such 
aid is subject to approval from the National Assembly. A serving military officer 
opined that even though the federal and state governments had statutory security 
councils, the only difference between these two tiers of government is 
bureaucratic in nature. He noted that before the military can be deployed in any 
state of the federation, there must be a written order from the Commissioner of 
Police of that state declaring that the police force of the state is no longer capable 
of maintaining law and order. This order must be communicated to the 
Commandant or General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the key army unit of that 
state. From there, the order must be communicated to the state executive 
governor, who subsequently communicates to the President, who then either 
approves or declines the request without necessarily seeking permission from the 
National Assembly.
17  
Conclusion, Hypothesis One 
There have been significant role expansions of the military post-1999 in Nigeria. 
By my estimate, the military has maintained four out of the eleven military 
prerogatives similar to those enumerated by Stepan in a Latin American context. 
These are: its constitutional mission, the defence sector, its role in intelligence, 
and restricted legislative oversight.  Has the retention of these prerogatives 
produced a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria? In some respects it 
may have done so in that the constitution provides the military with the ability to 
search for new missions and roles in Nigeria without effective civilian oversight. 
Also, it does not allow for adequate funding and training of weaker security 
institutions, such as the police, whose primary role is currently being shared with 
and occasionally dominated by the military. The annual security budgetary 
allocation is also important in this regard (Omitoogun 2003; Omitoogun and 
Oduntan 2006).  
Hypothesis Two: The military has intervened in politics post-1999. 
Do the Nigerian media regard military involvement in the polity post-1999 as 
constituting ‘intervention’ of one form or another, and thus a new form of military 
authoritarianism in Nigeria? In the course of analysis, the previous hypothesis 
focused upon the constitutional role of the military post-1999; the analysis 
concluded with the possibility that the military in Nigeria, as in some Latin 
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American countries, has moved from an old form of military professionalism to a 
new form of professionalism (Stepan 1988; Cawthra and Luckham 2003) as 
shown in Table 3.1. 
The second hypothesis explores this new form of military professionalism in 
Nigeria, testing whether it regards the military as having significant latitude in 
decisions regarding internal security. It explores whether the media regards the 
military as engaged in a new form of authoritarianism. The primary research data 
in this section are the media reports, and personal interviews. 
Since 1999, the media reports on the military’s involvements in the polity can be 
categorized under three broad headings: 
 Military involvement in ethnic militia and ethno-religious conflicts; 
 Military responses to maritime challenges; and, 
 Military aid in disasters (Obe 2012; Anaba 2010; Guardian Newspaper 
2000; The New Nigerian Editorial 2001).  
 
Media Reports and Commentaries on Military Involvement in Ethnic Militia 
and Ethno-Religious Conflicts  
Since 1999, the military has consistently intervened in ethnic militia and ethno-
religious conflicts. The first notable case for the new civilian administration 
occurred in July, 1999, during the Oro cultists’ festival in Sagamu, Ogun State. A 
Hausa woman was accused of violating the cultural custom of the Oro cultists by 
leaving her house. By Oro tradition, women are supposed to be at home. This act 
was said to contravene the cultural traditions of that time of the year (the Oro 
festival) in the town of Sagamu, a predominantly Yoruba town in Southwest 
Nigeria. The local reaction led to altercations, and resulted in Yoruba and Hausa 
casualties, including deaths. Several days after this incident, reprisal attacks on 
Yoruba were carried out in Kano city, a predominantly Hausa-Fulani city in 
Northern Nigeria (Post Express 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Tempo 1999). 
The 2001 attacks on New York City and the US Pentagon also had consequences 
in Nigeria, especially after October, 2001, when the United States launched an 
offensive against the Taliban government in Afghanistan. There were riots in 
Kano to protest the United States’ action, especially after President Olusegun 
Obasanjo (1999-2007), a southern Nigerian Christian, announced that the 
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Nigerian government supported the United States military offensive in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Several southerners in Kano were killed, and their properties, places 
of worship and businesses were destroyed as reported in media (VOA 2001; Ugoh 
2001). 
Other ethno-religious conflicts that had a major presence in the Nigerian media 
reports took place in Kaduna and Enugu. These riots were caused by the 
introduction of the Islamic Legal Code (Sharia) by governors in the Northern 
states of Nigeria, the first being Zamfara state under Governor Ahmed Yerima. 
When Sharia was introduced in Kaduna state in February 2000, hostilities erupted 
between Muslims and Christians—most of the latter were Igbos residing in 
Kaduna City. The resultant riots in Kaduna also had effects in the South-eastern 
city of Enugu, a predominantly Igbo city, in the form of reprisal attacks on the 
Hausa communities there (Soyinka 2000a, 2000b; Yornamue 2000).    
Lastly, the military in Nigeria through the Joint Task Force (JTF), is currently 
engaging an ultra-religious, militant group, Boko Haram, all over Northern 
Nigeria. Boko Haram is described in the media as seeking to overthrow the 
present federal government of Nigeria and establish an Islamic state (Chothia 
2012; Vanguard 2012b; Vanguard Editorial 2009). 
Military Responses to Maritime Challenges: Nigeria’s major export is crude oil 
which is mostly pumped in the Niger-Delta area. This area supports several 
onshore and offshore oil installations owned by multi-national as well as local 
corporations. The enormous wealth coming from these oil reserves has never been 
well-managed and this, in turn, has resulted in media reports of conflicts between 
the local communities, the multi-national corporations operating in the area, and 
the federal government (Banjo 2000; Vanguard Editorial 2010). 
The international community first heard of the plight of the Niger-Delta people 
when the attention of the international media was directed to human rights 
violations there, committed by the regime of General Sani Abacha (1993-1998). 
The most notorious of these cases was the verdict of a Special Military Tribunal 
that condemned civil rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa and nine others to be hanged 
in 1995. Saro Wiwa had consistently accused the Royal Dutch Shell Company of 
serious environmental violations—particularly of his home town of Ogoni. The 
Abacha regime, reacting to the perception that the non-violent demonstrations by 
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these activists were slowing and even stopping vital crude oil production, carried 
out the executions despite widespread international protest (Peel 2010; Useh 
1995; Djebah 1999). 
As a result of the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and nine others, the region now is 
reported to have many expressly violent ethnic militia groups who are described 
as fighting against the oil companies and the federal government. The most 
prominent of these is the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by 
Asari Dokubo. The military, through JTF, has consistently intervened in the 
Niger-Delta area, countering the rise of piracy, robbery on the high seas, illegal oil 
bunkering, crude oil theft, pipeline vandalism, and the proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons in the various ethnic militias in the region (Hill 2012; Maier 
2000). 
Military Aid in Time of Disasters: The military has been actively engaged in 
disaster management, one key case widely reported in the media was the Sokoto 
state flood of 2010. The Nigerian Army Engineers were called upon to construct 
bailey bridges to facilitate the movement of Internally Displaced Persons into 
safety zones.
18
 Similar efforts were devoted to the Anambra state floods of 2012 
(Obe 2012). The military also organized structures to assist civil authority in 
emergency situations. For instance, ‘Operation Second Eleven’ is an aid to civil 
authority initiative aimed at complementing civil agencies in the maintenance of 
essential services such as telecommunications, petroleum product distribution and 
medical services in the event of a natural or man-made disaster (Ogah 2011; 
Ehwarieme 2011). 
Much of the media focus on the military has tended to be less on the involvement 
of the military in response to maritime challenges or aiding civil agencies in times 
of disasters. Emphasis has focused more on the military limiting violent ethnic 
militias and, recently, their involvement in the electoral process (Punch Editorial 
2012a). Why the media tends to focus more on the engagement of the military in 
ethnic conflicts perhaps has to do with the historical context of how the military 
started its involvement in internal security duties (Idang 1970; Fayemi 2002).  The 
internal security duties of the Nigerian military were initially perceived to be an 
instrument of the political party that had the majority of parliamentary seats at the 
federal level during the First Republic. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) 
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probably wanted to use the military as an instrument for ethnic and regional 
domination (Panter-Brick 1970; Mackintosh 1966). Consequently, the Hausa-
Fulani elite in the North, even though it was educationally and economically 
underdeveloped as compared to the Western and Eastern Regions, had apparently 
used their geographical size, population and superior numbers in the military 
(though not at the officer-corps level at the time) to their advantage (Siollun 2009; 
Luckham 1975). It was apparently by design that shortly before independence the 
NPC passed into law the ‘Royal Military Forces Act’. One of the main provisions 
of the Act was clause 6(2), which provided for the “operational use of the 
Nigerian Armed Forces for internal security” and for the “maintenance of public 
safety and public order” (Idang 1970: 235). This section also empowered the 
Prime Minister “to give directions direct to the commanding officer with regards 
to the use of the Army for internal security purposes in support of the civil 
authority” (Idang 1970: 235). It is interesting to note that the NPC government’s 
decision to take advantage of this clause, and to send the army to prop up the 
unpopular Akintola Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) government of 
the Western Region, was ultimately one of the causes leading to the January 1966 
military intervention (First 1970; Siollun 2009; Muffett 1982; Ademoyega 1981; 
Daily Times 1966). 
Since the start of the Fourth Republic media reports have focused on the 
continuous involvement of the military in internal security duties (Punch Editorial 
2012a, 2012b, 2013; Guardian Editorial 1999a, 2000; Vanguard Editorial 2010). 
At the moment (2014), just as during the period of military rule, the president has 
absolute power to engage the military (Punch Editorial 2012b, 2014b, 2012a).  
As for interviews, all my respondents felt that it was not necessary for the military 
to be ‘submissive’ to any other political institution in the country. Under these 
current terms of engagement, it seems unlikely that military officers will be 
prosecuted for human rights violations, especially in high stakes political contests, 
because of the military’s option to claim that it is carrying out the orders of the 
president. Consequently, presidents since 1999 are repeatedly said to have abused 
the constitutional powers of military engagement. The danger of this constant 
abuse of political power without proper legislative approval (as required by the 
constitution) is that it may tend to polarise the military, as it did before 1966 
(Panter-Brick 1970; Ademoyega 1981; Muffett 1982). Such polarisation has 
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tended to focus on the ethnic composition of the military (Mustapha 2006; 
Luckham 1975).  
As stated in the previous chapter, virtually all of my respondents spoke of, or at 
least acknowledged that religion and, most especially, ethnicity played a role in 
the military. As regards the role of religion in the military, a retired military 
officer alleged that: 
It is the Christian military that is holding Nigeria [together] because they are still 
nationalists. The day Christians in the military see themselves other than 
Nigerians, this country is gone. I’m sorry about that. The day the average 
Christian who is in military sees himself first, as not a Nigerian, this nation is 
gone because maybe, they are more liberal than an average Muslim officer 
because his first inclination is Islam. He will do anything for Islam, even against 
the nation. When it’s not in his personal interest that means Islamic interest. 
That’s my experience… 19   
As a consequence of ethno-religious factors in the military, appointments to high 
military positions are usually said to have ethnic and religious implications. For 
example, the appointment to the position of Chief of Army Staff (COAS) is 
perceived by other mid-to-high ranking members of the military to be based on 
ethnicity. Since 1999, all democratically elected civilian presidents in Nigeria 
have tended to dismiss the previous COAS upon taking office. The appointment 
of a new officer to replace the incumbent officer usually follows the pattern of 
selecting someone from the geographical region of the president. Alternatively, 
there may be the appointment of an officer from a minority ethnic group as a 
means to counterbalance the perceived hegemonic dominance of the Hausa-Fulani 
ethnic group in the military.  
In 2012, there have been two questionable political interventions by the military. 
The first involved the decision of the federal government to deploy soldiers in the 
streets of Lagos during the peaceful protests over the government’s decision to 
remove the subsidy on fuel in early January. Commenting on this, a Punch 
Newspaper editorial of January 12, 2012 pointed to the dangers of such 
engagements and the continuing relevance of the military as an important factor in 
the Fourth Republic. The editorial stated that: 
Events since President Goodluck Jonathan made his broadcast on the fuel 
subsidy removal… the democratic space [has been] shrinking in the country. By 
breaking up peaceful protests on Monday morning with troops, President 
Jonathan added awesome military might to the shocking, over 100 per cent 
increase in petrol prices he had effected on New Year’s Day. With armed troops 
setting up roadblocks in parts of Lagos and Abuja, democracy and the right to 
peaceful assembly are taking a battering and raising great tension in the land… It 
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is uncalled for, heavy-handed and tactless. Throughout the duration of the 
protests organized by civil society in Lagos, peace and orderliness had reigned 
and the non-violent nature of the action was repeated in speech after speech by 
the organisers… This is not quite how democracy is designed to operate… The 
troop deployment is a dangerous sign of a government that has lost the trust of 
the people… It is also an ominous reminder of the dark days of the late General 
Sani Abacha era (1993-1998). Not even under the military have soldiers become 
so involved in internal security, serving in crime control, riot control and 
guarding installations. The sad thing is the extent to which history has repeated 
itself…. There are serious implications in using the military for political ends…. 
The powers of the President to deploy soldiers must be more closely controlled 
by the National Assembly and more cautiously applied (Punch Editorial 2012b). 
The second questionable deployment occurred in the month of July, where a 
sizeable number of soldiers manned the entrance to the headquarters of the Power 
Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) in Abuja. This followed the workers’ 
dispute with the government over pensions and gratuities. The government 
justified their action by stating that the move was made to secure government 
property and installations (Amaefule 2012). 
It seemed that the institutional position of the military as an ‘intervening impartial 
umpire’ is generating negative consequences in Nigeria, with the military able to 
independently in an unconstitutional manner if the top military officers judge it to 
be in the best interest of some political elite in the country (Adepegba and 
Adetayo 2013; Adepegba 2013). An example of this was the 2009-2010 political 
succession crises in Nigeria. On 23 November 2009, President Umaru Musa Yar’ 
Adua (2007-2010) was secretly flown out of Nigeria to Saudi Arabia for an 
undisclosed sickness. The constitution, however, required a serving president to 
write a letter of leave of absence, to be approved by the senate. This was 
especially the case if the absence was on grounds that the serving president was 
incapacitated and unable to perform the duties required of the office. This 
constitutional requirement was not followed, however, and this created a power 
vacuum. According to a WikiLeaks report, it is alleged that the then COAS 
Lieutenant-General Abdulrahman Dambazau, an officer from the North, met the 
United States ambassador at the time, Ms Robin Sanders, on 24 February after the 
sudden and unexpected return of the ailing president from Saudi Arabia. The 
report further stated that Dambazau expressed his opinion to the U.S. ambassador 
that even though the National Assembly had unconstitutionally declared 
Goodluck Jonathan the acting president, there were concerns, especially from the 
North, that he was not a person politically capable of ruling a complex country 
like Nigeria. He was thought to have owed his political career to former president 
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Olusegun Obasanjo. Dambazau assured the United States ambassador that he had 
no plans to take over the government, and was on the lookout for any attempt by 
officers to stage a coup. Dambazau apparently ordered a brigade of guards (the 
president’s personal security) without the approval of the acting president, 
Goodluck Jonathan, to welcome and escort the ailing president from the Nnamdi 
Azikiwe International airport in Abuja (Wikileaks 2010; Sahara Reporters 2011; 
Zounmenou 2010). 
Similar media reports of the military acting outside of its constitutional duties 
have appeared in 2013 and 2014 (Punch Editorial 2013; Nigerian Tribune 
Editorial 2014b). As noted in the Punch Editorial (2012b) cited above, they 
include reports of military actions in crime control, riot control, guarding of oil 
installations and preventing journalists from performing their duties during 
internal security operations (Punch Editorial 2012a; Fabiyi 2012). In addition, 
there has been a significant rise of reports of soldiers serving as security escorts to 
politicians (Soriwei 2014); soldiers attacking and destroying public property and 
private property of civilians (Olabulo and Oparaocha 2014; Vanguard Editorial 
2014a, 2014c; Punch Editorial 2014c); some reports suggest that the military is 
used to harass politicians during security operations (Ameh et al. 2014); other 
media reports suggest that the military appear to take sides in political events 
(Aziken et al. 2014; Punch Editorial 2014b). One particular case in 2014 provides 
an important example of the appearance of the military’s unrestricted involvement 
in the polity. On 6 June, 2014, the military was reported to have conducted the 
censoring of the leading newspapers in the country. The military proceeded to 
several newspaper distribution outlets in major capital cities across the federation 
and prevented these newspapers from getting to the public. Explaining the reasons 
for this overt action against the print media, the director of defence information, 
Major General Chris Olukolade was reported to have said that: 
Troops, this morning, embarked on a thorough search of vehicles conveying 
newspapers and newsprints across board. This followed intelligence report 
indicating movement of materials with grave security implications across the 
country using the channel of newspaper related consignments. The Defence 
Headquarters wishes to clarify that the exercise has nothing to do with content or 
operation of the media organizations or their personnel as is being wrongly 
imputed by a section of the press. The military appreciates and indeed respects 
the role of the media as an indispensable partner in the ongoing counter-
insurgency operation and the overall advancement of our country’s democratic 
credentials. As such, the military will not deliberately and without cause, infringe 
on the freedom of the press. The general public and the affected media 
organizations in particular are assured that the exercise was a routine security 
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action and should not be misconstrued for any other motive (Nigerian Tribune 
Editorial 2014a). 
What is, however, unclear about this military operation is whether the civilian 
authorities had ordered this particular action. Based on media reports, the office of 
the presidency, through the president’s senior special assistant on public affairs, 
Dr. Doyin Okupe, denied that President Goodluck Jonathan had ordered the 
censoring of the press. Okupe, however, noted that the military carried out that 
action based on intelligence reports that suggested that some individuals or groups 
were possibly going to use print media distribution vehicles to convey materials 
that had serious security implications for the country. Overall, the presidential 
spokesman stated that the action of the military was not aim at any particular 
media organization, and insisted that the military action was an issue of national 
security in the light of the security challenges confronting Nigeria (Nigerian 
Tribune Editorial 2014a; Fabiyi 2014; Vanguard Editorial 2014b). 
Conclusion, Hypothesis Two 
Has military intervention via internal security duties post-1999 created a new 
form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria? Security-related media reports on the 
military since 1999 and my personal interviews with serving and retired military 
officers, confirm that it has at least given this impression. The military, through 
the Joint Task Force (JTF), are frequently reported in the media to have violated 
human rights in areas of engagement (Chiedozie 2012; Smith-Spark 2012; 
Nossiter 2013; Vanguard Editorial 2010, 2009). These alleged incidents of abuses 
are, however, difficult to verify, mostly because of a lack of adequate civilian 
enquiries into these cases. What is clear is that key newspapers and other media 
report such abuses frequently, and link them to authoritarianism in their editorials 
(Vanguard Editorial 2013; Punch Editorial 2012b). 
There seem to be two major reasons why the political elite in Nigeria are not able 
to strengthen institutions that should limit authoritarianism if media reports and 
my interviews are accurate. The first is the legacy of military rule, and more 
importantly the pattern of political administration after military rule, which is 
arguably ‘over-centralized’ at the federal level (Wunsch and Olowu 1995). This in 
turn can be said to have created weak political institutions that are also militarised 
(Hutchful and Bathily 1998; Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Best 1999; Obi 2007). 
The second reason seems to be that repeated military-crafted transitions to civilian 
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rule have created another power elite in Nigeria, the retired high ranking ‘military 
politicians’ (Badmus 2005; Akinrinade 2006). Since 1999, the retired military 
elite have been perceived to be a dominant factor in Nigeria’s civilian politics 
(Adekanye 1999). Retired officers are contesting and winning key political 
positions, including the presidency, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), the current 
senate president, Senator David Mark, many past and present members of the 
National Assembly, and so on. Has the leadership pattern of these retired officers 
in civilian positions manifested authoritarianism based on their military 
background? The following hypothesis explores this question and the possible 
consequences this may have on the state. 
Hypothesis Three: Retired Military Officers are gaining Influential Political 
and Economic Positions. 
Retired military officers’ involvement in civilian rule is not a new phenomenon in 
Nigeria. The short-lived Second Republic (1979-1983) had an array of retired 
military officers, including Colonels Amadu Ali and Garba Musa Dada, in the 
Senate. Similarly, Lieutenant J.C Ojukwu and Lieutenant-Colonel P.C Amadu 
were members of the House of Representatives (Adekanye 1999: xi). Other retired 
officers who were prominent politicians in the Second Republic include: 
Brigadier-General Benjamin Adekunle (a famous civil war commander); former 
Biafra secessionist leader, Chukwuemeka Ojukwu; and Brigadier-Generals U.J. 
Esuene and George Kurubo; Major-Generals Adeyinka Adebayo and Hassan 
Usman Kastina were executive members of political parties (Adekanye 1999: xi). 
What was, however, different with the military’s transition to civilian rule in 
1998/1999 was that it produced a former military ruler as a democratically elected 
civilian president. 
Several scholars have written about the retired military officers as an emergent 
political factor in Nigeria post-1999 (Adekanye 1999; Badmus 2005; Ntiwunka 
2012; Akinrinade 2006; Amuwo 2009; Siollun 2013). They have argued that 
retired military officers would continue to dominate, direct and even determine 
the future of democratic governance in Nigeria (Badmus 2005). Their sheer level 
of influence, wealth, connections with government, ‘old boy’ networks, 
organizational skills and experience have transformed retired military officers into 
a formidable political elite. Do this, however, constitute to a new form of military 
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authoritarianism? Perhaps the most egregious example of this perceived military 
authoritarian comparison after 1999 has been that of former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, who throughout his tenure in office (1999-2007) appeared to violate the 
rule of law repeatedly with no legal consequences (Adejumobi 2010; Agbaje et al. 
2004; Ajayi and Ayodele 2004). 
Even though the influence of retired military officers was not included in Alfred 
Stepan’s ‘military prerogatives’ for Latin America, it appears to be a crucial 
variable, an additional Nigerian military prerogatives in understanding the state 
after 1999. The sheer number of retired military officers seeking and holding key 
government positions in Nigeria (in the hundreds) is impressive. This trend has 
involved officers who were compulsorily retired by President Obasanjo in 1999, 
and those who left the military before then (Sankore 1999; Guardian Editorial 
1999b).  
Retired Military Officers in Economic Positions
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Prior to this present civilian government, mid-to-high ranking military officers 
tended to have relatively short career spans. This can be attributed to three factors. 
The first is based on the coups and counter-coups that have taken place over the 
years in Nigeria. Many military officers have been killed during coups and coups 
attempts, or, accused of staging coups. Those in the latter category face the 
possibility of death by firing squad if found guilty by courts-martial. The second 
factor occurs when a new military dictator assumes office. The usual practice for a 
changeover of this kind is the compulsory retirement of all officers senior to the 
new dictator in rank, and the retirement of officers who are perceived to be a 
threat to the new regime. The last factor is also key to a successful military 
transition to civilian rule. The usual practice is for the incumbent military ruler 
and, with him, his loyal aides, to retire from the military (Nwagwu 2002; Siollun 
2009). 
It is, therefore, not surprising that military officers who are still in their prime are 
frequently forced to retire from the military. For example, when the military 
handed over power to the civilians in 1979 the ages of military officers retired 
from service were revealing in this regard: Generals Obasanjo and Danjuma, 42; 
Major General Yar’Adua, 36; Vice Admiral Adelanwa, 39; and Major General 
Shuwa, 40 (Adekanye 1999: 12). The retirements in 1979 were similar to those in 
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1999, when President Obasanjo compulsorily retired eighty-nine military officers 
who were still in their prime (Sankore 1999).  
High ranking retired military officers tend to be highly selective in their post-
retirement careers. The military institution has traditionally been a means for 
higher social mobility, and high ranking retired military officers’ post-retirement 
careers tend to fall into one of ten categories: 
Defence Procurement and Contracts—supplying of fuel, food, apparel, boots and 
furniture. This also includes arms and equipment, and contracts for building and 
construction. Examples of this category are not easy to find, although a sizeable 
number of high ranking retired military officers are engaged in this type of 
business; 
Large-scale Farming and Agro-Allied Ventures—particularly in poultry, feed-
mills, maize, citrus and other fruit cultivation, livestock and fishery, food 
processing and other agro-allied industries. A noteworthy example of large-scale 
farming is the property owned by former head of state and president, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo; 
Building and Construction (Other than Defence)—contracting for building, civil 
engineering and construction projects of all kinds, and related services. Examples 
include, Major General Obada, Rear Admiral Sode and Rear Admiral Olukoya; 
Petroleum production—petroleum and gas exploration, production services, 
bunkering, marketing and distribution, running petrol stations. Major General 
Magoro, Lieutenant General Inuwa Wushishi and General T.Y Danjuma; 
Real Estate—property and real estate investment, building and management, 
provision and renting of house and office accommodation: most retired and 
serving military officers have at least one interest in real estate, and thus the list is 
too extensive to list; 
Finance, Banking and Insurance—financial investment and lending, including 
ownership of banking institutions, stock broking firms, investments in the 
insurance sub-sector: Lieutenant General Jeremiah Useni, Brigadier General 
Anthony Ukpo and Major General O.A Obada; 
Printing and Publishing—companies specializing in printing, investment in the 
book trade, and government printing/currency printing institutions: Colonel 
Sambo Dasuki; 
Imports and Exports, including Shipping—imports and exports, clearing and 
forwarding, container services, warehousing, running of private jetties, operation 
of shipping charter lines, and ownership of ocean-going vessels: General T.Y 
Danjuma; 
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Sporting Activities—stakeholding/chairing sporting activities such as football, 
table-tennis, and athletics: Major General H.E.O Adefope (late) and Brigadier 
General D.O Oneya; and 
Foreign Service—ambassadorial positions and foreign mission activities, 
especially in the conflict regions of Africa: Brigadier General M.B Marwa, Air 
Commodore Dan Suleiman and General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Adapted from 
(Adekanye 1999: 58-60).  
Retired Military Officers in Political Positions
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The 1999 military transition to civilian rule could be described as a ‘vague’ 
transition process (Ojo 2004: 64; Fayemi 1999). Unresolved policy conflicts were 
left by the military to the new civilian government (Adejumobi 2010; Olurode and 
Anifowose 2004b). The two most significant of these were the 1999 Constitution, 
which had not been debated and fully considered before it was promulgated into 
law;  and a large number of high ranking retired military officers who were 
directly involved in the transition process. It was not insignificant that General 
Abubakar in 1998 had private meetings with most of Nigeria’s retired military 
rulers, top retired generals and retired police chiefs within three months of taking 
power after the death of General Abacha (Guardian Newspaper 1998). There were 
two notable persons absent at that luncheon: Generals Obasanjo and Buhari. By 
the time of one meeting, it had already been agreed that Obasanjo would declare 
his interest and run for the presidency under the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP). The major financiers for Obasanjo’s presidential campaign in 1999 
included high ranking retired officers, including Generals T.Y Danjuma and 
Ibrahim Babangida
22
, and Lieutenant Generals Mohammed Gusau and 
Mohammed Wushishi (Adekanye 2005; Fayemi 1999). 
Since the election of Obasanjo in 1999, there have been a number of retired 
military officers contesting for, or being appointed to, senior government 
positions at the federal and state level. Particularly noticeable is the position of the 
National Security Adviser (NSA). This position, from the beginning of civilian 
rule, has been occupied by retired military officers. Generally, retired military 
officers’ post-retirement careers in politics include: 
1. Contesting for the highest political position of the country, the presidency. 
2. Contesting for governorships across the federation. 
3. Occupying influential positions in political parties. 
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4. Becoming members of state and federal houses of assembly. 
5. Becoming ministers in both state and federal cabinets. 
6. Occupying positions in civilian intelligence agencies, e.g., State Security 
Service (SSS) and National Security Advisor (NSA). 
Interviewees Responses to Hypothesis Three 
Virtually all my respondents stated that there was nothing wrong with retired 
military officers contesting political positions. In fact, one serving officer said that 
this trend is likely to increase as more officers seek elected positions.
23
 they were 
all of the opinion that retired military officers posed no threat to the current 
democratization process in Nigeria. One retired officer, commenting on whether 
retired military officers continued to be influenced by the military, noted that 
some high ranking military officers are occasionally invited by serving officers to 
air their views on issues that are of importance to the military. He stated that: 
…apart from personal relationships of past leaders with the new ones, there is no 
provision for it by law, although it may be through personal relations [or] 
interactions. For example, if [the current political elites] are thinking of 
something that they feel will enhance the well-being of the navy. [There is] what 
[is called] the annual conference [of] the chief of naval staff. In that conference, 
they sort of discuss issues that they feel will advance the progress of the navy. 
They call the older ones [past service chiefs], and some senior officers that they 
feel in their own imagination can contribute effectively to such discussion [and 
lobby against any policy that may not be in the interest of the navy].
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A serving officer commenting on high ranking retired military officers in politics, 
added that, regarding officers in politics, 
You would find out that these were the same political officers that were in the 
same military politics then who had the experience and the act of governing and 
ruling [or] the expertise [in] ruling. If you look at the United States army, at 
times you see one or two people [who took advantage] of their background and 
experience [into politics and did well]….David Mark is an ex-military politician 
but look at the way he controls the senate, he still has the attitude of discipline, 
self-control and strong control.
25
 
Another serving officer commenting on this same issue stated that: 
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… in the United States and other developed democracies in the world, ex-
military men play significant roles in the polity and in Nigeria a lot of military 
men are into politics. It can tell you that there is something they are doing right 
because they have no hold or relationship with the military. They have something 
to offer; if Obasanjo was anything it was because he put his 100 per cent energy 
in work. It might not have solved the [numerous] problems. His ADC [told] us 
that he [has] meetings till 3.30am in the morning, but [Obasanjo] still wakes up 
at 5.00am to play squash. So that’s because of the training he received in the 
army, that’s my take.26  
Commenting on whether the military is a means to higher social mobility in 
Nigeria, politically and economically, a serving officer answered: 
Not really; it was because we were involved in governance. Look at other 
African countries like Niger. Their leaders are former military men because they 
had the power of the gun. But [I] am going for [an academic career when I leave 
the military] because I don’t have a flare for politics per se [or maybe] because of 
the way it is being done in this country. But if it was played in a proper way, I 
would have been interested….The truth is that the military exposes you a lot 
through peace-keeping and courses that we attend…so it places you on a higher 
pedestal or the stepping stone that you are talking about.
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Another serving officer commented on this same issue: 
Each and every individual aspires for greater heights and I don’t think there is 
anything wrong [in that]. Every Nigerian has the right including ex-military men. 
It doesn’t restrain us….the training is key because a military man is trained a 
little in everything, as I said, we are constantly trained….Look at Dimeji Bankole 
[former federal speaker House of Representatives] for instance; he had some 
military training in the UK. It means that military training allows you do 
something differently from the civilians and we have the right to serve….The era 
of military intervention is over and gone for good….We shouldn’t be seen as 
people that should sit down because we have a higher stake….28 
Conclusion, Hypothesis Three  
My third hypothesis, that retired military officers who gain influential political 
and economic positions might facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism in 
Nigeria is not supported by the evidence. Retired military officers in economic 
and/or political activities are apparently pursuing personal interests. That the 
military decided to hand-over political power to a retired military general in 1999 
seems to suggest that the military elite in 1999 were worried about the prospects 
of the military under a civilian leader, particularly one who might limit the 
prerogatives of the military post-1999, and might limit military operational 
capacity. The ruling military elite of the day probably felt that only a retired 
officer could gain the confidence of the military and stay out of political power. 
The notion that retired military officers had de facto influence over current 
serving officers could not be ascertained. However, top ranking retired officers are 
occasionally invited by the military to air their views in regard to issues that are 
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regarded as fundamental to the operational functions of the military. This is 
significant in regards to the central question of this thesis.  
Apart from General Azazi, a post-1999 retiree appointed as the National Security 
Adviser, all retired officers gaining influential positions were either those 
compulsorily retired by the Obasanjo government in 1999 or those who had left 
the military before 1999. They did not owe the military their allegiance, and did 
not seem to be influenced by it. The era of retired military officers in influential 
positions in the political sphere may be a passing phase in Nigerian politics. This 
is reinforced by the ages of these categories of officers. For example, Generals 
Obasanjo, Babangida and Danjuma are, respectively 75, 71 and 74 years old. 
There is no current evidence to suggest that post-1999 retirees from the military 
would dominate the political and economic space to the extent of their 
predecessors, who had had the advantage of being the first ‘military politicians’ 
(Fayemi c.2012). For the foreseeable future, it seems that the position of the 
National Security Adviser will be occupied by a retired military officer, however.  
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented an examination of military prerogatives in Nigeria, using 
Alfred Stepan’s interpretation of late military authoritarianism in Latin America. 
It also analysed three hypotheses that seek to shed light on whether there is a new 
form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria based upon retention of 
military prerogatives. 
For hypothesis one, the military in Nigeria has retained significant prerogatives, 
it seems that the military has maintained four out of the eleven military 
prerogatives enumerated by Alfred Stepan. These are: its constitutionally 
hegemonic mission, the nature of the defence sector, its dominant role in 
intelligence gathering, and the low level of legislative oversight. In some limited 
respects, the retention of these prerogatives may have produced a new form of 
military authoritarianism because it provides the military with the ability to search 
for new missions and roles without effective civilian oversight.  
The second hypothesis, the military has intervened in politics post-1999, 
discussed three key military involvements under a civilian era. These are: its 
involvement in ethnic militia and ethno-religious conflicts; the military’s 
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responses to maritime challenges; and its activities during time of disasters. The 
analysis of this hypothesis however revealed that most of the studies on the 
military have tended to focus on their activities as they relate to ethnic militia and 
ethno-religious conflicts. It appears that the military especially through the Joint 
Task Force (JTF), been perceived to have engaged to some extent in a new form 
of military authoritarianism, based on the media reports of alleged human rights 
violations in areas of engagement. 
Finally, the third hypothesis, retired military officers are gaining influential 
political and economic positions, discussed the perceived link between retired 
officers involvement in the economic and democratic sphere, and the relationship 
with the military institution. The evidence suggests that this hypothesis is not 
valid. Top ranking retired officers are occasionally invited by the military to air 
their views in regard to issues that are regarded as fundamental to the operational 
functions of the military, however. 
To conclude, based on the data analysed and the hypotheses that were discussed, 
it appears that the current authoritarian tendencies of the Nigerian state cannot be 
fully attributed to the activities of individuals (retired and active officers) 
operating in the political system as hypotheses two and one extensively discussed. 
Neither can it be explained from the perspective of military prerogatives alone. It 
seems that the problems are rather more institutional, especially on examination of 
the current internal engagements of the military and the level of alleged human 
rights abuses by the military. The next chapter will explore the institutional bodies 
responsible for limiting the activities of the military, and the extent to which they 
have fulfilled their responsibilities. 
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Endnotes 
1) A coup attempt was uncovered by the government in 2004. See Ehwarieme (2011);  
Ojo (2006).  
2) The table in appendix 15 gives a profile of the various governments Nigeria had has 
since independence and their relationship to the military institution.  
3) The Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC) was set up by the 
Obasanjo government in the year 2000. In 2002, the commission submitted its main 
report to this same government after several people had testified at the panel sittings 
in various states across the federation. To date, 2013, the report of the commission is 
yet to be officially published by the government. The author used the unofficial report 
that is available on the internet. 
4) One of the key plotters of the unsuccessful April 1990 coup attempt against General 
Babangida, Major Gideon Orkar, alleged that one of the reasons why he decided to 
take-over the reins of power was to prevent the establishment of the National Guard. 
See (Babarinsa et al. 1990). Check appendix 16 for a table that shows the decrees that 
cease to have an effect from May 29, 1999. 
5) The 1995 constitutional conference that produced a draft constitution was a political 
farce. As General Sani Abacha had no plans of relinquishing political power, rather, 
he had plans of succeeding himself. 
6) Section 315(5)c . The National Security Council as defined by the 1999 Constitution 
states that: 
25. The National Security Council shall comprise the following members 
a) the President who shall be the Chairman; 
b) the Vice-President who shall be the Deputy Chairman; 
c) the Chief of Defense Staff 
d) the Minister of the Government of the Federation charged with the 
responsibility for internal affairs; 
e) the Minister of the Government of the Federation charged with the 
responsibility for defense; 
f) the Minister of the Government of the Federation charged with the 
responsibility for foreign affairs 
g) the National Security Adviser; 
h) the Inspector-General of Police; and 
i) such other persons that the President may in his discretion  appoint 
26. The council shall have power to advise the President on matters relating to 
public security including matters relating to any organization or agency establish 
by law for ensuring the security of the Federation. 
Section 217(2)c (c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities 
to restore order when called upon to do so by the president, but subject to such 
conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly… 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
 
7) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Ibadan (May 12, 2011). 
8) Same officer (above). 
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9) This information was provided during the course of my interview with a serving 
Major, Zaria (April 2, 2011). 
10) Same officer (above). 
11)  Personal interview with a serving Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 7, 
2011). 
12) Same officers (above). 
13) Personal interview with a retired Vice-Admiral, Lagos (May 30, 2011). 
14) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011). 
15) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 7, 2011). 
16) Section 217(2) a) defending Nigeria from external aggression. b) maintaining its 
territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
17) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Ibadan (May 12, 2011). 
18) This information was provided during the course of my interview with a serving 
Major, Zaria (April 2, 2011). 
19) Personal interview with a retired Brigadier General, Lagos (May 27, 2011). 
20) Check appendix 1 for a list of retired military officers in business and public service 
positions. It is important to note that the table in the appendix attempts to replicate the 
research done by Bayo Adekanye (1999) for retired military officers in the mid-
1980s. It is, however, hard to track the business ventures of top retired military 
officers, as majority of these officers have their stolen loot and business ventures 
overseas, while others use other person to front in their businesses. An example is 
General Babandiga, who several media reports has linked with Chief Mike Adenuga, 
Chairman of Globacom—the second largest telecommunications mobile provider in 
Nigeria. Some have said that Babandiga owns or has significant shares in the 
company. This compilation was, however, made by the author through a Google 
search on some key past military officers. The list is inexhaustible. 
21) Check appendix 2 for a list of political activities and government positions that some 
retired military officers have been appointed to and occupied since 1999. It is 
important to note from the table that former President, Olusegun Obasanjo is no 
longer the Chairman Board of Trustees (BOT) of the PDP but has a significant 
influence in the party. In 2015, Obasanjo left the PDP partly due to irreconcilable 
differences between him and President Goodluck Jonathan.  
22) Former military ruler Babandiga is a political godfather for many aspiring politicians 
due to his level of political influence. Media reports credit him with being 
instrumental in the appointment of his former aid-de-camp (ADC), retired Colonel 
Sambo Dasuki as the current National Security Adviser.  
23) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Ibadan (May 12, 2011). 
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24) Personal interview with a retired Vice-Admiral, Lagos (May 30, 2011). 
25) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011). 
26) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011).  
27) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011). 
28) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011). 
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Chapter Four 
Civilian Control of the Nigerian Military 
Introduction 
Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria? This chapter 
suggests that a new form of authoritarianism may be facilitated in Nigeria because 
of weak civilian oversight of the military. The previous chapter extensively 
discussed the role that the retention of military prerogatives may have on the 
operational workings of the military in Nigeria after 1999, and the link they seem 
to have to authoritarian practices within the polity. This chapter continues this 
investigation of military behaviour and operations within the context of civilian 
rule, and the effectiveness of civilian political institutions that should, but in some 
cases apparently do not, limit the activities of the military in a civilian era. 
Two hypotheses are tested to identify whether there is a new form of military 
authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria due to weak civilian oversight of the 
military. The first hypothesis is: autonomous military involvement in human 
rights abuses since 1999; and the second: civilian government oversight remains 
weak, and this facilitates military authoritarianism. 
In general terms, effective political institutions are particularly important for both 
liberal and aspiring liberal democracies such as Nigeria. This is because political 
institutions in liberal democracies are the “decisive step towards… the devolution 
of power from a group of people to a set of rules” (Przeworski 1991: 14; 
Przeworski et al. 2000). Political institutions are not only seen as organisations 
which create, enforce and apply laws that mediate against societal conflicts, they 
are also seen as the pillars of order in any political system. Given this importance, 
it is expected that conscientious effort should be made to develop effective 
political institutions in Nigeria, since there is the appearance of weak political 
institutions in general (Przeworski et al. 2000; Mamdani 1996; Apter 1965; 
Coleman 1975).  
There have been reasons postulated as to why developing countries tend to have 
weak institutions. Joel Migdal (1988) argues that some developing countries have 
weak institutional capacity because of the state’s inability to exercise effective 
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social control over its geographical area. This lack of effective social control, 
Migdal elaborates, is based on the drastic societal transformation that occurred 
under colonialism where colonial societies were exposed to the global capitalist 
system of trade. Migdal adds that some dictators see the emerging institutions as 
political rivals, and systematically undermine them. Colonial authorities may well 
have done the same. In a sub-Saharan African context, this resulted in colonial 
societies being introduced to a new form of taxation that was exploitative, forced 
labour on plantation farms (especially in Francophone Africa), and ensured that 
agricultural production for export was greatly encouraged (Chew and Denemark 
1996; Rodney 1972), while the development of local institutions was discouraged. 
These changes, tax procedures, to a certain degree land tenure laws, and the 
development of accessible means of transport (railway lines) that quickly brought 
cash crops from the hinterland to the coastal areas for export, fundamentally 
transformed the conditions of colonial societies. In turn, it greatly affected the 
existing social organisation and the social control which had been exercised 
(Migdal 1988).  
As noted above, based on the contextual realities, the colonialists in sub-Saharan 
Africa either discouraged, permitted, or encouraged the creation of new social 
organisations for societal control, especially when they were perceived to be in 
their economic interests (Ajayi and Crowder 1971; Crowder 1968; Mamdani 
1996). An example of encouraging an existing social organisation for social 
control that would benefit the colonial establishment can be found in the old 
Sokoto Caliphate of present day Northern Nigeria (Falola 2009; Ubah 1998). The 
colonial authorities introduced a policy of indirect rule where colonial interests 
were transmitted through the existing social structure that consisted of paramount 
rulers such as the Emirs, Sultan
1
 and other important traditional authorities in the 
Caliphate
2 
(Muffett 1978; Burns 1963; Isichei 1983; Lugard 1922).  
Similarly, James Wunsch and Dele Olowu (1995) posit that, in a post-colonial 
context, the failure of political institutions in virtually all African countries can be 
attributed to the ‘over centralised’ system of governance that African countries 
adopted after colonial rule. This, they argue, is due to the system of political 
administration inherited from colonial rule, decades of military authoritarian rule, 
and the strong personal rulership system that African states tended to adopt 
(Wunsch and Olowu 1995). Under this condition of centralisation, based on the 
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variables itemised (colonial legacy, military rule and personal rulership system), 
there was a significant shift of political power from the component units to the 
central government in revenue generation, the distribution of revenue generated, 
and a more centralised economic development policy. As a result of the emphasis 
on centralised socio-economic development, several African states were not 
adequately equipped with experienced manpower at the local level to transform 
government policies to desired outcomes at the local level (Adamolekun 1986; 
Mawhood 1983; Smith 1985).  
In a Nigerian context, while it seems that, since 1999, policies have been adopted 
to address weak political institutions, it appears less is being done to address the 
institutions of the security agencies. This has been observed since the start of 
civilian rule in 1999. Local and international media reports, and also those of 
international organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, have accused Nigerian security agencies (especially the military) of 
human rights abuses in their internal engagements (Human Rights Watch 2012). 
In addition, some of these reports have also blamed the federal government for a 
lack of civilian enquiries into these alleged human rights abuses by security 
agencies. Does ineffective civilian oversight of the military facilitate the 
emergence of a new form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria? This chapter 
will examine this within the context of the two hypotheses mentioned above. 
Hypothesis Four: Autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses 
since 1999.  
Since 1999, the military has been involved in numerous internal engagements, the 
most notable being those in the Niger-Delta area and, currently, in the northern 
part of the country. In these engagements, casualties have been witnessed within 
both the combat soldiers and the group(s) waging violent activities against the 
state. In virtually all of the engagements by military personnel, there have been 
allegations against the military of human rights abuses by both local and 
international media organisations (Punch Editorial 2014a; Guardian Editorial 
1999a; Vanguard Editorial 2010; Punch Editorial 2014c). 
It should be noted, however, that allegations against the military of human rights 
abuses in internal engagements did not start with the advent of civilian rule. Under 
each of the military regimes there were allegations against the military of gross 
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human rights violations. The military regime with the worst record for human 
rights violations was that of General Sani Abacha (1993-1998). During the 
Abacha regime, it was observed that the main security apparatus that committed 
such violations was a brigade of guards—personal security of the president, the 
military police, and most importantly, a strike force—a unit that was set up and 
used by Abacha’s Chief Security Officer (CSO), Major Hamza Al Mustapha, to 
assassinate the regime’s enemies and also to sponsor covert terrorist activities. 
Such terrorist activities included bombings in the Lagos metropolitan area (Useh 
1995; Anyanwu 2002). The regime also used these bomb attacks as an excuse to 
arrest pro-democracy activists (Sankore 1999; Agwuncha 1999). 
An annotated list of prominent victims of human rights abuses under the Abacha 
regime includes: 
 Chief Moshood Abiola, presumed winner of the 12 June 1993 presidential 
election that was later cancelled by the regime of Ibrahim Babangida 
(1985-1993). Abiola was later arrested by the Abacha regime under 
questionable charges of treason brought against him when he declared 
himself the lawful president of Nigeria. He eventually died while 
incarcerated in 1998 (Diamond et al. 1997). 
 Wariebi K. Agamene and Frank O. Kokori, national president and general 
secretary NUPENG, (Nigeria Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Workers). Both were imprisoned for embarking on a national strike against 
the Abacha regime (Useh 1995). 
 Ken Saro Wiwa, writer and civil activist. He and eight other Ogoni chiefs 
were executed by hanging in 1995 by a Special Military Tribunal that was 
set-up to investigate murder charges brought against Saro Wiwa and the 
eight others. Prior to his death, Saro Wiwa was the leader of the Survival of 
the Ogoni People (MOSOP). This organisation led a nonviolent campaign 
against environmental degradation of the land and waters of Ogoniland by 
the operations of multi-national corporations, especially those of the Shell 
Oil Company (Mumuni 1995; Useh 1995). 
 Tell Magazine’s George Mba, The News’ Kunle Ajibade, TSM Magazine’s 
Chris Anyanwu and Classique Magazine’s Ben Charles Obi were accused 
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of aiding a coup and all got a life sentences which were later commuted to 
15 years (Anyanwu 2002). 
 Colonels Lawan Gwadabe, Bello Fadile and R.A. Emokpae were accused 
and imprisoned for staging coups. A number of retired military officers also 
faced similar accusations and sentences; these included General Olusegun 
Obasanjo and Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (who died in prison in 
1997).  
 Dr Frederick Fasehun, civil rights activist and founder of the Oodua 
People’s Congress (OPC) in the mid-1990s, was arrested 18 December 
1996 in connection with the Lagos bombings, and released 25 June 1998.  
 Chief Olu Falae, a former finance minister under the Babangida regime, 
and the main opposition presidential aspirant against Olusegun Obasanjo to 
usher in the Fourth Republic in 1999. He was arrested on 10 January 1997, 
also in connection with the bombings in Lagos, and was released on 25 
June 1998. 
 Milton Dabibi, general secretary of PENGASSAN (Petroleum and Natural 
Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria), was arrested on 21 January 1996 
for his role in the 1994 oil workers’ strike, and released on 16 June 1998. 
 Chief Olabiyi Durojaiye, National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) 
member, was arrested on 3 December 1996 in connection with the Lagos 
bombings and released 16 June 1998. 
 Femi Falana, a human rights activist, was detained on a number of 
occasions throughout the Abacha regime. 
 Sylvester Odion Akhaine, general secretary of Campaign for Democracy 
(CD), was released from detention without charge on 31 December 1995 
following his arrest on 17 January 1995. 
 Ledum Mitee, vice president of the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP) prior to Ken Saro Wiwa’s death, was acquitted at 
the same trial.    
 Wole Soyinka, Nobel laureate and NADECO member, left Nigeria in 
November 1994 after charges were brought against him by the Abacha 
regime. 
 Babafemi Ojuda, managing editor of The News, was imprisoned for eight 
months by Abacha, and then freed 24 July 1998.  
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 Malam Ibrahim Zakzaky, a leader of a militant group, the Islamic 
Liberation Movement which was involved in the Kastina religious 
disturbances in April 1991, was imprisoned from 1996 until late 1998. 
 Abraham Adesanya, chairman of NADECO, was detained in 1996 and later 
released. He survived an assassination attempt, likely by the Abacha regime 
in 1997. 
 Beko Ransome Kuti, chairman of Campaign for Democracy (CD) and a 
well-known human rights activist, was found guilty by the Aziza Tribunal 
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This was later commuted to 
15years (Home Office (UK) 2000: 43-45; Anyanwu 2002).  
 
Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission (HRVIC) 
Upon assumption of office in 1999, President Obasanjo, a victim himself of 
human rights abuses by the Abacha regime, constituted the Human Rights 
Violations Commission (HRVIC). This was known as the Oputa panel after the 
chair of the commission, Justice Chukwudifu Oputa. Initially, the commission 
was mandated with the task of investigating cases of human rights abuses from 
1983 to 1998. This was strongly criticised by human rights activists, civil society 
organisations, politicians and the general public. It was argued that the years 
selected by President Obasanjo were too restrictive, and that this was more or less 
a ‘witch hunt’ targeting past military rulers and politicians. It was suggested, 
rather, that the period of Nigeria’s civil war and Obasanjo’s period as military 
Head of State (1976-1979) should also be included (Yusuf 2007, 2013). 
Ultimately, the mandate of the commission was extended to the first military 
intervention of January 1966. Overall, the commission was mandated to: 
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Ascertain or establish the causes, nature and extent of all gross violations of 
human rights committed in Nigeria from 15 January 1966 to 28 May 1999; 
Identify the person or persons, authorities, institutions or organizations which 
may be held accountable for such gross violations of human rights and determine 
the motives for the violations or abuses, the victims and circumstances thereof 
and the effect on such victims and the society generally; 
Determine whether such abuses or violations were the product of deliberate state 
policy or the polity of any of its organs or institutions or whether they arose from 
abuses of their office by state officials or whether they were the acts of any 
political organization, liberation movement or other groups or individuals; 
Recommend measures which may be taken whether judicial, administrative, 
legislative or institutional to redress past injustices and to prevent or forestall 
future violations or abuses of human rights; 
Make any other recommendations which are, in the opinion of the Judicial 
Commission, in the public interest and are necessitated by the evidence; and 
Receive any legitimate financial or other assistance from whatever source which 
may aid and facilitate the realization of its objectives (Yusuf 2007; Human 
Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002b). 
The commission was, however, constrained by a lack of skilled personnel and 
finances, and decided in the end to hear only 200 cases. The criteria for selection 
of cases was based on the nature of the rights violations involved, the extent or 
degree of the infringements alleged and the selection of representative cases. 
Eventually, the commission invited testimony from 2,000 witnesses nation-wide 
in their various public hearings and received 1,750 exhibits related to these 
selected cases (Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002b; Yusuf 
2013). Upon completing its task in May 2002, the commission submitted its 
findings, conclusions and most importantly, recommendations for the political 
institutions of the country. The main recommendations for the military were: 
That from May 29, 1999, anyone who stages a coup in the country must be 
brought to trial, no matter for how long they had ruled and regardless of any 
decrees they had passed to shield themselves from future prosecution; 
The military should be trimmed down to a manageable size; 
There be a programme of civil and human rights education in the military 
formations across the country; 
The military should review its methods of internal discipline, especially in 
relation to detention in the guardrooms, court-martial and other methods of 
justice that violate human rights. Proceedings in guardrooms and court-martial 
should conform with the African Charter especially relating to torture; 
The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), with its powers and functions is 
limited strictly to military intelligence gathering; 
An urgent return to military professionalism in terms of training as an on-going 
process, while also encouraging the authorities to act decisively to sanction the 
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display of any form of religious, ethnic or sectarian sympathies in the exercise of 
official duties; and that; 
The attention of the chaplaincies of the military and those of the Directorate of 
Military Intelligence must be drawn to the creeping fragmentation of the 
Barracks, along religious lines by the intrusion of fanatics (Human Rights 
Violations Investigation Commission 2002a). 
As laudable as the South African-style commission was in Nigeria, there were 
segments of the civil society and the general public who were disappointed with 
the commission’s final outcome and especially with the inability of the 
commission to compel three former Heads of state and former top government 
functionaries to appear at one of the public hearings. The former heads of state 
were Generals Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida and Abdulsalami 
Abubakar (Fayemi 2002). These three challenged the legality of the commission 
in court and sought an injunction barring them from being summoned to any 
public hearing of the commission. The other top functionaries who refused to 
honour the commission were Colonel Halilu Akilu, a former director of Military 
Intelligence under Babangida, and Lieutenant Colonel A.K Togun, a former 
deputy director of the State Security Service (SSS) under Babangida. Both were 
accused of sending a parcel bomb that killed Dele Giwa in his home in 1986. At 
that time, Giwa was a prominent journalist, and editor and founder of Newswatch 
Magazine. The magazine had published articles that were damaging to the regime 
(Yusuf 2013, 2007; Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission 2002a).  
Interviewees Responses to Hypothesis Four 
The government of President Olusegun Obasanjo and successive governments 
have refused to publish the report of the HRVIC,
3
 and it is logical to presume that 
the recommendations of the commission have not been implemented. The same 
can be presumed for the military in relation to the commission’s 
recommendations. During the course of my field research in 2011, two notable 
cases informed the question asked by the author as regards the allegations of 
human rights abuses by the military.  The first was what has been described as the 
Odi massacre of 1999. This incident happened during the early period of the 
civilian administration of President Obasanjo six months after the military 
formally handed over political power. Commenting on the Odi incident, an 
editorial in the Guardian Newspaper on 13 December 1999 stated that: 
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The government ordered the [military action] on November 20 following the 
horrendous killing earlier in the month of about a dozen security personnel at 
Odi. The act was barbaric and it was universally condemned. On November 10, 
President Olusegun Obasanjo issued a 14 day ultimatum to the Bayelsa State 
government to apprehend and prosecute the killers else a state of emergency 
would be imposed. But a few days before the expiration date, the soldiers struck. 
The ruthless manner the attack was executed points to a premeditated plan to rout 
the community. The soldiers did not only deploy the most lethal of weapons, 
they sealed off the area and made escape practically impossible, even for the 
children and the aged. Worse still, no access was opened for observation nor was 
relief allowed to reach the injured and the dying. The media was shut out. This is 
a violation of all conventions governing war. It is inexcusable (Guardian 
Editorial 1999a). 
Similarly, the second noteworthy case that informed the question asked by the 
author in relation to allegations of human rights abuses dealt with the recurring 
ethno-religious crises in the north eastern state of Plateau, and especially its 
capital, Jos. The media repeatedly carried stories to suggest that soldiers posted to 
that region continuously violated human rights. The crises in Plateau state initially 
started as an ethnic conflict between the predominantly Christian indigenous 
people of the state, and Muslim Fulani herdsmen and later settlers of Plateau state 
(Ukiwo 2003; Suberu 2001; Maier 2000; Anaba 2010).  
 
It is perhaps not surprising that military officers roundly deny the violation of 
human rights by the military. Two serving officers interviewed observed that the 
military should not be blamed for any human rights abuses. They further 
elaborated that the military in its external and internal engagements is guided by 
three closely followed laws: 
 Their own internal laws sanctioned by the military courts or tribunals; 
 The civil laws of Nigeria; and, 
 International laws that deal with human rights. For example, the 
Geneva Convention.  
According to this, whenever the military is deployed in a particular area of the 
country for internal security duties, the rules of engagement are always clear, and 
begin with trying to stop a crisis as quickly as possible without causing greater 
hardship to the people. This is taking into consideration that the military is only 
called into a crisis when other enforcement agencies are unable to handle it. 
Accordingly, the military’s mind-set whenever deployed is said to have an 
emphasis on stopping the emergence of a war-like situation. Examples which the 
officers cited included the Niger-Delta crisis and the crises in Plateau State. It is 
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significant that the only way that the military can address such crises is to deal 
with them as a war-like situation. 
The interviewees further stated that if it were true that the military allegedly 
violated human rights so repeatedly, how was it then possible that in states prone 
to ethno-religious crises, for example Kano, Kaduna, Borno and Bauchi, that the 
non-indigenous of those states and others affected by the crises normally ran to 
the nearest military barracks for protection. The two serving officers further cited 
an example of a particular family that was affected by the ethno-religious riots in 
Kano city in 2001. This particular family was said to have run into a barracks in 
the city and stayed there for seven years! This, the officer claimed, was proof that 
the military was not perceived as being out to violate individual human rights. 
The two serving officers further stated that the allegations of human rights abuses 
attributed to the military were based on misinformation propagated by the 
Nigerian media. They insisted that the crisis in Odi was caused when local people 
in Odi ambushed three out of four military vehicles and killed the soldiers who 
were inside. The military considered this as an outright act of war this was why 
they attacked the village the way they did. They also stated that people who had 
no ulterior schemes or motives definitely would not have been affected in the 
targeted area, because the military had informed the locals prior to their operation.  
When it was asked during the interview if military personnel should be liable to 
civilian prosecution for allegations of human rights abuses, the two serving 
officers cited an example of a soldier who shot a tanker driver in 2010. The 
soldier was court-martialled and dismissed from the military after a proper 
investigation was made into his case. The deceased family sued the military for 
the incident and at the time of the interview, the officers claimed that some three 
weeks earlier a court verdict was given. The military was ordered to pay the 
deceased family nineteen million naira and the company that employed the tanker 
driver, four million naira.  
The two interviewees argued that part of the crisis the military was facing in 2011 
was that of being deployed in tasks that constitutionally were not within their role. 
They further cited the 2011 general elections where approximately twenty 
thousand Nigerian troops were deployed in several states across the federation. 
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They stated that from a security perspective, this was not good for the country 
because it meant that Nigeria was very vulnerable to external attacks during 
election periods when soldiers were deployed in large numbers across the 
federation.
4 
 
Another serving officer, commenting on the allegation that the military committed 
gross human rights abuses in their engagement in Odi, seemed to affirm this while 
arguing that:  
… Under President Obasanjo we had the Odi issue. It was unfortunate it 
happened and every reaction is in response of an action. The highest professional 
[military institution in the world is] the American army, but apart [from] 
Guantanamo prison issue, just recently about two or three weeks ago, the 
American troops were posing with dead bodies of Afghans. The type of job you 
do affects your psyche [unless] you are a super human. When you see your 
colleague butchered, although one injustice does not warrant another… [Soldiers 
tend to retaliate].
5
 
Similarly, another serving officer attempted to justify the military’s action in Odi, 
commenting further about the military’s rule of engagements in internal security 
duties while confusingly, denying that human rights violations had occurred. He 
noted that: 
The militants were the sons [of the community] and also part of the [daily life of 
the] community. When [the army goes] on security duties, [we] have what is 
called the rules of engagement [and] we operate within the norms and the rules. 
When you are there to make peace and you are probably fired at, what happens? 
What do you do? And when they actually allege that places were destroyed and 
we ask them where? Sometimes these things are blown out of proportions. What 
is the collateral damage done to the place? Did they go into Odi? How big is 
Odi? How did the military kill people and destroy Odi? We have the Geneva 
Laws of Convention. We are not fighting a war but we draw out certain rules that 
would guide us. We have principles of international security—what we do when 
we are in internal security operations. [That is], justification, use of minimal 
force, evidence and the others. These are things we are trained to do. Tomorrow 
[I] am going out for the election patrol. I have a camera man with me so that 
anything we are doing would be filmed to justify whatever we are doing on the 
field. So that when [cases of abuse] comes up we can use [the camera for 
evidence]. If a man in Kawo says I saw the military beating people, we would 
come out to say how and who are the military people? We have so many of them 
who are [not genuine soldiers and] commit [these] crimes.
6
  
Commenting further on the alleged abuses of the military in Jos, this officer stated 
that: 
… People were not killed like [in] Odi. Houses were not razed down and people 
were not targeted deliberately. It was only in the course of duty that one form of 
over zealousness occurred. We have moved far away from where we used to be 
to where we are now. [I have] just finished a course on the law of armed conflicts 
organized by UNICEF. So this kind of training goes on often in the army in 
which our rules of engagement for everything you do [are] stated. [Even for the 
2011 general election], there is a guideline and code of conduct [for] the military 
129 
 
because we want to be seen as professionals and this training makes it virtually 
impossible to do anything that is not within the confines of the law. With a 
higher level of training and the conscious effort of the army, I don’t think human 
rights abuses is an issue.
7
 
This officer also commented on the issue of the military’s alleged bias in their 
operation in Jos as mentioned in some local media outlets. In fact, some local 
media organisations even went as far as alleging that soldiers deployed to enforce 
peace in Jos were taking sides with the Muslim Fulani herdsmen and aiding them 
to kill the indigenous Christian people of Jos and the immediate environs 
(Vanguard 2012a; Morning Star News 2014). Regarding the allegation of bias in 
Jos, this serving officer noted that: 
Even in Jos we had to change our uniform because they alleged the military [did] 
so much of killings so we changed our uniform from green camouflage to brown 
desert camouflage because it was easier for people to get the green camouflage to 
perpetrate those evil acts than the brown one. From the [time of the change], you 
would find out that we have been absorbed from that [because] if [you are in] the 
military [but] not part of the Task Force in Jos, you will be easily identified 
because you are not using the same type of uniform. Honestly, I don’t think we 
abuse human rights; it’s just circumstances that we find ourselves sometimes. 
[Rather], we try to protect and respect that freedom, the fundamental human 
rights of the citizens, which [are] our main duty, to protect people. So why 
should we go and abuse them? We are not going to jump up and go to Zaria and 
start bombing them, Odi was yes… we have the rules of engagement of what we 
are doing, you cannot run into a church or mosque and start firing at us and you 
expect us to keep staring at you. Even before we go into a community or place, 
we try to ensure that the people are actually isolated from those cases. We have 
had crisis in other parts of the country and how did we cool it? Let’s go far back 
as 1982 during the Maitesene crisis in Kano and so on. The military had to come 
in when the police was overwhelmed; we had to use force.
8  
 
When asked whether there was legislative oversight or civilian enquiry into the 
military, especially regarding the allegations of human rights abuses, another 
serving officer stated that, in general, the National Assembly had adequate 
oversight over its affairs: 
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… The military is completely subject to civilian governance even up to the yearly 
budget of the army… [And there are legislative] committees to decide [the 
army’s annual expenditure]. Remember the issue of the naval admiral who was 
driving in a convoy and [unfortunately], a lady [accidentally] cut into the convoy 
and the overzealous escorts jumped down from the car while the admiral was still 
in the car oblivious of what was happening. There was [supposedly] an abuse 
[because the lady] was beaten and [she filed] a petition to the Nigeria army. The 
Chief of Naval Staff was made to explain [what happened] and [the case] was 
taken to court. [The verdict from the court was that about 100million naira must 
be paid to the lady because of the assault on her]. So the rule of law is working 
and there is no sacred cow [anymore]. There [are legislative] committee[s] on 
defence, security [and so on] and they have a right to ask questions [and] if 
anybody does what is wrong, they would be made to face the music.9 
A similar argument that the military was submissive to legislative oversight 
functions, especially as regards cases of alleged human rights abuses, was 
expressed by another retired military officer. However, this officer blamed 
successive civilian governments for not investigating such cases. He stated that: 
… It’s the government’s choice. The military is always subject to the 
government of the day. The point [that] remains is how aware or how willing is 
the government to try such cases? Even if it’s an instrument of government, it’s 
an agency of government, the military does not just come out… it’s unlike the 
mobile police. The mobile police are a riot police, the military does not go out to 
arrest offenders, they go out to kill and suppress uprising. So to move out, 
government called them out.
10
  
Another serving officer, however, disagreed with the idea that the military had 
any legislative oversight, especially when it came to cases regarding human rights 
abuses: 
I don’t think we really have any oversight but in our Armed Forces Act, we have 
a provision that could cater for such things if they happen. We have some section 
there that deals with such cases, ill treatment of people, torturing [and so on]. If a 
soldier is found guilty after an investigative body has written a report, [the 
officer] is court martialled but I don’t know about the civil aspect of it, but I 
think in the military, we have that provision.
11
  
Overall, the author identified two major strands of arguments from the 
interviewees. The first line of argument agreed to a certain degree that military 
involvement does increase human rights abuses. This considering the fact that the 
military is usually called in as the last resort against any form of civil uprising. In 
this situation, the police and the mobile police apparently could not handle the 
situation. It seems inevitable that human rights abuses will occur because the 
military will use force to quell civil-disturbances, and restore law and order. Also, 
virtually all of my respondents claimed that all military deployments are well 
documented, but that the reports were not meant for the general public. This was 
partly due to the sensitivity of some of these operations.  
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The second line of argument is that the media in Nigeria is very judgemental 
when it comes to the activities of combat soldiers on internal engagements 
(probably based on the military’s historical antecedents). Soldiers, according to all 
my respondents, are never instructed to kill during internal operations. What they 
are told to do is maintain law and order. Generally, when soldiers are on duty 
during internal engagements, they try to identify the ring leader of any uprising 
with the aim of demobilising, arresting or crippling that individual so that the 
group will be disorganized. Also, during internal operations, combat soldiers 
never carry tear-gas or rubber bullets—these are used by the police. Unlike the 
police, who shoot into the sky to disperse a rioting crowd, for example, soldiers 
are not able to do this because there is a greater accountability for the bullets they 
fire in internal engagements. This is because all bullets are accounted for and 
documented by their superior officers, therefore, making it practically impossible 
to violate human rights on the scale reported in the media.  
Regarding legislative enquires on alleged human rights abuses, there seems to be 
a general consensus that the committees in charge of the military in both houses of 
the National Assembly are not pro-active or responsive to military-related issues. 
Most of the respondents stated further that in general terms, the military does not 
have any real form of legislative oversight apart from the annual budget, which is 
approved by the National Assembly, and that all widely reported human rights 
abuses in the media, in Jos and Odi, for example, were investigated by internal 
military enquiries. A majority of the officers said that the Odi and Jos 
engagements were documented, but have been classified as they are considered 
issues of national security, and therefore cannot be released to the press. 
Finally, it is important to note that in 1995, when Nigeria was still under military 
rule, the National Human Rights Commission was established by the National 
Human Rights Act (Amended 2004 and 2010). The Act gave the commission 
greater financial and operational independence. Examples of these are: 
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Independence in the conduct of the affairs of the commission; 
The funds of the commission to be a direct charge on the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund of the Federation of Nigeria; 
The establishment of the Human Rights Fund; and; 
The recognition and enforcement of the award and recommendations of the 
commission as decision of the High Court (National Assembly Nigeria 2010). 
The commission’s thematic includes: 
Women and gender; 
Children; 
Corruption and good governance; 
Police, prison and other detention centres; 
Environmental and Niger-Delta; 
Education; 
Freedom of religion and belief; 
Torture, extra-judicial, summary and arbitrary executions; 
Law reform and law review; 
Independence of the judiciary and access to justice; 
Labour, food and shelter; 
Communal conflicts and other related violence; 
Health; 
Freedom of expression and the media; and 
People with disabilities (National Human Rights Commission 2012). 
It is, however, difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of the commission even with 
the two amendments giving it greater independence. This is noteworthy when it 
comes to addressing military-related human rights abuses since 1999. However, a 
6 February 2012 news item on the commission’s website indicated that it had 
requested the National Security Adviser and the Inspector General of Police to 
carry out urgent investigations over allegations of extra judicial killings, torture, 
harassment and other forms of human rights violations levelled against the Joint 
Task Force (JTF) operating in Borno and Kano States. It is not possible for the 
author to know if such an investigation was ever carried out as it does not appear 
that any civilian investigation was made against the JTF. This is based on the fact 
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that it was not reported by any major media organisation in Nigeria. Also, 
throughout 2012, the author was not able to find any major news item from 
leading media outlets in Nigeria that reported the trial of a number of active 
military personnel in regards to human rights violations in these states. 
In sum, it is logical to assume that the inherent weaknesses of civilian institutions 
responsible in limiting human rights abuses have allowed the military greater 
independence during internal engagements. A high degree of discretion is vested 
in the president, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, when it 
comes to military deployments, and there is little oversight from the National 
Assembly. This consistent pattern of a single line of command, without significant 
oversight from civilian institutions, appears to have contributed to allegations of 
human rights abuses against the military.  
Conclusion, Hypothesis Four 
Based on the various data collected and analysed, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the military has had inappropriately autonomous involvement, 
especially as regards human rights abuses. Additionally, the current operational 
method of deployment of the military in internal engagements appears to have 
facilitated authoritarian tendencies in Nigeria. 
As previously stated, under military rule a human rights commission was 
established to investigate and recommend on cases of human rights abuses. As of 
2014 this commission seems not to have been adequately responsive to its 
mandate. The next hypothesis will explore further the problems of authoritarian 
tendencies in Nigeria, as the result of weak civilian oversight. 
Hypothesis Five: Civilian government oversight remains weak, and facilitates 
military authoritarianism. 
It appears that there is insufficient government expertise available to monitor the 
actions of the military. Two institutions have primary responsibility by law to 
exercise oversight functions over the military: the National Assembly and the 
Ministry of Defence. 
The National Assembly of Nigeria is a bicameral legislative house and the highest 
law-making body of the country. It consists of 109 members in the Senate and 360 
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members in the House of Representatives. It is empowered by law to legislate on 
wide range of issues. As a result, it has numerous standing committees in both 
houses that are empowered to investigate social and political issues before laws 
are made. This process is expected to be achieved by seeking input from officials 
in the sector under investigation and from experts invited to the public hearings of 
the committees.  
The enabling law that empowers the National Assembly to have these oversight 
functions over the military is categorised under four areas as specified by the 1999 
Constitution. They are: 
a) The National Assembly has budgetary control; allocations are provided 
through the Ministry of Defence; 
b) The president cannot unilaterally engage the military in any internal or 
external duties without formal approval from the legislative chambers; 
c) The National Assembly ensures that the composition of the officer corps of 
the military reflects the federal principles of the country; and 
d) The National Assembly has powers to make laws as regards the appointment, 
promotion and disciplinary control over the military (Section 217-218).  
Further expanding each of the constitutional roles of the National Assembly as 
highlighted above, the de jure process for budgetary allocation passes through 
four phases: formulation, implementation, auditing, and reporting (Omitoogun 
and Oduntan 2006: 158). It is expected that during these processes, the civilian 
minister of defence, the permanent secretary in the defence ministry and other 
civilian experts within the ministry will be significantly involved, and that the 
committees in charge of defence within the National Assembly will scrutinise 
defence expenditures when the budget is submitted as a draft to the House. The 
Minister of Defence will then be invited to a public hearing of the committee to 
explain and clarify any issues regarding the allocated funds. From there, the 
committee in charge of defence will evaluate the expenditures. The budget will 
then be debated in the House before being approved. 
 
Despite the appearance of being a rigorous process, the reality is that approval of 
defence expenditures is more or less a ‘rubber stamping’ of the draft submitted to 
the legislative house, with insignificant adjustments. This, it seems, revolves 
around a lack of civilian expertise in military matters, partly due to a lack of 
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understanding of what Nigeria’s defence priorities are, as well as a lack of 
knowledge of the committee members in charge of defence in the House.  At 
present (2012), the Senate has committees for the Air Force, and Defence and 
Army (combined). Similarly, the House of Representative has committees for the 
Air Force, and Defence and Army (combined). The jurisdiction of these 
committees basically comprises the following: 
Payments, promotion, retirement and other benefits and privileges of members of 
the army; 
Size and composition of the army; 
Defence headquarters; 
Ammunition depots, forts, arsenal reservation and establishments; 
Scientific research and development in support of the army; 
Barrack projects; 
Military application of nuclear energy; 
Disarmament; 
Army cadets; 
Resettlement scheme for serving officers of the army; 
War graves, monuments and memorabilia; 
Peacekeeping operations; and 
Consideration and appropriation of annual budget estimates for the army 
(National Assembly Nigeria). 
Likewise, within the Ministry of Defence (MOD), it is also expected that there 
should be experts on military matters. The MOD’s core function should be that of 
formulation and execution of Nigeria’s defence policy and the planning of 
military expenditure. The ministry is also expected to provide administrative and 
support services for the training, equipping and combat readiness of the military. 
This support expected from the MOD is thought to ensure that the military will 
perform their missions and functions, both actual and potential (Omitoogun and 
Oduntan 2006: 157). 
Issues that appear to hinder legislative oversight over budgetary issues of the 
military are the extra-budgetary spending and funds allocated to the military from 
the presidency. Under military rule, this method was used effectively to ‘loot’ the 
treasury, especially under the Abacha regime (Djebah 1999), and to undermine the 
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functions of the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Also, peacekeeping allocations 
under the military were never channelled through the MOD and were inadequately 
accounted for. An example of this was the estimated US$12 billion that 
successive regimes spent through  the Economic Community of West African 
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in attempting to end the civil wars in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone (Omitoogun 2003; Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006). 
Under the present civilian dispensation, this method of allocation has not 
significantly changed. Funds are allocated to the military under ‘security votes’ in 
the budget, and allocation for peacekeeping duties is still catered for through 
funds not allocated by the MOD (Egbo et al. 2012). 
 
In terms of the National Assembly’s oversight in ensuring that the recruitment and 
selection of officers reflects the federal character principle of Nigeria, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether this process follows the constitutional principle of 
federal character. This is because, to a considerable extent, enlisting in the 
military is purely a military affair. Since the start of civilian rule in 1999, there 
has been no significant suggestion that the principle of federal character has not 
been abided by in the military as specified in the constitution. At present, the 
process of recruitment for officers into the military is usually advertised in 
reputable and national print and electronic media outlets. The advertisement 
usually specifies the number of prospective officers that will be taken from each 
state of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. It is usually 
in equal numbers from each state.  
 
In terms of the National Assembly’s oversight functions in the appointment, 
promotion and disciplinary control of the military, at present this is only 
applicable to the appointment of the service chiefs. However, under the tenure of 
Presidents Obasanjo and Umaru Yar’adua, the appointments of the service chiefs 
were never sent to the National Assembly for formal ratification. This 
constitutional process only started under the current presidency of Goodluck 
Jonathan.  
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Interviewees Responses to Hypothesis Five 
Virtually all of my respondents agreed that civilian expertise (National Assembly 
and the Ministry of Defence) was lower than desired. The officers interviewed 
were asked to comment on the perceived weakness of these civilian institutions. 
To aid the interviewees in answering this question, the author asked both the 
retired and serving officers to comment on the institutional processes framing the 
nation’s defence policy.12 
Some officers stated categorically that things of military importance could not be 
shared with civilians and that people within the MOD were not trained or 
sufficiently educated to understand military affairs. A serving officer, however, 
tried to clarify why the military could not share information with employees 
within the MOD. He contended that those working in the MOD would not be 
familiar with the tactical aspects of military operations because of national 
security. However, civilian employees understood the normal day-to-day 
administrative workings of the military well. The officer also stated that it was the 
function of civilians to craft the defence policies for the country and to do this 
beyond the jurisdiction of the military. Explaining further, this officer stated that 
the defence policy of any country was measured in terms of the strength of that 
country’s military, and that Nigeria, due to its regional strength in its economy, 
military strength, population and labour force, had a defence policy that was more 
like a ‘big brother’ to other neighbouring countries. According to the serving 
officer, this was important when such countries had internal crises. Examples the 
officer cited included Liberia and Sierra Leone.
13
 
Another serving officer, commenting on the level of civilian military expertise, 
especially as it related to framing defence policies with the MOD, commented 
that: 
… For example, we have people in the civil society who have majored in issues 
like defence policies, if they get involved with [the military] we would have that 
expertise… we have the Ministry of Defence [but] who are the people that make 
[up] the ministry? They are civilians. It is supposed to be a joint effort just like 
the Pentagon; I don’t know what the British call their own MOD. But I think it is 
[the] same too. But in the MOD when you have this civilians, the weakness is 
that you could find someone from the Ministry of Health with the professional 
knowledge of health been posted to the MOD as permanent secretary to come 
and handle defence matters or issues. He has to rely on people or the residual 
knowledge of what he reads and so on. So you could have some of these lapses. 
But people who might have studied in the field that is related to defence policy, 
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defence matters or international relations, I don’t really think they would be 
deficient in this aspect. But when you now diversify talking about the core basis 
[I mean], talking of the technicalities of arms and the rest, we can now advise.
14
  
Commenting further, this serving officer explained in detail the process of 
framing defence policies in Nigeria. He stated that: 
[It is] the civilians [responsibility to frame the defence policy]. It’s a process we 
start from the lowest rank up to the top and that’s why we have schools like the 
National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies. We [also] have military ones 
like the National Defence College, the Armed Forces Command and Staff 
College. [This is] where some of these policy issues are discussed and papers are 
written and these are sent up to be collated and [further] discussed at that level. It 
becomes some policies and strategies that are used… We formulate it but there 
are inputs when it gets to the top. There is a defence policy but it starts from the 
military but it is chartered with the civilians too. So the policy is formulated by 
both and adopted.
15
 
Another serving officer commented on civilian weakness in military matters by 
citing the challenges the military had with the MOD in terms of acquiring military 
equipment. According to this officer, this lack of expertise was noticeable in the 
lack of synergy in equipment within the three branches of the military. He stated 
that: 
… I think the people [that] are missing out are the military men because we must 
have a vocal person that would translate ground strategy to the military’s 
strategic level. The civilians at the top would say ‘Let us make the Nigerian army 
combat ready [and] equip them adequately’. [But] it is the military guys that 
know the weapon[s] they need. [It is therefore very unfortunate] that the 
military’s presence is lacking in the MOD. Let me give you [an] instance without 
sounding as if I am castigating [anybody]. Some of the equipment’s procured [by 
the MOD] are not what we need. So there is no [compatibility of equipment] 
between the army, air force and the navy. [But] there should be synergy, for 
example, if you are buying communication equipment, it should be the same 
because we go on operations together and it hinders proper communication. 
[Therefore], there should be synergy so that we can all work on the same page.
16  
 
A retired military officer gave an example of the potential conflicts that could 
arise because of a lack of military expertise within the National Assembly. He 
provided this example, citing the case of some members of the National Assembly 
debating whether or not the country needed to have a maritime coastguard just 
like the United States of America. He stated that: 
Of recent [the National Assembly] is talking of [the] formation of [a] maritime 
coastguard. But is [the] coastguard provided for in the constitution? No. Some 
people are sponsoring this to [be a constitutional provision]. Things are still 
evolving. If some interest groups want to bring in such thing, I think they must 
start from the maritime organisation they have on the ground. They must identify 
the weakness, they must find out how viable such an organization they are 
[establishing] will be. They must know if the government can support it, can the 
economy support it? For even without finding out first, if it is necessary or [not], 
they are already debating it in the [National Assembly] and I as an individual felt 
that it is a wrong way of going about it because you can lead the nation astray by 
putting something in the constitution that is not well grounded. You have not 
thought over it well… [to] see the pros and cons of it because people just say that 
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the United States of America has a coastguard so Nigeria must have a 
coastguard, that is illogical. The United States of America has an overall view of 
the world and they have a navy to look outside their coast to safeguard their 
interest. What [institution] looks [after their] internal security [in terms of] US 
territorial waters? They have a coastguard. [This] is sensible. While [one state] is 
looking at the global interest, another one is securing the internal. But for Nigeria 
to say, [that it needs] a coastguard without that understanding is not normal. The 
navy [that we have here], what is their role? And have they equipped the navy 
well enough? To be able to do certain things [which are, already] ineffectively 
[being done] by the navy… [The question is,] is it the organization that is 
ineffective or the government that is ineffective in [adequately] providing for [the 
navy?].
17
   
Also, this retired officer cited another example of what he perceived as civilian 
ignorance of security issues in the country. He used the example of the current 
military engagement in the Niger-Delta to reinforce his argument: 
… That I am assisting in internal security for the nation does not make it my 
responsibility. Somebody has a major role, [the other supportive], the one that is 
acting on supportive cannot make that job is major job; he is only on the 
supportive role… Of recent what we have in the [Niger]-Delta, is something that 
is not permanent [it is a Joint Task Force], and when you say a task force, after a 
while they disband when they finish that particular task for which they formed. 
But if we look at what is happening in the [Niger]-Delta area is it a task force that 
you engage in that area? We now see the army, navy and at times the police 
doing this work, but it is internal. Where is our inland waterway that I told you 
about?—[the First Republic Constitution provided for a police unit that was 
solely responsible for policing the inland waterways and creeks]. [But] because 
we jettisoned [the inland waterways police unit during decades of military rule], 
which is the organization that should have been developed now to a level [that 
would have firmly taken care of the present crises] that is, [policing] the creeks 
and waterways… but in the absence of that, we have the task force…18      
A serving military officer, commenting on the level of civilian expertise in 
military matters within the National Assembly, cited the example of an Air-Force 
officer who represented the Air-Force before the committee in charge of the Air-
Force to defend their budget. He stated that: 
I would give you an instance: the Nigerian Air-Force went to defend their budget 
[at the committee level of the National Assembly]… usually a particular senior 
officer goes, but on that particular day another officer went… He [is] a general 
and this was his particular field of expertise [the item to be purchased]… There 
was a professor who was a committee member… the professor [was of the 
opinion that the proposed aircraft that was budgeted was not needed]. The 
general stood up and said with due apologies ‘Who are you? You don’t have a 
clue as to our [particular] need.
19
 
On the MOD level of civilian expertise, this same officer stated that: 
I want to agree with you that we have a rather huge defence ministry with 
[civilians]. [I] am not very competent to talk about their qualification[s], but 
there is a need for a higher level of cooperation in order to have a more 
functional MOD, so that they operate on the same page. So there [is] need [for 
some kind of re-training] so that persons working there [MOD] must have value 
to add and we have a lot of Nigerians who can do it….20     
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Conclusion, Hypothesis Five 
It appears that civilian weaknesses in expertise within the MOD, and the inability 
of the National Assembly to investigate and enforce recommendations of alleged 
cases of human rights abuses, have facilitated the possibility of authoritarian 
practices in Nigeria.  
It should, however, be noted that there is a wide perception that allegations of 
human rights abuses by military personnel in internal security duties are of 
concern to the government of Goodluck Jonathan.  This is based on reports in the 
Punch Newspaper, such as that of 2 September 2012. That report noted concern of 
the federal government over the rising incidence of alleged human rights abuses 
by the military, observing that it had sent a bill to the National Assembly to 
address this issue. The bill, if passed into law “forbids unjustifiable attacks against 
civilian population” (Chiedozie 2012). Other offences that are deemed punishable 
include: 
Rape, torture, murder, extermination, deportation or forcible transfer of 
population, forced pregnancy or enforced sterilisation or any form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity. (Chiedozie 2012) 
The bill also states that: 
…. Soldiers that may directly be involved in such abuses, military commanders 
will also be liable for war crimes committed by the troops such as “extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly (Chiedozie 2012). 
The newspaper report concluded that all military personnel alleged to be culprits 
in human rights abuses would be liable to be tried by the International Criminal 
Court. 
As laudable as the bill may be, it is still unclear whether the bill would be passed 
into law by the National Assembly. What would the reaction of high ranking 
military officers be to this bill if they were invited to the defence committees of 
the National Assembly to air their views. For now, cases of human rights abuses 
by the military apparently continue unabated. The Punch Newspaper of 9 October 
2012 reported that operatives of the Joint Task Force (JTF) killed 30 persons in 
Maiduguri, Borno State, in reprisal for an attack on their patrol vehicle in the city. 
The report further noted that most of the victims that were attacked or killed by 
the soldiers during the reprisal attack were civilians. The report alleged that over 
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50 houses, shops and vehicles were burned by the soldiers during this ‘reprisal 
attack’ (Agency Reporter 2012).   
Chapter Summary 
This chapter investigated whether the lack of civilian control facilitates a new 
form of military authoritarianism in Nigeria. It analysed two hypotheses that are 
perceived to be crucial to our understanding of civilian control over the military. 
 
For hypothesis four, autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses 
since 1999, there may be a link between alleged human rights violations by the 
military and authoritarian practices in the polity. Even under military rule, and 
General Sani Abacha’s regime, a Human Rights Commission was established to 
address cases that involved alleged cases of human violations in the country. The 
author, however, found no evidence to suggest that since its establishment, 
commission reports investigations have been adequately pursued by the agencies 
responsible for the prosecution of violators of human rights. 
 
The fifth hypothesis, civilian government oversight remains weak, and this 
facilitates military authoritarianism, examined interviewees’ impression of the 
level of civilian expertise within the Ministry of Defence and the National 
Assembly, especially as regarded alleged cases of human rights abuses against the 
military. While President Goodluck Jonathan sent a bill to the National Assembly 
in 2012 that was meant to address cases of human rights violations brought 
against the security agencies in Nigeria, it is unclear whether the bill has been 
debated by the National Assembly. At present (2014), most cases against the 
military for alleged human rights violations are apparently still ignored. 
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Endnotes  
1) The Sultan of Sokoto is the supreme traditional leader of the Sokoto caliphate in 
present day Nigeria. The sultan is often regarded as the ‘Amir ul-Momineen’ 
translated to mean the commander of the faithful or the leader of the faithful in 
Nigeria. 
2) The Sokoto Caliphate is in present day Nigeria. At its peak in the 1800s, it included a 
significant portion of present day northern Nigeria. 
3) It is widely believed that part of the reason the HRVIC report has ever been officially 
published by the government is that several of the people involved in alleged human 
rights abuses (mostly high ranking retired military officers) are aware of the legal 
consequences this report may have on them. 
4) Personal interview with a serving Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 7, 
2011).  
5) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011). 
6) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011). 
7) Same officer. 
8) Same officer. 
9) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011). 
10) Personal interview with a retired Brigadier General, Lagos (May 27, 2011). 
11) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011). 
12) At present (2014), Nigeria does not have a well-articulated defence policy that 
involves all the main stakeholders. The current policy is derived from a draft policy 
that was produced by the Obasanjo government in 2001. As a result, each arm of the 
military has its own interpretation of the defence policy in terms of operational 
capabilities. 
13) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Ibadan (May 12, 2011). 
14) Personal interview with a serving Colonel, Kaduna (April 8, 2011). 
15) Same officer. 
16) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011).  
17) Personal interview with a retired Vice-Admiral, Lagos (May 30, 2011). 
18) Same officer. 
19) Personal interview with a serving Lieutenant-Colonel, Zaria (April 5, 2011). 
20) Same officer. 
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Chapter Five 
Military Expenditures and Authoritarianism in Nigeria 
Introduction   
Is a new form of military authoritarianism emerging in Nigeria? This chapter 
suggests that a significant increase in the military budget post-military rule might 
facilitate a form of military authoritarianism in a civilian-dominated era. The 
previous chapter discussed the roles of institutions that should limit the activities 
of the military especially in the area of allegations of human rights abuses. It also 
assessed other civilian institutions that are primarily responsible for on-going 
civilian control of the military. This chapter continues this investigation of the 
military’s behaviour in post-military Nigeria by comparing military expenditures 
of Nigeria with those of Ghana and Cameroon. One hypothesis is derived for 
examination: increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of 
military authoritarianism by creating a powerful and even hegemonic institution. 
Literature on the military’s budget in transitional states has been examined from 
different perspectives. There have been a number of empirical studies that suggest 
that when the military is in power, its corporate interest is to ensure that there is a 
significant increase in the monetary allocations accorded to the military as an 
institution. Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) stated that in most military regimes, the 
military elite in power needs the support of the military as an institution to 
consolidate their regime. As a result, there is usually the need to adequately cater 
to the budgetary demands of the military (increases in its budget) as a way of 
protecting the regime against opposition groups. Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) 
further states: 
… even when the threat from other opposition groups is minimal, the regime 
may not be in a position to reduce allocations to the military, since attempts to 
decrease the military budget may create discontent within the military, and 
destabilize the government. The regime then allocates resources to the military, 
not because it requires military services for its survival, but rather because there 
is need to buy off the military (Kimenyi and Mbaku 1995: 701). 
Similar views of the military acting in its corporate interests as regards its budget 
are discussed by Bayo Adekson (1981), Jenkins and Kposowa (1992), Robin 
Luckham (1998), and, Herbert Howe (2001). 
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In a Brazilian context, Alfred Stepan (1988) argues that at least part of the reason 
why the military decided to relinquish political power in 1985 was the decline in 
its military budget. The military in Brazil, to enhance legitimacy when in power, 
had deliberately under-funded itself, and subsequently reasoned that the only way 
it could effectively lobby for its monetary needs was to disengage itself from 
political power (Stepan 1988: 72-80). In a more recent study, Justin Clardie 
(2011) notes that in all post-military societies, the civilian political elite have 
basically two options as regards the military budget. The first is to further increase 
the allocation, because this may guarantee the success of the democratic transition 
as it serves as a ‘pacifying mechanism’ for the military. The alternative option 
suggests that decreasing the monetary allocation help to assure the success of the 
democratic transition because a financially strong military is more capable of 
influencing the political process (Clardie 2011). Some other studies have argued 
that increasing the monetary allocation to the military tends to have a negative 
impact on the economic development of transitional states because allocations are 
taken from other productive, often important, sectors such as education, health, 
agriculture, public works, and housing to pacify the military (Bel and Elias-
Moreno 2009; Stroup and Heckelman 2001; Clardie 2011; Dauda 2004; Adebakin 
and Raimi 2012).
1
  
Hypothesis Six: Increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new 
form of military authoritarianism. 
This hypothesis will examine whether increases in the military expenditures of 
Nigeria post-1999 could facilitate a new form of military authoritarianism in 
Nigeria. Military expenditure for this study, are defined according to Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as: 
all spending on current military forces and activities. It tries to also include 
current and capital spending on: the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; 
defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects; 
paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for 
military operations; and military space activities (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute 2013a).  
In a global context, significant increases in military spending are based on 
regional contextual realities, or regional strategic interests, and conflicts that may 
be present in a particular region of the world. According to SIPRI (2013b), the 
world’s military expenditures in 2012 were estimated at $1756 billion, 
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representing approximately 2.5 per cent of the global gross domestic product or 
$249 for each person in the world (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute 2013b: 125). This varies across regions however. In Western and Central 
Europe, and the United States, there has been a drastic reduction in military 
spending. This is largely due to the aftermath of the global economic crisis and 
the need for states within this region to adopt austerity measures to limit the 
vulnerability of their local economies to the global market. The SIPRI (2013b) 
report also noted that in Asia and Oceania, military spending increased slightly in 
2012, with significant increases in regional powers such as Indonesia and China, 
while military spending in India decreased. In addition, there were substantial 
increases in military spending in the Middle East and North Africa, while military 
spending in sub-Saharan Africa appears to have fallen. Lastly, all over Central and 
Meso America, military spending increased, especially in countries where there is 
a high level of insecurity, such as Mexico and Panama. Table 5.1 presents the 
military expenditures for 2012 by region, and the major increases or decreases in 
military expenditures of some countries within a region. 
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Table 5.1: Key Military Expenditure Statistics by Region 2012 
Region/Sub-
Region 
Military 
expenditure 
2012 (US 
$b) 
Change 
(%)
a 
2011-12 
2003-
12 
Major changes, 
2012 (%)
b
 
Increases 
Decreases 
Africa 
 
North Africa 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
(39.2) 
 
16.4 
 
 
 
(22.7) 
1.2 
 
7.8 
 
 
 
-3.2 
8.5 
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61 
Zimbabwe 53 
Cote d Ivoire 22 
Ghana 20 
Tunisia 20 
 
Uganda -57 
South Sudan -42 
Nigeria -12 
Botswana -7.0 
Americas 
Central 
America & 
Caribbean 
 
North 
America 
 
 
South 
America 
782 
 
8.6 
 
 
 
708 
 
 
 
65.9 
 
 
 
-4.7 
 
8.1 
 
 
 
-5.5 
 
 
 
3.8 
35 
 
70 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
62 
Paraguay 42 
Venezuela 39 
Peru 16 
Colombia 11 
El-Salvador -9.0 
Jamaica -8.2 
Ecuador -7.8 
USA -5.6 
Asia & 
Oceania 
 
Central & 
South Asia 
 
East Asia 
 
Oceania  
 
South  
East Asia 
390 
 
 
59.8 
 
 
268 
 
28.2 
 
 
33.7 
3.3 
 
 
-1.6 
 
 
5.0 
 
-3.7 
 
 
6.0 
63 
 
 
62 
 
 
72 
 
28 
 
 
37 
Kazakhstan [30] 
Vietnam 26 
Mongolia 24 
Indonesia 24 
Afghanistan -12 
Sri-Lanka -9.6  
Australia -4.0 
Thailand -3.4 
Europe  
 
Eastern  
Europe 
 
Western & 
Central 
Europe 
407 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
307 
2.0 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
-1.6 
10 
 
 
117 
 
 
 
-4.5 
 
Ukraine 24 
Estonia 17 
Bosnia 17 
Russia [16] 
Hungary -20 
Portugal -18 
Spain -13 
Middle East (138) 8.3 57 Oman 51 
Saudi Arabia 12 
Kuwait 10 
Iraq -3.6 
Egypt -2.6 
Source: (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2013b: 131) Notes: ( )= SIPRI uncertain estimate; [ ]=SIPRI 
estimate. a  changes in real terms; b the list shows the largest increases or decreases for each region as a whole, rather than 
by region. Countries with a military expenditure in 2012 of less than $100m, or $50m in Africa are excluded. 
The data in Table 5.1 also shows for the year 2012 that military expenditures in 
sub-Saharan Africa and in Nigeria in particular, have significantly decreased. The 
reliability of military expenditures data in sub-Saharan Africa are, however, 
difficult to verify based on the quality of data available from Nigeria and the rest 
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of the region. Most of the time, military expenditures in sub-Saharan African 
countries is shrouded in secrecy, or does not include other sources of monetary 
allocations to military institutions (Omitoogun and Hutchful 2006). Overall, South 
Africa, Angola, Morocco, Libya and Nigeria were regarded as the top military 
spenders on the continent in 2012 (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute 2013b). In the case of Nigeria, there appear to be two main factors that 
affect the data quality in military budgets as released by organisations that collate 
the defence expenditures: lack of comprehensiveness, and determination of actual 
expenditure of the ministry of defence (MOD). 
Lack of Comprehensiveness: A major challenge to virtually all data sources on 
military expenditures in Nigeria is a lack of comprehensiveness. The main reason 
for this is that military budgets tend to be narrowly defined as ‘government 
allocation to the MOD’ (Omitoogun and Hutchful 2006). Data sources fail to 
include extra-budgetary allocations to the military in their annual publications on 
Nigeria. Such allocations include security allocations for peacekeeping activities 
such as those through the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the United Nations. Lastly, even when some 
of these data sources try to distinguish in their annual reports the differences 
between military budgets and military expenditures, the data for Nigeria do not 
account for internal military-related projects that generate a source of income for 
the military. For example, income from products produced by the Defence 
Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) a significant money generator, are not 
included in such annual reports (Omitoogun and Oduntan 2006; Egbo et al. 2012). 
Determination of the Actual Expenditure of the MOD: Another problem that 
undermines the data quality of the military’s budget in Nigeria is the problem of 
ascertaining the actual expenditures for a given financial year. As is the usual 
practice in Nigeria since the return to civilian rule in 1999, budget estimates for 
the following year are sent to the National Assembly for deliberation and 
approval. The problem, however, is that at the end of the budgetary year, the 
actual amount released to the MOD is usually different from the initial estimates 
approved by the National Assembly (Omitoogun 2003; Willett 2009).    
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Despite the shortcomings highlighted, this study will use the annual reports of 
SIPRI and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) as the principal 
data sources for military expenditures in Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon.  
Cases  
The cross-national analysis for this study assesses two countries bordering on 
Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon, for the following reasons. While it is undeniable 
that Nigeria has the largest military expenditures and best equipped military in 
West Africa, in their political histories, all three of these countries have had 
periods of low intensity conflict and diplomatic tension. Both Nigeria and Ghana 
have similar histories of colonisation by the British, as well as their political 
elite’s commitment to end colonial and apartheid rule in Africa, and their periods 
of military authoritarian rule. The ‘infamous’ deportation programmes of both 
countries against each other’s citizens in the 1970s and early 1980s is similarly 
comparable (Diamond 1984; Gravil 1985). At present, in democratic 
consolidation and the establishment of responsive political management and 
governance, most studies rate Ghana over Nigeria (Freedom House 2014). 
Nigeria and Cameroon also share certain similarities though not as strongly as 
those between Ghana and Nigeria. In political history, for example, Southern 
Cameroons was a trustee territory of Nigeria until 1961, when the United Nations 
conducted a plebiscite to gauge whether the region would like to be part of 
Nigeria or Cameroon. The region voted for the latter. Also, both countries have 
had territorial disputes in the Bakassi Peninsula. This led to the involvement of 
both countries’ militaries in the early 1990s in the disputed area. Eventually, 
Cameroon took Nigeria to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994, and 
again in 2002, where the ICJ ruled in Cameroon’s favour. In governance, 
Cameroon is quite different from Nigeria and Ghana because it has had a long 
period of one political party dominating the political process, and a strong 
authoritarian ruler who has ruled for more than three decades.  
In sum, Ghana and Cameroon are good subjects with which to examine Nigeria 
because they offer comparisons of two different extremes in their political 
systems, although all three have a semblance of Western-style liberal democracy. 
Ghana is seen, by most Western countries and organisations, as a model country 
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within the sub-region, regarded as having transitioned successfully from military 
authoritarian rule, and as being on the track towards fully consolidating its 
democracy. Cameroon, on the other hand, is seen as occupying another extreme, a 
heavily flawed democratic system with a president who has undermined the 
political processes since he assumed political power in 1982. Nigeria appears to 
be positioned between the two ends of this political spectrum. Ghana and 
Cameroon are important because they help our understanding of military 
expenditures across the different political systems and the possible trends within 
the region.
2
 
Method  
Microsoft Excel (2007) was used for the analysis of this hypothesis, which 
examined the military expenditures of Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon from the 
early 1980s to 2013. The data result is presented in a time-series graph. In the 
annual military expenditures for the three countries examined, the monetary 
values are in constant 2011 US$ millions. The three countries were examined 
under two categories. The first category analysed the military expenditures under 
absolute authoritarian rule: for Ghana and Nigeria, the period of military rule, 
while for Cameroon, the period of the one-party state system. The second 
category examined military expenditures of the countries after the introduction of 
a multi-party electoral system: for Ghana and Nigeria, the transition from military 
authoritarian rule to civilian rule, and for Cameroon, the legal provision that 
allowed for other political parties to contest the ruling party. 
Military expenditure data for the year 1987 is missing for Cameroon, and the 
years 1982, 1983 and 1987, for Ghana. 
Results 
The data for military expenditures under authoritarian rule are presented in 
Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. For Cameroon, they reveal that the country’s military 
expenditures after the commencement of the one-party state system under 
President Paul Biya (1982 to date) showed an initial constant increase in 
expenditures. This, however, changed around 1988, when spending decreased. 
Expenditures for subsequent years remained similar to the 1982 level until the end 
of absolute authoritarian rule in 1992.  
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Figure 5.1: Cameroon: Military Expenditure under Absolute Authoritarian Rule 
 
Ghana’s military expenditures under military authoritarian rule showed a different 
pattern from that of Cameroon. Its expenditures decreased in the first four years of 
the military assumption of power, but experienced a constant increase from 1988 
until the end of military rule in Ghana in 1993. 
Figure 5.2: Ghana: Military Expenditure under Absolute Authoritarian Rule 
   
Compared to the other two countries, Nigeria’s military expenditures under 
military authoritarian rule differed in its pattern. As with Ghana, there was a 
decrease in the country’s military expenditure from 1984 to around 1987. 
Thereafter, Nigeria’s military expenditures fluctuated, but not as significantly 
when compared to its pre-1987 levels. Overall, it seems Nigeria’s military 
expenditures under absolute authoritarian rule differ from Cameroon but was 
similar to that of Ghana. 
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Figure 5.3: Nigeria: Military Expenditure under Absolute Authoritarian Rule 
  
Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 present the results of Cameroon, Ghana and Nigeria 
after the introduction of the multi-party electoral system. The results for 
Cameroon and Ghana show similar patterns in the sense that its military 
expenditures did not increase significantly in the first four years after the end of 
military rule for Ghana, and the introduction of multi-party elections in Cameroon. 
In fact, for Cameroon, military expenditures decreased in 1994, maintaining a 
similar pattern until 1997 when its expenditures increased significantly. Ghana’s 
military expenditures remained virtually the same in 1994 and 1995, decreasing 
over the next two years (1996 and 1997) until 1998, when they began to increase.  
Figure 5.4: Cameroon: Military Expenditure under Multi-Party Electoral System 
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 Figure 5.5: Cameroon: Military Expenditure after the Removal of Term Limit for Paul Biya 
    
Figure 5.6: Ghana Military Expenditure under Multi-Party Electoral System 
 
Figure 5.7: Ghana Military Expenditure after Jerry Rawlings 
 
Nigeria’s pattern of military expenditures differed from that of Ghana and 
Cameroon at the start of its multi-party system (the Fourth Republic). Its military 
expenditures in the first three years after the end of military authoritarian rule 
increased significantly. This contrasted with both Ghana and Cameroon, where 
expenditures remained relatively constant or decreased. 
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Figure 5.8: Nigeria Military Expenditure under Multi-Party Electoral System 
  
Discussion 
The result of the cross-national analyses of the military expenditures of Nigeria, 
Ghana and Cameroon suggest that the pattern of military expenditures in Nigeria 
differed from the other two countries examined under the period of absolute 
authoritarianism. The notion that, according to some studies, the military’s 
corporate interest while in power is to significantly increase its budget does not 
appear to apply to Nigeria (Kimenyi and Mbaku 1995; Howe 2001). This result 
for Nigeria confirms the empirical findings of Anyanwu, Egwaikhide and 
Aiyedogbon (2012), in which they argued, based on a comparative study of 
Nigeria’s military expenditure under the Second Republic, the period of military 
authoritarian rule and the Fourth Republic, that the military allocated less funds 
for itself while in power (Anyanwu et al. 2012: 99). Their main finding is 
presented in Table 5.2 (below).
3
 
Table 5.2: Military Expenditure as a Percentage of Federal Government Expenditure 
Years/Period of 
Civilian/Military 
Rule 1980-2010 
Regime 
Type 
Total 
Milex
4
  
Total Federal 
Government 
Expenditure 
(₦ Million)  
Milex as a % 
of Federal 
Govt 
Expenditure 
1980-1983 Civilian 4,674.80 47,942 9.75 
1984-1998 Military 83,056.44 2,203,275.30 3.77 
1999-2010 Civilian 976,100.74 21,866,990.9 4.46 
Sources: (Anyanwu et al. 2012: 99) Table Computed from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin Dec. 2009 
and Annual Report and Statement of Accounts Dec. 2010.  
Based on the findings on Nigeria, it is logical to assume that, as in Brazil, part of 
the reason the military handed over power in 1999 was to increase its budget. As 
Alfred Stepan (1988) observed regarding Brazil, there were combat soldiers in 
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distant garrisons and some top military officers who felt that the military elite in 
power had neglected the military’s needs, and therefore needed to disengage itself 
from power and pressure the civilian administration for a bigger budget (Stepan 
1988: 80). The political requirement of a military dictatorship to maintain its 
limited legitimacy precluded its ability, in the case of Brazil, at least, to raise its 
own military budget. The Nigerian military was in a similar situation after more 
than a decade in power. Military professionalism was at its lowest point and 
successive military elites in power had deliberately refused to allocate funds for 
newer and more sophisticated military equipment out of fear of a loss of 
legitimacy, or at least that junior officers might stage a coup that would be similar 
to that of the first coup in 1966 (First 1970; Ademoyega 1981; Babarinsa et al. 
1990).  
Do increases in the military expenditures facilitate new forms of military 
authoritarianism? While it can be argued that the increases in the latter years in 
Nigeria’s military expenditures appear to be linked with the level of insecurity in 
some parts of the country, the monetary allocations accorded the military seem to 
have been unchecked by institutions constitutionally mandated to have oversight 
functions over the military. Omitoogun and Oduntan (2006) argued that the 
challenges of civilian control over the budgetary process of the military sector in 
Africa are largely due to the lack of responsiveness of institutions that are legally 
and constitutionally mandated to ensure an on-going civilian control (Omitoogun 
and Oduntan 2006: 175). This is also confirmed by some of my interviewees 
(chapter four) in their discussion of whether there were civilian or legislative 
enquiries as regarded military personnel who were alleged to have committed 
human rights abuses in internal security duties. At present, there have also been 
calls made to the National Assembly by trade unions and other groups in civil 
society to investigate funds released to the military to fight the Boko Haram 
insurgency in the northeast of Nigeria. This is against the backdrop of the 
continued onslaught by this sect in numerous villages and towns which have led 
to hundreds of civilian casualties. However, the chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Petroleum and Downstream, Senator Magnus Abe, stated that the 
Senate would not probe the funds released to the military to fight the insurgency. 
Abe added that: 
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The call on the National Assembly by the Nigerian Labour Congress to 
investigate funds appropriated to the military to fight insurgency is a two-edged 
sword. First of all, the military right now is involved in a sensitive operation to 
stabilise the country and provide adequate security. If we start any form of public 
probe and the military thinks we are only interested in the money and not the 
efforts at combating insurgency that may become counterproductive. The troops 
would not feel supported. However, clearly, there are issues dealing with the 
ways our security funds are being expanded. We have more money than Boko 
Haram, we have more personnel than them, so if we spend our money properly, 
it should show in the field… I think it is rather between the Commander-in-Chief 
and the military authorities that should go back to the drawing board, find out 
what happened to the money that are being released for security operations and 
how well the money was being spent. What are the target areas of the money and 
who is ensuring that the money actually gets to those it should get to and that the 
money is achieving the purpose for which it was released. At this point, I will not 
advocate for the National Assembly to carry out that investigation but I will 
insist on a thorough, internal review of the financial dealings as regards the 
security votes, war on terror and the expenditure of the federal government on 
security. It is a very critical point and nobody should overlook it. Our troop[s] 
should be well motivated with money, training and necessary equipment to 
prosecute the war against insurgency (Vanguard Newspaper 2014).   
In sum, and based on Senator Abe’s response to the question, it seems enquiries 
into military spending, especially during periods of crises, remain unanswered and 
devoid of legislative oversight, even though it appears the Commander-in-Chief 
would be able to initiate such an inquiry. 
Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter examined whether military expenditures were increasing in post-
1999 Nigeria, and whether, if so, might facilitate new forms of military 
authoritarianism in Nigeria. To investigate the first part of this hypothesis, a cross-
national analysis of military expenditures of Ghana, Cameroon and Nigeria was 
examined. Two categories were used to analyse the three countries. The first 
category examined military expenditures under periods of absolute authoritarian 
rule, while the second category analysed military expenditures under multi-party 
electoral systems. The findings suggest that Nigeria’s military allocations under a 
period of absolute authoritarianism differed from those of Cameroon in similar 
periods. Nigeria’s expenditures did not increase significantly. Also, when these 
three countries transitioned into multi-party electoral systems, only Nigeria’s 
military expenditures significantly increased, at least in the first three years of the 
new administration.  
The author, therefore, argued that it is logical to assume for Nigeria that, as in 
Brazil, part of the reason the military decided to hand over power in 1999 was to 
augment its defence budget. The military elite, aware of the institutional decay 
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that had occurred within the military and its inability while in power to jeopardise 
its legitimacy by raising the military budget deliberately under-funded any 
significant modernisation programme of the military during their period in power. 
The only means by which the military could then truly re-professionalise and 
modernise was through their disengagement from power. Based on the foregoing, 
and secondary evidence that links military budgets to institutional power, this 
chapter argues that it is plausible to assume that increases in military expenditures 
may facilitate new forms of military authoritarianism. In the areas where the 
military were heavily engaged due to heightened levels of insecurity, the 
institution primarily responsible for on-going civilian control, the National 
Assembly appears to be unresponsive to its constitutionally required mandate to 
oversee the monetary allocations budgeted to the military.   
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Endnotes 
1. Adebakin and Raimi (2012) argue that the monetary allocation given to national 
security in Nigeria is economically unsustainable. To support their claim, they 
compared the federal government recurrent expenditure on education, agriculture, 
health and construction with that of national security. The primary data used in their 
analysis is presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Federal Government Recurrent Expenditure (₦ Million) 
Year Security  Education Agriculture Health Construction GDP 
1961 9.47 4.52 0.42 1.81 0.59 2361.2 
1965 27.73 10.61 6.08 1.88 25.29 3110.0 
1970 135.18 24.44 1.92 12.48 14.28 5205.1 
1975 610.11 126.5 22.48 52.85 31.97 20957 
1980 595.13 155.81 17.14 52.79 46.03 49632.3 
1985 1430.2 258.60 20.36 132.02 151.11 70633.2 
1990 6540.2 2,402.80 258.00 500.70 643.40 271908 
1995 11855.2 9,746.40 1,510.40 3,320.70 1,699.10 1934831 
2000 68556.99 57,956.64 6,335.80 15,218.08 4,991.09 4727523 
2001 85922.29 39,882.60 7,064.55 24,522.27 7,202.04 5374335 
2002 132369.9 80,530.88 9,993.55 40,621.42 7,452.14 6232244 
2003 119444 64,782.15 7,537.35 33,267.98 16,951.37 6061700 
2004 174117.5 76,524.65 11,256.15 34,197.14 14,897.01 11411067 
2005 153618.1 82,795.06 16,325.60 55,661.63 17,914.96 15610882 
2006 202200 87,294.56 17,212.81 62,300.00 20,100.00 18564595 
2007 253400 107,529.39 21,202.73 81,900.00 71,300.00 20,657.317 
2008 164500 164,000.0 65,400.0 98,200.00 94,500.00 24,296,329 
2009 276490 137,156.6 22,435.2 90,200.00 80,630.00 24,794,238 
2010 422900 170,800.00 25,200.00 99,100.00 138,050.00 29,205,782 
2011 563200 335,800.00 41,200.00 231,800.00 195,900.00 33,994,612 
 Sources: Adebakin and Raimi (2012: 21). Computed from Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazettes, Central Bank of 
Nigeria (1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000-2011). 
2. According to the Freedom House 2014 Freedom of the World Report, Nigeria is 
classified as partly free, Ghana—free and Cameroon—not free (Freedom House 
2014).  
3. Check appendix 17 for Nigeria’s total defence expenditure as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP). It confirms the claim that the military allocated less to itself 
while in power. 
4. Milex stands for military expenditure. 
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Chapter Six 
Summary and Conclusion 
This thesis has examined whether there is a new form of military authoritarianism 
in Nigeria. To explore this research question, a “mixed-method procedures” 
(Creswell 2003: 208-225) research strategy that included qualitative and 
quantitative strategies was implemented. The main qualitative collection strategy 
was that of field research, conducted in the first half of 2011 in the form of elite 
interview, where the author interviewed serving and retired high ranking military 
officers based on a structured interview technique, even though the interviewee 
had the opportunity to air their personal opinions regarding events or questions 
(see appendix 18, for University of Waikato approved interview questions and 
other ethics documents). The selection of the officers interviewed was limited to 
those who had been enlisted in the military before the start of the Fourth Republic. 
In addition, some of the officers interviewed are holding or have held top 
positions in the military, and for the retired officers, some of the interviewees had 
held political positions such as military administrators, during military rule. 
Overall, 18 officers were contacted and 12 accepted the invitation to be 
interviewed. 
A quantitative strategy was also used that involved a cross-national analysis of the 
military expenditures of Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon. The data collection 
involved data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Other primary sources 
used for this thesis included archival research, were the author collected relevant 
newspapers reports, news magazine articles, editorials, official government 
documents, and previous Nigeria constitutions. For secondary sources, the author 
used a document analysis technique (McNabb 2004: 365). The main secondary 
data sources used in this thesis were relevant journal articles and textbooks on 
civil-military relations, democracy and democratization, comparative politics, 
Nigerian history and military intervention in Africa. Contemporary newspapers 
and news magazine articles and editorials were also used from reputable print 
media organizations such as The Economist, Nigerian Tribune, the Guardian 
Newspaper (Nigeria), the Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) Vanguard Newspaper 
(Nigeria) and others. 
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The ‘single-country studies as comparison’ case study methodology in the broader 
subfield of comparative politics was used in the analysis. The ‘new 
institutionalism’ methodological approach, pioneered by March and Olsen (1984) 
framed the way this study was approached. The approach is derived from the 
traditional institutional analytical approach, although it differs in that political 
institutions are no longer equated with political organizations. Rather, they are 
seen as sets of ‘rules’ that guide and constrain the behaviour of individual actors. 
The new institutionalists are concerned with informal conventions of political life 
as well as the formal constitutions and organizational structures (Lowndes 2010). 
Alfred Stepan’s (1988) Latin American concept of ‘military prerogatives’ was 
applied to Nigeria herein. Military prerogatives are defined as: 
Those areas where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution 
assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise 
effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra military 
areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the 
state and political or civil society (Stepan 1988: 65). 
In brief, this concept initially examines, in a Latin American context, military 
behaviour in a transitional phase from prolonged military dictatorship to re-
democratization. Stepan (1988) identifies these military prerogatives in an early 
democratizing society as: 
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The constitutionally sanctioned independent role the military; 
The military’s special relationship with the chief executive; 
The retention of the military as the institution in-charge for the coordination of 
the defence sector; 
The guarantee of places in the civilian cabinet for active-duty military officers; 
A weak or non-existent role of the legislature in the oversight of the military; 
The special role of senior career civil servants or political appointees in 
designing and implementing defence and national security policy; 
The active participation of the military in intelligence agencies; 
The operational command of senior active-duty military officers over the police; 
The exclusive role of the military in its internal promotions; 
The appointment of military officers to head state enterprises; and, 
The role of the military court’s jurisdiction outside of the narrow internal 
offences against military discipline (Stepan 1988: 94-97). 
The author, aware of the contextual differences between Latin American military 
establishments and that of Nigeria, justified the use of Stepan’s (1988) concept of 
military prerogatives in Nigeria based upon Nigerian military’s uniquely high 
level of professionalism in the African context, and close comparisons with the 
Brazilian military interlude. While Stepan’s concept may not fully apply to most 
African countries, there are three important features that make it applicable to 
Nigeria. First, after almost three decades in power, the military as an institution 
has apparently been guided, to a large extent, by what it perceives to be the ‘true 
nationalistic mission’ of the Nigerian military (Abegunrin 2003). This military-
crafted nationalistic mission initially developed during the start of the civil war in 
1967, and appears to have been consolidated a decade after the war ended in 1970 
(Oyediran 1979). The central theme of this mission has significantly emphasised 
the indivisibility of Nigeria, and appears to have placed the military as the 
principal focus for ensuring national unity (Frank and Ukpere 2012; Hill 2012; 
Ehwarieme 2011). Second, the military in Nigeria, like that in Brazil, appears to 
have constructed a unique identity for itself after re-democratization, one set 
against a background of mutually accommodating and antagonistic ethnic 
identities in the country. This unique identity seems to be evidence of the degree 
of autonomy the military has over its affairs. Third, in a Nigerian context, military 
prerogatives, a concept that Stepan derived from the Brazilian case, appear to 
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highlight accurately the conflicts that have arisen between a ‘re-professionalized’ 
military institution and civilians. 
Six hypotheses were from the research question explored, and this formed the 
body of this study: hypothesis one, the military in Nigeria has retained significant 
military prerogatives; hypothesis two, the military has intervened in politics post-
1999; hypothesis three, retired military officers are gaining influential political 
and economic positions; hypothesis four, autonomous military involvement in 
human rights abuses since 1999; hypothesis five, civilian government oversight 
remains weak, and facilitates military authoritarianism; and lastly, hypothesis six, 
increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of military 
authoritarianism. 
Hypothesis one, the military in Nigeria has retained significant prerogatives, 
tested whether military prerogatives constituted a new form of authoritarianism in 
Nigeria. To test this hypothesis, the author relied on the primary data sources 
(interviews) from the field research conducted in 2011, and the behaviour of 
media, the latter seen only as an indicator. Basically, and from a theoretical 
perspective, this hypothesis analysed the concept of military prerogatives as 
postulated by Alfred Stepan (1988) in Nigeria. It discussed and justified the 
applicability of this concept to Nigeria and concluded that the military in Nigeria 
have retained four out of the eleven prerogatives as enumerated by Stepan in the 
case of Brazil. These four prerogatives include: the Nigerian military’s 
constitutional mission; its role in the defence sector; its role in intelligence; and 
lastly, the low level of legislative and civilian oversight. These military 
prerogatives have to some degree facilitated authoritarian tendencies in the polity 
because they provide the military with the ability to search for new missions and 
roles without adequate and effective civilian and legislative oversight. Lastly, the 
retention of these prerogatives after the dictatorships appear to discourage 
adequate funding and training of other security agencies, such as the police, 
whose primary role is the maintenance of law and order. There is, in sum, an over-
reliance on the military in breakdowns of law and order in the country. 
Hypothesis two, the military has intervened in politics post-1999, assessed the 
level of military involvement in the polity and examined whether this constituted 
a new form of military authoritarianism. The examination of this hypothesis relied 
162 
 
on key security-related media reports on the military after 1999, and concluded 
that it may have contributed to a new form of military authoritarianism based on 
the sheer number of internal security-related duties that the military has been 
involved with post-1999. It also observed that minus the many allegations of 
human rights violations by the military in internal security duties, this level of 
internal security involvement of the military seems to have its own challenges 
considering the historical antecedent of ‘over-involvement’ of the military in the 
political process. As William Ehwarieme (2011) comments: 
… it is important to note that since 1999, civilian authorities have been deploying 
the armed forces to handle civil and political crises as in the deployment of 
troops to Odi, Ekiti gubernatorial rerun elections and the Niger-Delta. Indeed, 
officers commanding the military Joint Task Force (JTF) deployed to the oil rich 
region have become household names in Nigeria. Over time, such continued use 
of the military could lead to increased visibility, creation of networks with 
civilian populations, and a sense of military self-importance that have 
encouraged military intervention in the past (Ehwarieme 2011: 507). 
Hypothesis three, retired military officers are gaining influential political and 
economic positions, examined whether the sheer number of high ranking military 
officers contesting and winning important political positions such as, the position 
of the president, senate president, members of houses of the federal national 
assembly among others, constitute a new form of military authoritarianism in 
Nigeria. It also examined the economic interests of high ranking retired military 
officers. The examination of this hypothesis relied on the data gathered during the 
field research (interviews) conducted in 2011 as the primary data source for 
analysis for this study. Overall, this hypothesis found little or no current evidence 
to suggest that high ranking retired military officers had any significant link with 
the military institution they retired from that could facilitate a form of military 
authoritarianism in Nigeria. It seems based on the empirical evidence presented 
that the retired military officers’ phenomenon in the country is a passing phase in 
Nigeria’s political history. This is based on the ages of those retired officers who 
have previously dominated the political process. Also, excluding those officers 
compulsorily retired in 1999, and those who retired before then, no group of high 
ranking retired officers have dominated the political process, or the economic 
sector of the country. It is also questionable whether their loyalty to the military 
establishment that, in many cases, forced their retirements, would be sufficient to 
sustain some elements of conspiracy. 
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Hypothesis four, autonomous military involvement in human rights abuses since 
1999, examined whether the military has had significant latitude in determining 
how they engage in internal security duties and this without adequate civilian 
oversight; and whether this is a contributing factor in the many allegations of 
human rights violations by the military. The study relied in this hypothesis on the 
answers given by the author’s respondents (retired and serving military officers) 
during field research conducted in 2011. In sum, and based on the empirical 
evidence presented, it would appear that the military has had autonomous 
involvement in internal security missions, and that this has led to human rights 
abuses. This in turn, appears to have created renewed authoritarian tendencies 
within the polity. It also started that under military rule, a human rights 
commission was established. At present, it is yet to be seen whether the 
commission’s findings of human rights abuses in the military will proceed to the 
courts. 
Hypothesis five, civilian government oversight remains weak, and facilitates 
military authoritarianism investigated whether institutions constitutionally and 
legally empowered by law, to have oversight over the military, are weak, and 
whether this facilitates a new form of military authoritarianism. The study, again, 
relied on the responses given by the respondents (serving and retired military 
officers) who were interviewed, on the behaviour of key media outlets, as evident 
in reports and editorials, and on abundant secondary sources that tend to affirm 
my primary sources. The analysis showed that there appear to be significant 
weaknesses in institutions responsible for oversight of the military. It also showed 
that these weaknesses in civilian oversight are noticeable in human rights 
violations alleged against the military, and the inability of these civilian 
institutions to properly investigate such claims and ensure that due process of the 
law is followed for any alleged offenders. Although the current government of 
Goodluck Jonathan has sent a bill to the National Assembly that forbids military 
personnel from committing unjustifiable attacks against civilian populations in 
their area of internal security duties, it is yet to be seen whether the bill will be 
passed and if it is passed, whether it will limit such cases alleged against the 
military, given the low level of civilian oversight. 
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Hypothesis six, increases in military expenditures might facilitate a new form of 
military authoritarianism, examined whether increases in the defence budget post-
military rule may facilitate new forms of military authoritarianism in a civilian 
dominated era. To ensure a level of objectivity in this study, a cross-national 
analysis of the military expenditures of Ghana and Cameroon was compared with 
Nigeria. The data was from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The author 
argued based on the data, for Nigeria, as for Brazil, part of the reason the military 
decided to hand-over power in 1999 had to do with its weak budgets. It seems that 
the military elite, concerned with the loss of legitimacy that would be suffered if 
the military dictatorship raised the military budget, and aware of the institutional 
decay that had occurred within the military, and the fear of a junior officers coup 
d'état, as a result, had deliberately under-funded any significant modernisation 
programme of the military during their periods in power. The only way the 
military could then truly re-professionalise and modernise was through their dis-
engagement from power. Based on the foregoing, it was stated that it is plausible 
to assume that increases in military expenditures might facilitate new forms of 
military authoritarianism. It is logical to suggest this, considering that in the areas 
where the military were heavily engaged, the institution primarily responsible for 
on-going civilian control (the National Assembly) appears not to have been 
responsive to its constitutionally required mandate, especially as regards military 
allocations and expenditures.   
Aside from these hypotheses, Chapter Two provides the necessary background to 
this thesis. It is impossible to do effective research on authoritarianism in Nigeria 
without discussing the role of ethnicity and the significant impact on the political 
processes of the country that this exercises. Although ethnicity was not part of my 
interview questions during the course of my field research in 2011, several of the 
high ranking serving and retired military interviewees volunteered that the role 
ethnicity has been crucial in the military. Some interviewees, however, also 
volunteered that ethnic tensions had improved, suggesting that a separate military 
identity, a ‘quasi-ethnicity’ had gradually emerged and was allowing the military 
to avoid internal schisms, and to play the ethno-political game more effectively.  
Chapter Two explored whether multi-ethnic states such as Nigeria tend to have 
authoritarian systems. It discussed the theoretical underpinnings regarding this 
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question, and concluded that there was no general consensus among scholars on 
whether multi-ethnic states in the African context are prone to authoritarian 
practices. The chapter also examined some pre-colonial semi-autonomous and 
autonomous kingdoms subsumed in present day Nigeria and how the merging of 
these kingdoms by the British to create Nigeria in 1914 has impacted negatively 
on the country’s development post-independence. Such areas include the ethnic 
driven politics that were largely instrumental for the failure of the first, second 
and third republics; the Biafra civil war; the first and second military coups had 
several ethnic underpinnings; and the other major ethnic driven politics/conflicts 
that Nigeria have dealt with since independence. Lastly, the chapter as noted 
above, returned to the ethnic factors that became prevalent in the military, and 
discussed post-1999 whether the military had developed a distinct quasi-ethnic 
identity for itself within the context of the various ethno-religious driven demands 
and conflicts that seem to threaten the very existence of the Nigerian state. 
In summary, and based on the primary and secondary data used for this thesis, 
several observations can be made about the Nigerian military as an institution. 
1. The Nigerian military today appear to have a virtual monopoly over national 
security. Contributing factors to this include: the legal and constitutional roles 
of the military that appear to allow for role expansion and the continual 
adoption of new missions, without adequate civilian oversight; and the failure 
of civilian enforcement agencies (notably the police), and the political elite to 
adequately address the many ethno-religious, economic and societal concerns 
that have significantly increased post-1999. 
2. Apart from the defence budget that is deliberated upon in the National 
Assembly, there is little if any legislative oversight of the military, especially 
in cases where there are alleged human rights violations. In addition, some of 
my interviewees stated that top military service chiefs can only attend House 
of Representative or Senate committee hearings if granted approval by the 
president. 
3. There appear to be significant weaknesses in civilian expertise as regards 
defence matters in Nigeria: in virtually all cases, the military is only 
answerable to the president. 
4. The three arms of the armed forces (navy, army, and air-force) work relatively 
independently of each other, even though they do claim to work as a 
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coordinated unit. One of my interviewees stated that military equipment that is 
not compatible with the other arms of the military is sometimes purchased. 
5. Military promotions are purely a military affair expect for top political 
positions, for which the president requires the ratification of the National 
Assembly. 
6. The depth of ethno-religious sentiments within the military cannot be over-
stated, although based on the comments made by some of my interviewees 
they are not as significant as in the past. The author argues that the military 
may be in the initial stages of forming a distinct quasi-ethnic identity for itself, 
as mentioned in chapter two. 
7. Military deployments in internal security matters and alleged cases of human 
rights abuses will continue to rise as long as the level of insecurity in the 
country is not properly addressed. Within this context, it seems practically 
impossible, based on the current institutional arrangement, to control combat 
soldiers if their colleagues are killed or wounded in internal engagements. A 
retired officer observed that in such situations, it is even difficult for the 
commanding officer to restrain soldiers as this may put the commanding 
officer’s life at risk. 
8. The Nigerian army created a section called the Department of Civil-Military 
Relations in 2011, during the time of my field research. The department, 
according to an officer who spoke about this, was created as an avenue were 
ordinary citizens could source information and better understand the activities 
of the army. It should be noted also that even before the creation of this 
department, the army’s corporate affairs section dealt with similar cases. As at 
the time of my field research, none of these departments were easily accessible 
by the public except by invitation from an officer who worked in the army 
headquarters. The security personnel at the gate of the army headquarters in 
Abuja told the author he would not be granted entry because of the Freedom 
of Information (FOI) bill, which at that time had not been signed into law, and 
this failure meant the author could not be granted access to this particular 
department in the army headquarters. 
9. Finally, all of my interviewees agreed that the system was not perfect, but 
noted that it was, however, evolving in phases. 
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Conclusion 
As noted earlier, the aim of this thesis has been to focus on assessing whether a 
new form of military authoritarianism is emerging in Nigeria. Based on the 
empirical evidence, the author could not identify a new form of military 
authoritarianism. However, the legal, institutional, constitutional, and operational 
framework of the military, which is largely devoid of civilian oversight and 
effective civilian expertise in military affairs, has contributed significantly to 
authoritarian practices in the country post-1999. Table 6.1 (below) presents the 
author’s findings on Nigeria based on the earlier discussed most potential 
important variables or manifestation of a new form of military authoritarianism in 
a democratising phase.   
Table 6.1: Dimensions of a New Form of Military Authoritarianism in 
Democratising Nigeria 
Arena Dimension Degree of 
civilian control 
1) Military prerogatives Military mission 
Role of national assembly 
Coordination of defence sector 
Role in intelligence 
Emerging  
Low 
Emerging 
Emerging 
2) Media perception of 
military internal 
engagement 
Media commentaries of the military Low  
3) Retired military officers Retired military officers in politics 
Retired military officers in the 
economic sector 
High 
High  
4) Human rights Military attitudes towards allegations 
of human rights abuses 
Emerging  
5) Civilian military expertise Civilian expertise on military matters Emerging  
6) Military budget Control of budget Low  
 
The conclusion of this study appears to confirm a recent quantitative study of 
transitional states that have cultures of military intervention by Rollin Tusalem 
(2013). Tusalem argues that in the past: 
Transitional states where the military apparatus has a large role in shaping 
policies, are more likely to have lower levels of democratic accountability and 
are more likely to reverse democratic gains… politicised military institutions and 
the institutional legacy of overthrowing civilian regimes in pre-transitional past 
have an enduring effect in eroding prospects for democratic consolidation (2013: 
13). 
The importance of this argument cannot be over-emphasised, given the current 
state of high insecurity in some parts of country, and the rise of a violent, 
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religiously inspired militia group, Boko Haram. The apparent failure of security 
agencies, and especially the military, to deal with the current challenge of Boko 
Haram and other ethno-religious crises since 1999 suggests that the institutional 
framework that guides the military and civil society appears to be inadequate. 
Areas that are of importance in this regard include: 
1. How the executive uses the military as part of the administration;  
2. How to address the increasing autonomy of the military and its tendency to 
search for new missions in the absence of civilian oversight. If this condition 
persists, it may ultimately allow the military to act as if it is not part of any 
administration; and 
3. The articulation of an effective national defence policy and armed forces act 
for Nigeria. Such articulation should include inputs from all stakeholders and 
the relevant NGOs in the country. 
Overall, the Nigerian political elite may need to re-think how to effectively 
administer the military in a civilian-dominated era. It may, for example, want to 
apply some of the institutional measures adopted by Spain, which was in a similar 
situation some four decades ago (Linz 2000). Narcis Serra (2009) while 
describing how Spain was able to reform its military from the country’s 
transitional phase to democratic consolidation, identifies four areas of institutional 
reforms that non-consolidated democracies need to resolve vis-à-vis their military 
establishments: define new missions for the armed forces; continue with the 
modernization of the security and defence sector; foster mechanism of regional 
cooperation in security; and guide and direct the armed forces. 
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Define new missions for the armed forces, especially in areas of human security 
and international collaboration. This definition will help prevent the armed forces 
from attempting to cover any perceived legitimacy deficit that would entail the 
mere continuity of traditional missions, or seeking out of new domestic missions, 
which might imply unacceptable interventionism in the state or displace the 
civilian administration from its own task. 
Continue with the modernization of the security and defence sector, establishing 
[or strengthening] ministries of defence [to make them] equivalent to those 
existing in already consolidated democracies. 
Foster mechanism of regional cooperation in the field of security as the 
European process has been essential to solving problems in Spain. 
Guide and direct the armed forces of each country toward a progressive 
contribution to regional and international governance (Serra 2009: 89).  
Some of the suggestions made by Serra may not be easily applied to a Nigerian 
context because of the profound contextual differences between Spain and 
Nigeria.  This is especially true in the area of regional and African contributions 
of armed forces personnel to deal with Nigeria or regional security concerns. Part 
of the reason has to do with the huge financial commitment of maintaining such a 
regional force.  Nigeria’s neighbours seem not to have the necessary financial 
resources available to them. In addition, there are relatively low levels of 
technological sophistication among the neighbouring countries, including Nigeria, 
to effectively deal with some of the security concerns without external assistance 
from more militarily advanced countries.   
However, as earlier stated in this chapter, this thesis has concluded, based on the 
empirical evidence presented, that the current institutional arrangement for the 
military seems to have contributed to authoritarian practices. This suggests that 
institutional reform is needed to adequately cater to the many challenges that the 
Nigerian state faces.  
Finally, even though the author could not identify a new form of military 
authoritarianism in Nigeria, it is still worth asking why the military decided to 
hand-over power when it did in 1999. Based on the empirical findings of 
hypothesis six (chapter five), part of the reason why the military relinquish power 
in 1999 was because of its waning military budgets. It needed to dis-engage from 
politics so that it could gain more allocations to modernise and re-professionalise 
its institution after it had suffered from a decade of neglect. This feature, which 
the Nigerian military shares with the Brazilian military at the tail end of military 
authoritarian rule in Brazil, may justify, at least in part, the application of a 
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concept initially used to understand the military’s behaviour in a transitional 
phase in Latin America, the retention of military prerogatives well into a period of 
democratisation. 
Further Areas of Research 
The research findings of this thesis suggest that there is not, in the evidence, 
support for the conclusion that a new military authoritarianism is emerging in 
Nigeria. The current institutional framework of the military does, however, seem 
to contribute to authoritarian practices within the polity. This thesis offers three 
main contributions to the framework of research on civil-military relations in 
emerging democracies.  
First, to my own knowledge, there has been no systematic theoretical discussion 
of the military in Nigeria that applies Alfred Stepan’s (1988) concept of military 
prerogatives to military behaviour in Nigeria. While several authors on civil-
military relations in Nigeria agree that insufficient civilian control of the military 
in some way affects the quality of democratic governance, virtually all of the 
literature has tended to focus more on its potential to lead to military intervention. 
This thesis, then, offers the first comprehensive theoretical argument regarding 
military behaviour in a transitional phase, and how it might affect the 
civilianisation process in Nigeria.  
Second, by disaggregating the issue-areas of this thesis into six core areas 
(hypotheses), this research has revealed the complexity of civil-military relations 
in Nigeria. Most recent studies on civil-military relations in Nigeria have been 
unclear as to the state and the achievement of civilian control of the military. The 
application of Stepan’s (1988) concept of military prerogatives to Nigeria 
provides a potential set of institutional indicators together with a sharpened 
research question. This analytical framework provides an empirical tool for 
assessing in detail this case, as well as others.  
Finally, by explicitly framing this thesis analysis within a discussion of civil-
military relations, it has provided a possible basis for a stringent scholarly debate 
in a Nigerian context. A systematic discussion of the impact of unrestricted 
military autonomy on the democratisation process holds broad comparative 
implications. This would appear to be a significant contribution to the body of 
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knowledge on civil-military relations in Nigeria. Furthermore, the approach used 
in this thesis allows for further rigorous analyses, and opens it up for critical 
evaluation by other scholars. 
This research does not claim to be a definite work on contemporary Nigerian 
politics. As stated, the main research method used for this thesis entailed field 
research where the author interviewed high ranking retired and serving military 
officers (elite interview technique). The limitations of my research design as 
observed during and after my field research devolve into three main points:  
1. The primary research method relied on the responses of military interviewees. 
However, the author realised during the course of these interviews that there 
seemed to be a significant level of bias in all the respondents. Some based on 
the positions they held or had held (retired officers), ‘blindly’ defended the 
military and justified some of the actions taken by this institution (some even 
defended past military rulers). Others were significantly uncooperative during 
the course of the interview, or stated that some of the questions asked were 
issues of national security and therefore could not be discussed. 
2. In terms of archival documents used for this thesis, getting access to official 
documents was surprisingly difficult. For example, it was almost impossible to 
find the annual military budgets from the early 1980s to date, numerous 
newspaper issues were missing from the archives, and some official 
government documents from the mid-1980s were also difficult to obtain. An 
official who helped me at the archives told me that this is partly due to 
Nigeria’s long decades of military rule, where the military elite did not allow 
adequate funding to the archives. With the re-emergence of civilian rule in 
1999, sourcing adequate funding is still a major issue according to this staff 
member. 
3. The sixth hypothesis analysed the military expenditures of Nigeria, Ghana, 
and Cameroon. As earlier noted in chapter five, the major limitation of 
military expenditure data in Nigeria, and to a considerable extent sub-Saharan 
Africa, is data quality. Therefore, researchers embarking on any statistical 
analyses of military spending in Nigeria or sub-Saharan African countries 
should be aware that their research findings are inevitably flawed to some 
extent, and may be subject to scholarly debates and interpretations. 
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Given the high state of insecurity in Nigeria at the moment, the author foresees 
the emergence of more scholarly literature on civil-military relations in Nigeria 
and possibly other security agencies. It is important that these scholarly articles 
expand the sample size used in this thesis. That is, rather than base the military 
respondents on only a very stringent selection criteria; they should include all 
military officers and combat soldiers also. They should also include key actors in 
the National Assembly and the Ministry of Defence, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), as well as notable academicians whose research areas are 
in civil-military relations. Finally, attention should be paid to the Nigerian police 
and intelligent agencies, especially in regard to issues that appear to hinder them 
from performing their duties at the highest professional level. 
These are dangerous times for researchers, however. I doubt that I would have 
been able to conduct the same field research that I conducted in 2011 today. 
Ironically, perhaps, a moment of rich opportunities in researching civil-military 
relations in transitional Nigeria is also, for would-be researchers, a most 
challenging hour. 
Postscript  
Since the start of this study and especially after my doctoral field research was 
conducted in 2011, there have been numerous significant political events in 
Nigeria, many of which directly involved the military. The most noteworthy of 
these, widely reported in both local and international media, has been the inability 
of the Nigerian military to stop Boko Haram from claiming vast tracts of territory 
in northern Nigeria. This is in addition to other horrifying activities this group has 
perpetrated.  On 14 April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped more than two hundred 
girls from a state secondary school in Chibok, Borno State. Two months later, at 
an agricultural training school in Buni Yadi, Yobe State, it attacked and killed 
sixty boys in a school dormitory. These are two cases of the numerous acts that 
this religiously inspired militant group has committed since it evolved into a pan-
jihadist organisation, and pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL). 
The question most observers and political commentators on Nigeria have been 
asking is an obvious one: how can a relatively professional and well-resourced 
military institution be apparently incapable of stopping such a group from seizing 
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towns and villages and committing atrocities on Nigerian soil, and since 2015 rely 
on the far less developed armies of neighbouring Niger and Chad to resolve what 
is fundamentally a Nigerian problem? Was the military establishment using the 
crisis in the North as a political bargaining chip to enhance its budget, or improve 
its political position in the new ‘democratic’ setting?   
To complicate matters even further, on the eve of the presidential elections of 14 
February 2015, the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC), Professor Attahiru Jega, announced that the elections would be delayed 
by six weeks because the service chiefs had written to him that they could not 
guarantee the security of INEC personnel if the elections were conducted as 
scheduled. This was complicated by the apparent support that the military had 
given to the candidacy of the incumbent candidate, Goodluck Jonathan, and 
apparent military resistance to the challenger, who was leading in the polls at the 
time, a former military dictator-turned-democrat, Muhammadu Buhari. 
After the re-scheduling of the elections, the Nigerian military suddenly and 
unexpectedly started a massive counter offensive against Boko Haram, which 
continued to be aided by the armed forces of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. This 
offensive ultimately reclaimed all the territory that had been lost to Boko Haram.  
Why had the Nigerian military refrained from its security duties in the North prior 
to the rescheduling of the elections?  Perhaps the nonchalant attitude towards the 
insecurity in the northeast was a political tool used by the Jonathan government 
but later backfired based on the sudden popularity of Buhari as an alternative to 
the PDP/Jonathan? If that was the case, the plan failed. Buhari was elected to the 
presidency with a substantial majority at the end of March 2015, and will assume 
the office in May. 
There are points that need to be reiterated based on the continuing situation in the 
country as of April 2015, especially as it relates to the military. The ineptitude of 
the military in its response to Boko Haram, reportedly due to low morale and 
military shortages (military hardware, basic military medical supplies and care, 
non-delivery of military wages and allowances, and even the demoralising effects 
of endemic corruption, which continues to be a hindrance not only in the military 
as an institution, but the entire society), while difficult to link to abandonment of 
post and bases during attacks by Boko Haram, may be related to the desire to 
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increasingly pressure the government by a dissatisfied military establishment that 
is willing to lose bases, and fail in security engagements until it gets the budget 
that it wants. As noted in chapter five, civilian control of the military budget is 
low and the National Assembly merely approves the budget without adequate 
scrutiny of how the funds allocated are spent. In the case of the military’s 
offensive against Boko Haram, it should be expected that the National Assembly 
would be concerned whether appropriate military equipment are being procured 
by the military to fight this militant organisation. Therefore, is the surprising 
military failure, then, nothing more than a strategy? What has changed in the 
military institution that suddenly, after more than two years of repeated failures in 
tackling such a threatening insurgency, it has been able to achieve tremendous 
progress against Boko Haram in just six weeks, coincidentally after the 
rescheduling of the 14 February elections? 
Overall, and as this thesis has repeatedly stated, there is an urgent need for the 
civilian elites to create an institutional framework that would adequately provide 
broad-based civilian (not just presidential) oversight of the military.  Simply 
having presidential control of the military seems to have failed Nigeria at its 
crucial hour. There have been allegations that President Jonathan is not really 
interested in northeast Nigeria. The military’s pressure tactics, if that is what they 
were, then, were gauged to pressure the National Assembly.  President Jonathan 
was ‘under their influence,’ and challenger Buhari was suddenly the political 
threat.  The National Assembly, apathetic, lacking in military expertise, could be 
shocked into submission.  An appropriate civilian institutional framework, one 
with focus on the military and civilian expertise in military matters, would 
guarantee adequate oversight of the military, ostensibly eliminating the situation 
in which the military routinely instructs the INEC and other government 
institutions on when and how to carry out their legal responsibilities, and 
occasionally resorts to shocking the nation into funding an ever increasing 
military budget.      
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 1: Retired Military Officers in Business Ventures and Public 
Service Positions, 1999-2007 
Venture type Business Officer Position 
Defence 
Procurement and 
Contracts 
The most natural 
venture for top retired 
military officers in 
Nigeria and several 
other countries. 
Nigerian examples 
are not easy to come 
by, but certain to 
involve countless 
private companies or 
individuals, civilian 
and retired military 
officers, foreign and 
local contractors. 
A sizeable number of 
high ranking retired 
military officers. 
Large-Scale 
Farming and 
Agro-Allied 
Ventures 
Obasanjo Farms 
Nigeria Limited 
Several retired 
military officers are 
engaged in farming. 
A noteworthy example of 
large-scale farming is 
that owned by former 
head of state and 
president, General 
Olusegun Obasanjo 
Import and Export 
Business, (Inc. 
Shipping) 
Nigeria America 
Line (NAL) Ltd: 
Comet Shipping 
Agencies Nigeria 
Ltd. 
General T.Y 
Danjuma 
Chairman 
Building & 
Construction 
(Other than 
Defence) 
Electrical & Civil 
Works 
Contractors 
Marine 
Engineering 
Consultancy 
Company. 
Construction 
 
 
 
Davnotch Nigeria 
Limited 
 
Sabita Nigeria 
 
Intercontinental 
Engineering and 
Home Development, 
ScanHomes 
Afri-Luck Nigeria 
Limited. 
 
 
 
 
Major General O.A. 
Obada 
 
Rear Admiral A.O. 
Sode 
 
Rear Admiral A.O. 
Sode  
 
Rear Admiral S.A. 
Olukoya 
 
 
 
Chairman 
 
 
Owner 
 
Board of Directors 
 
 
Director 
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Venture type Business Officer Position 
Petroleum Business, 
(incl. Natural Gas) 
Oando Group  
 
Lottoj Oil and Gas 
Acorn Petroleum (as 
at 2010). 
South Atlantic 
Petroleum Limited 
Major General 
Magoro 
Rear Admiral A.O 
Sode   
Lieutenant General 
Inuwa Wushishi 
General T.Y Danjuma 
Chairman, until 2000 
 
Board Member 
 
Board of Directors 
Chairman 
Property or Real 
Estate Business 
Most military officers 
of the rank of 
lieutenant colonel and 
above or their 
equivalents, whether 
serving or retired, 
have one interest or 
the other in real estate 
business. Thus, 
examples of retired 
military involvement 
here are so numerous 
that it makes no sense 
to list any. 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Finance, Banking  
and Insurance 
Diamond Bank 
 
Keystone Bank 
Skype Bank 
 
Agbarho 
Microfinance Bank 
Standard Alliance 
Insurance 
Cooperative 
Development Bank 
Stanbic IBTC Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lieutenant General 
Jeremiah T. Useni 
Brigadier General M. 
Aminun-Kano 
Brigadier General 
Anthony Ukpo 
Major General O.A 
Obada 
Brigadier General 
D.O Oneya 
Air Commodore I.E 
Nkanga 
Lieutenant General 
Inuwa Wushishi   
Director 
 
Director 
Director 
 
Chairman 
 
Director 
Board Member 
(2001) 
Former Director 
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Venture type Business Officer Position 
Conglomerates United Africa 
Company (UAC) 
UPDC (Property 
Development). 
Lieutenant General 
Inuwa Wushishi 
Lieutenant General 
Inuwa Wushishi 
Chairman (until 2010) 
 
Chairman 
Sporting 
Activities 
International 
Olympic Committee 
(IOC) 
Nigeria Football 
Association (NFA) 
Major General H.E.O. 
Adefope (late) 
Brigadier General D.O. 
Oneya 
Member (1985-2006) 
 
Chairman (2000) 
Printing National Security and 
Printing Company 
Colonel Sambo Dasuki Managing Director 
Others Rubber Research 
Institute of Nigeria 
Jemibewon 
International 
Academy  
Nigerian Chamber of 
Commerce, Industry, 
Mines and 
Agriculture 
Institute of Strategic 
Management of 
Nigeria 
Institute of Strategic 
Management of 
Nigeria 
 
Institute of Strategic 
Management of 
Nigeria 
Institute of Strategic 
Management of 
Nigeria 
Federal Psychiatric 
Hospital, Calabar 
Cocoa Research 
Institutue of Nigeria 
 
Akwa Ibom Airport 
Implementation 
Committee 
Air Commodore Dan 
Suleiman 
Major General David 
Jemibewon a School 
Major General Garba 
Mohammed 
 
Major General L.S 
Ajiborisha 
General Martin Luther 
Agwai, post-1999 
retiree 
Commodore Ebitu 
Ukiwe 
General A.O 
Ogomudia—post 1999 
retiree 
Brigadier General B. 
Asuguo 
Brigadier General S.T. 
Bello   
 
Air Commodore I.E. 
Nkanga 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chairman 
 
Owner 
National Vice 
President (in 2008) 
 
President & Chairman-
in-Council (in 2010)  
Advisory Board 
Member 
 
Advisory Board 
Member 
Advisory Board 
Member 
Chairman 
 
Board Member 
 
 
Chairman (in 2007) 
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Other Business 
Ventures 
Falpas Ventures 
Limited 
Federal 
Superphosphate 
Fertiliser Company 
Kaduna. 
Globasure 
Technologies Limited 
Kaddara Group of 
Companies. 
Albarka Airlines—no 
longer in operation 
MTS First Wireless 
Integrated Energy 
Distribution and 
Marketing Limited 
Brigadier General S.B 
Chamah (late) 
Brigadier General 
A.A.U.  Kama 
 
Brigadier General D.O. 
Oneya 
Brigadier General D.O. 
Oneya 
Brigadier General M.B. 
Marwa 
Lieutenant General 
Inuwa Wushishi 
 
General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar 
Managing 
Director/CEO 
Chairman 
 
 
Chairman 
 
Chairman 
Chairman 
 
former Director 
 
Chairman 
 
 
Foreign Service Nigeria’s High 
Commissioner to 
South Africa (2007) 
Nigerian Ambassador 
to the Russian 
Federation (2006) 
United Nations Peace 
Envoy to Congo, 
Kinshasa (2000) 
Brigadier General M.B. 
Marwa 
 
Air Commodore Dan 
Suleiman 
 
General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar 
Not applicable 
 
 
Not applicable 
 
Not applicable 
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APPENDIX 2: Retired Military Officers in Politics, 1999-2012 
Military Officer Date Political Activities/Position 
General Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
1976-1979 
1999-2007 
 
 Former military ruler 
 
 Civilian president 
 Chairman Board of Trustees (BOT) People's 
Democratic Party (PDP). 
 Member, People’s Democratic Party (PDP). 
 
 
General Muhammadu 
Buhari 
1983-1985 
2003, 2007, 
2011 
 Former military ruler 
 Main presidential contender under the All Nigeria 
People’s Party (ANPP) and Congress for 
Progressive Change (CPC). 
General Ibrahim 
Babangida 
1985-1993 
 
2007, 2011 
 Former military ruler 
 Founding member People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP). 
 Unsuccessfully sought nomination as the party’s 
presidential candidate for the general elections  
Brigadier General 
David Mark 
 
. 
 Former military administrator of Niger State and 
head of the Communications Ministry all under 
military rule.  
 PDP member and senate president (2013). 
Lieutenant General 
Mohammed Gusau 
1999-2006 
and 
2010 
 Former head Directorate of Military Intelligence and 
Chief of Army Staff under military rule. 
 Appointed National Security Advisor (NSA). 
 
 Member of the PDP. 
Major General Sarki 
Mukhtar 
2006-2010  Former military administrator of Kaduna and 
Katsina State. 
 Appointed National Security Advisor 
Colonel Kayode Are 1999-2007 
 
2010 
 
 Served in the Directorate of Military Intelligence 
under military rule. 
 Appointed Director-General State Security Service 
(SSS). 
 National Security Advisor  
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Military Officer Date Political Activities/Position 
General Owoye 
Azazi (late)—post 
1999 retiree 
2006-2007 
2010-2012 
 Former Chief of Army Staff 
 
 Appointed National Security Advisor 
Colonel Sambo 
Dasuki 
 
2012-To 
Date 
 Former ADC to General Babangida 
 
 Appointed National Security Advisor 
Air Commodore I.E 
Nkanga 
 
2002 
 Former military administrator of Akwa Ibom State. 
 Unsuccessfully sought governorship of Akwa Ibom in 
2003 under the Nigeria Democratic Party (NDP). 
Major General 
Magoro 
  Former Minister for Internal Affairs and Transport 
under military rule 
 A senator under the PDP (2013) 
Major General 
Tanko Ayuba 
 
2007-2011 
 Former governor of Kaduna State 
 
 Senator under the PDP 
Major General 
David Jemibewon 
 
1999 
2003 
 Former governor of the old Western State 
 
 Appointed Minister for Police Affairs 
 Unsuccessfully sought senatorial candidacy from his 
constituency. 
Navy Captain Caleb 
Olubolade 
  Former military administrator for Bayelsa State. 
 Current, the Minister for Police Affairs (2013). 
Major General 
Magashi 
 
2002 
2007 
 Former military administrator of Sokoto State. 
 legal advisor to the All Nigeria People’s Party 
(ANPP) 
 Unsuccessfully sought governorship of Kano State 
under the Democratic People’s Party (DPP). 
Brigadier General 
A.A.U. Kama 
 
2007 
 Former military administrator of Plateau State. 
 Unsuccessfully sought governorship of Adamawa 
State under the PDP 
Brigadier General 
Y. Mu’azu 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 Former military administrator of Sokoto State 
 Chairman of a committee investigating a fire that 
gutted the Department of Planning, Research and 
Statistics in Bauchi State Ministry of Health 
 Chairman commission of inquiry into civil 
disturbances in Bauchi 
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Military Officer Date Political Activities/Position 
Brigadier General 
O. Oyinlola 
 
2003-
2010 
 Former military administrator of Lagos State 
 
 Governor of Osun State under PDP 
Colonel J.O Dungs  
2007 
 Former military administrator of Delta State 
 Unsuccessfully sought governorship  of the PDP in 
Plateau State 
Colonel A.A. 
Usman 
  Former military administrator of Ondo State 
 PDP chieftain in Kogi State 
Brigadier General 
M. Mana 
 
2007-
2011 
 Former military administrator of Plateau State 
 
 Senator under PDP 
Colonel T.O. 
Bamigboye 
 
2007 
 Former military administrator for Bauchi and Osun 
State 
 Prominent politician in Kwara State 
 Lost the governorship election under the Accord Party 
Colonel 
Mohammed Bawa 
 
2007 
 Former military administrator of Ekiti and Gombe 
State 
 Unsuccessfully sought governorship Kebbi State  
under the Action Congress (AC) party. 
Lieutenant Colonel 
J.I. Akaagerger 
 
2007 
2008 
 Former military administrator of Katsina State 
 Became senator under the PDP 
 
 His election was later nullified by an election tribunal 
Commodore J.N.J.  
Aneke 
 
2009 
 Former military administrator of Imo State 
 A member of the PDP in Enugu State 
Air Commodore I. 
Kefas 
 
2007 
 Former military administrator of Cross River and Delta 
State. 
 Unsuccessful governorship candidate for Taraba State 
under National Democratic Party (NDP). 
General T.Y. 
Danjuma 
1979-
1980 
1999-
2003 
 Chief of Army Staff 
 
 Minister of Defence 
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APPENDIX 3: Past and Present Chief of Army Staff, 1963-2014 
Name Period 
Major General C.B. Welby-Everard 
(GOC) 
1963-1965 
Major General J.T.U Aguiyi-Ironsi 
(GOC) 
1965-1966 
Lieutenant Colonel Y. Gowon Jan1966-Jul1966 
Lieutenant Colonel J.R.I Akahan May1967-May1968 
Major General H.U Kastina May1968-Jan1971 
Major General D.A Ejoor Jan1971-Jul1975 
Lieutenant General T.Y Danjuma July1975-Oct1975 
Lieutenant General I.A Akinrinade Oct1979-Apr1980 
Lieutenant General G.S Jalo Apr1980-Oct1981 
Lieutenant General M.I Wushishi Oct1981-Oct1983 
Major General I.B Babangida Jan1984-Aug1985 
Lieutenant General S. Abacha Aug1985-Sept1990 
Lieutenant General S. Ibrahim Aug1990-Sept1993 
Lieutenant General A. Mohammed Sept1993-Nov1993 
Major General M.C Ali Nov1993-Aug1994 
Major General A.J Kazir Aug1994-March1996 
Lieutenant General S.L Malu May1999-Apr2001 
Lieutenant General A.O Ogomudia Apr2001-Jun2003 
Lieutenant General M.L Agwai June2003-June2006 
Lieutenant General O.A Azazi June2006-May2007 
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Lieutenant General L.N Yusuf June2007-Aug2008 
Lieutenant General A.B Dambazau Aug2008-Aug2010 
Lieutenant General O.A Ihejirika Aug2010-2013 
Lieutenant General KTJ Minimah 2013 to Date 
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APPENDIX 4: Past and Present 1 Division GOCs, 1967 to 2014 
Name Period 
Colonel M. Shuwa 30 Aug 67-20 Sep 69 
Brigadier I.D Bisalla 24 Sep 69-14 Dec 73 
Brigadier I.B Haruna 15 Dec 73-31 Jul 75 
Major General I.A Akinrinade 01 Aug 75-04 Jan 78 
Brigadier D.Y Balli 05 Jan 78-01 Sep 78 
Brigadier P.A Eromobor 01 Sep 78-04 Sep 79  
 
Major General G.A Innih 02 Oct 79-16 Apr 80 
Major General D.N Jemibewon 09 Jan 80-01 Nov 81 
Major General A.D Aduloju 01/11/ 81-29 Aug 83 
Major General H.A Hananiya 30 Aug 83- 09 Jan 84 
Brigadier J.O Oni 09 Jan 84-16 Sep 85 
Major General P.I Adomokhai 16 Sep 85-12 Oct 88 
Major General M.S Sami 25 Oct 88-17 Jan 90 
Major General I.O.S Nwachukwu 17 Jan 90-03 Sep 90 
Major General A.A Abubakar 03 Sep 90-01 Nov 91 
Brigadier General A.M Daku 25 Nov 91-18 Jan 93 
Brigadier General J.N Shagaya 18 Jan 93-20 Sep 93 
Brigadier General M.C Ali 20 Sep 93-06 Dec 93 
Brigadier General A.J Kazir 06 Dec 93-22 Sep 94 
Brigadier General A.A Abdullahi 22 Sep 94-22 Apr 96 
Brigadier General M.O Sule 22 Apr 96-01 Jul 96 
Major General A.S Mukhtar 16 Dec 96-10 Jun 99 
Major General A.O Ogomudia 19 Jul 99-24 Apr 01 
Brigadier General D.R.A Ndefo 30/05/ 01-29 Dec 01  
 
Major General S.A Asemota Aug 02-7 Jan 05 
Major General O.A Azazi 17 Jan 05-09 Jul 06 
Major General L.O Jokotola 10 Jul 06 - 2007 
Major General M.B Obi NA* 
Major General K.A Role 2008 - 2010 
Major General J.O.A Shoboiki 2010 - 2012 
Major General GA Wahab 
 
2012 - 2014 
Major General  KC Osuji 2014 to Date 
Location: Kaduna 
*Not available 
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APPENDIX 5: Past and Present 2 Division GOCs, 1967 to 2014 
Name Period 
Lieutenant Colonel M.R Mohammed 08/67-05/68 
Lieutenant Colonel I.B.M Haruna 06/68-05/69 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.S Jalo 06/69-05/70 
Brigadier General Oluleye 08/70-08/75 
Major General M. Adamu 08/75-06/78 
Major General E.O Abisoye 08/78-09/79 
Major General S.E Tuoye 09/79-01/81 
Brigadier General M. Buhari 01/81-11/81 
Brigadier General H.A Hananiya 11/81-08/83 
Major General M.D Jega 08/83-08/84 
Major General S Abacha 01/84-05/84 
Brigadier General Y.Y Kure 16/9/85-15/9/86 
Brigadier General G Duba 15/9/86-12/6/87 
Major General Dogonyaro 30/12/89-30/9/88 
Major General A.G Mohammed 01/90-09/90 
Brigadier General J.M Inienger 09/90-10/90 
Brigadier General G.O Abbe 20/9/93-12/9/94 
Brigadier General P.N Aziza 12/9/94-22/4/96 
Major General B.S Magashi 22/4/96-9/12/96 
Major General S.V.L Malu 8/1/98-10/07/98 
Major General F.A Mujakperuo 10/7/98-8/4/99 
Major General P.G Sha 22/04/99-19/7/99 
Major General E Archibong 19/7/99-8/4/01 
Major General O.E Okon 18/4/01-08/02 
Major General D.R.A Ndefo 08/02-03 
Major General C.I Obiakor 03-03/06 
Major General A.N Bamali 03/06 - 17/09/06 
Major General M.S Saleh 07/01/07 
Major General A.B Dambazau 2007-2009  
 
Major General Lawerence Ngubane 2009-2010 
Major General M.D Abubakar 2011 – 2013 
Major General AT Jibrin 2013 -2014 
Major General EF Abejirin 2014 to Date 
Location: Ibadan 
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APPENDIX 6: Past and Present 3 Division GOCs, 1967 to 2014 
Name Period 
Colonel B.A.M Adekunle Jul 67-Aug 67 
Colonel O. Obasanjo May 69- Jan 72 
Colonel T.Y Danjuma Jan 71-Dec 73 
Major General E.O Abisoye Jul 75-Jan 76 
Brigadier General M.M Remawa Aug 78-Jan 79 
Major General Jalo Jan 79-Oct 79 
Major General G.O Ejiga Oct 79-Nov 81 
Brigadier General M Buhari Jan 84-Aug 85 
Brigadier General S Ibrahim Jan 84-Aug 85 
Major General J.N Dogonyaro Sep 85-Dec 87 
Major General G Duba Jan 88-Jan 90 
Major General D.O Diya Feb 90-Sep 90 
Brigadier A.I Olurin Oct 90-Jan 93 
Brigadier General A.M Daku Jan 93-Sep 93 
Brigadier General T.A Olarewaju Sep 93-Mar 95 
Major General L.A Onoja Mar 95-Apr 96 
Brigadier General A Dada Apr 96-Oct 96 
Brigadier General P.G Sha Nov 96-Sep 97 
Major General E Archibong Mar 99-Jul 99 
Major General T.S Akande Jul 99 - Feb 02 
Major General Owonibi Feb 02-Feb 03 
Major General D Dyaji Feb 03-17 Jan 05 
Major General I.A Dikko 17 Jan 05- 09 Jul 06 
Major General J.O.S Oshanupin 10 Jul 06-2007 
Major General Akinyemi 2008 
Major General Saleh Maina 2009 
Major General S.O Idoko 2011-2012 
Major General Nwoga 2012-2013 
Major General EB Awala 2013 – 2014 
Major General JS Zaruwa 2014 to Date 
Location: Jos 
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APPENDIX 7: Past and Present 82 Division GOCs, 1975 to 2014 
Name Period 
Major General D.E Obada 07/08/75-22/03/76 
Brigadier M.I Wushishi 23/03/76-31/07/78 
Major General D.Y Bali 01/09/78-14/12/79 
Brigadier M. Buhari 14/12/79-04/01/81 
Major General Aduloju 09/01/81-08/01/84 
Brigadier Y.Y Kure 09/01/84-15/09/85 
Brigadier O Diya 16/09/85-13/12/87 
Major General M.S Sami 31/12/87-25/10/88 
Brigadier A.A Abubakar 25/10/88-02/01/90 
Major General S Ibrahim 02/01/90-07/09/93 
Major General C.A Garuba 07/09/90-19/09/93 
Major General T.M Shelfidi 20/09/93-25/09/94 
Major General SVL Malu 20/09/94-06/08/96 
Major General F.A Mujakperuo 06/08/96-23/07/98 
Major General O Popoola 24/07/98-01/01/99 
Major General A.A Sangotade 01/01/99-2003 
Major General B.A Jinadu 2003 - 2004 
Major General R Adeshina 2004-3/09/04 
Major General A.G Adewuyi 3/09/04-09/07/06 
Major General S.U Atawodi 10/07/06 
Major General A.T Ibrahim 2007 
Major General M.D Isah 2009 
Major General S.Y Bello 2009 -2010 
Major General S Idoko 2010-2012 
Major General O O Oshinowo 2012 -2013 
Major General Olaniyi 2013 - 2013 
Major General S Yusuf 2014  to Date 
Location: Enugu 
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APPENDIX 8: Past and Present 81 Division GOCs, 1992 to 2014 
Name Period 
Brigadier General  AK Adisa  
 
13 Jan 92 - Oct 92 
Brigadier General IR Bamaiyi  
 
20 Sep 93 - 30 Dec 94 
Brigadier General PN Aziza  
 
1 Jul 96 - 30 Jun 98 
Major General BS Magashi  
 
14 Jan 98 - 4 Aug 98 
Major General SVL Malu  
 
4 Aug 98 - 19 Jul 99 
Brigadier General G.T Zidon* 19 Jul 99 - 25 May 00 
Brigadier General T.N Abdu 13 Apr 01 - 2004 
Major General A.A Mshelbwalla 2004 - 17 Jan 2005 
Major General S Lliya 17 Jan 2005 - March 06 
Major General J.O Adesunloye March 2006 - 17 Sep 06 
Major General O.A Ihejirika 07 Jan 2007 - 2008 
Major General Eugene Nwanjuwa 2008 – 2010 
Major General KTJ Minimah  
 
2010 -2013 
Major General OA Umahi 
 
2013 - 2014 
Major General  TI Dibi 2014 to Date  
  
   
Location: Lagos 
*It was under the headship of Brigadier General G.T Zidon that this military unit became 
a division. Prior to that, it was known as the Lagos Garrison Command (LGC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 
 
APPENDIX 9: Past and Present 7 Division GOCs, 2013 to 2014 
Name Period 
Major General O T Ethan 22 Aug 13 - 01 Jan 14 
Major General J S Bindawa 01 Jan - 24 Feb 14 
Major General A Mohammed 24 Feb 14 - 16 May 14 
Brigadier General MY Ibrahim 16 May 14 to Date 
Location: Maiduguri 
Source: Nigerian Army (2014)   
217 
 
APPENDIX 10: Military Officers Compulsorily Retired from the Armed 
Forces by the President Olusegun Obasanjo Government,  
June 1999  
Army  
1) Major General S.O.G Ango 
2) Major General P.N Aziza  
3) Major General I. Garga 
4) Major General B.S Magashi 
5) Major General A.S Mukbtar 
6) Major General J.M Madaki 
7) Major General G.A Mohammmed 
8) Major General L.S Ajiborisha 
9) Major General A.O Mohammed 
10) Brigadier General B. Asuguo 
11) Brigadier General J.E Yeri 
12) Brigadier General A.A.U Kama 
13) Brigadier General I. Aliyu 
14) Brigadier General S.B Chamah 
15) Brigadier General S.T Bello 
16) Brigadier General D.O Oneya 
17) Brigadier General M.B Marwa 
18) Brigadier General S.O Makka 
19) Brigadier General C.K Emein 
20) Brigadier General Y. Mu’ Azu 
21) Brigadier General S. Ahman 
22) Brigadier General M.E Attah 
23) Brigadier General O. Oyinlola 
24) Brigadier General I.J Isah 
25) Brigadier General Y. Abubakar 
26) Colonel J.O Dungs 
27) Colonel P.A.M Agar 
28) Colonel A.A Usman 
29) Colonel M. Mana 
30) Colonel T.K Zubairu 
31) Colonel M.O Fasanya 
32) Colonel B.I Afikinya 
33) Colonel M. Shehu 
34) Colonel T.O Bamigboye 
35) Colonel U.F Ahmed 
36) Colonel D.M Kama 
37) Colonel H.I Shu’Aibu 
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38) Colonel U.A Amiebo 
39) Colonel J.B Yakubu 
40) Colonel H.I Ali 
41) Colonel A.I Kontagora 
42) Colonel A.U Obi 
43) Colonel M. Mohammed 
44) Colonel D.O Akintonde 
45) Colonel A.I Awoniyi 
46) Lieutenant-Colonel A.I Shekoni 
47) Lieutenant-Colonel M.I Bawa 
48) Lieutenant-Colonel Mas Onuka 
49) Lieutenant-Colonel P.E Obi 
50) Lieutenant-Colonel A.G Hussaini 
51) Lieutenant-Colonel A.S.Z Maimalari 
52) Lieutenant-Colonel B.M Mande 
53) Lieutenant-Colonel J.I Akaagerger   
Navy 
54) Rear Admiral O.O Joseph 
55) Rear Admiral S.A Olukoya 
56) Rear Admiral A.A Afolaban 
57) Rear Admiral A.O Sode 
58) Commodore A.E Oguguo 
59) Commodore A.I Ikwechegh 
60) Commodore T. Ejoor 
61) Commodore E.A Acholonu 
62) Commodore J.N.J Aneke 
63) Commodore K.L Olafinmoyin 
64) Navy-Captain J.A Kalu-Igboamagh 
65) Navy-Captain J.A Adewusi 
66) Navy-Captain A. Udosia 
67) Navy-Captain R.A Raji 
68) Navy-Captain A.B Agbaje 
69) Navy-Captain O. Olubolade 
70) Navy-Captain M.A Yusuf 
71) Navy-Captain A.I Onyiarugbulem 
72) Navy-Captain W.A Fegbabo 
73) Navy-Captain C.I Osondu 
Airforce 
74) Air Vice-Marshal F.O Ajobena 
75) Air Vice-Marshal G. Agboneni 
76) Air-Commodore A. Salihu 
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77) Air-Commodore B. Iyam 
78) Air-Commodore I. Kefas 
79) Air-Commodore I.E Nkanga 
80) Air-Commodore P.N Gana 
81) Air-Commodore I. Dada 
82) Group-Captain I.I Orji 
83) Group-Captain R.D Garba 
84) Group-Captain I.I Ben-Kalio 
85) Group-Captain E.C Ewang 
86) Group-Captain E.J Ebiye 
87) Group-Captain L.N Haruna 
88) Wing-Commodore E.U Ukaegbu 
89) Wing-Commodore A. Msheha 
Police 
90) AIG (Assistant Inspector General) Dabo Aliyu 
91) Acting AIG Simian Oduoye 
92) Acting AIG A.E Oyakhire 
93) CP Mustapha Ismaeil 
Source: Nigerian Tribune Friday June 11, 1999, pp. 1-2 
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APPENDIX 11: Comparative Rank Structure of the Nigerian Armed Forces: 
The Officer Corps 
Army Navy Equivalent Air Force Equivalent  
Field Marshal Admiral of the fleet Marshal of the Nigerian Air force 
General Admiral Air Chief Marshal 
Lieutenant-General Vice-Admiral Air Marshal 
Major-General Rear-Admiral Air Vice-Marshal 
Brigadier Commodore Air Commodore 
Colonel Captain Group Captain 
Lieutenant-Colonel Commander Wing Commander 
Major Lieutenant-Commander Squadron Leader 
Captain Lieutenant Flight Lieutenant 
Lieutenant Sub Lieutenant Flying Officer 
Second Lieutenant Midshipman Pilot Officer 
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APPENDIX 12: Names of Federal Ministers from 1960 to 2007 
Federal Ministers 1960-1965 
1) Prime Minister   Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
2) Defence Minister  Alhaji Mohammad Ribadu 
3) Minister of State (Defence) Alhaji Tanko Galadima 
4) Minister of State (Navy) M.T Mbu 
5) Minister of Finance  Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh 
6) Minister of State (Finance) Chief H. Omo-Osagie 
7) Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Jaja Wachuku 
8) Minister of Transport & Aviation Mr. R.A Njoku 
9) Minister of State (Transport & Aviation) Mr. M. Amechi. 
Dr. K.O Mbadiwe (1965) 
10) Minister of Works   Alhaji Mohammadu Inua Wada 
11) Minister of Labour  Chief J.M. Johnson. Mr. J.C. Obande (1965) 
12) Minister of Commerce & Industry Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcharima 
13) Minister of State Commerce & Industry Mallam Usman Maitambari 
14) Minister of Education  Mr. Aja Nwachukwu. Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim  
   (1965) 
15) Minister of Establishment Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Mr. J.C Obande    
  (1963-65) 
16) Minister of Internal Affairs Alhaji Usman Sarki. Alhaji Shehu Shagari   
   (1963-65) 
17) Minister of Mines & Power Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule 
18) Minister of Information Mr. T.O.S Benson 
19) Minister of Health  Dr. M.A Majekodunmi 
20) Minister of Communication Mr. Olu Akinfosile 
21) Minister of Lagos Affairs Mallam Musa Yar’Adua 
22) Minister of Economic Development Hon. Waziri Ibrahim 
23) Minister of Justice  Dr. T.O Elias (Attorney General) 
24) Minister of State (Police) M.O.A Olanrewaju (Police Matter) 
25) Minister of State (Cabinet Rank) Alhaji Hashim Adaji 
Federal Ministers 1966-1971 General Yakubu Gowon  
1) Minister of Finance  Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Alhaji Shehu   
   Shagari (1972) 
2) Minister of Internal Affairs Mr. Okoi Arikpo 
3) Minister of Transport  Mr. Joseph Tarka. Dr. R.A.B Dikko (1972) 
4) Minister of Communications Alhaji Aminu Kano 
5) Minister of Health  Dr. J.E Adetoro. Alhaji Aminu Kano (1972) 
6) Minister of Justice  Dr. T.O Elias. Dr. Graham Douglas (1972) 
7) Minister of Economic Development Alhaji Yahaya Gusau. Dr. Adedeji 
8) Minister of Establishment Rear Admiral Wey 
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9) Minister of Information & Labour Chief Anthony Enahoro 
10) Minister of Internal Affairs Alhaji Kam Salem 
11) Minister of Education  Mr. Wenike Briggs. Chief A.Y Eke (1972) 
12) Minister of Works and Housing Mr. Femi Okunnu 
13) Minister of Mines and Power Dr. R.O Dikko. Alhaji Shettima Monguno 
14) Minister of Trade and Industry Alhaji Ali Monguno. Dr. J.E Adetoro 
15) Minister of Agriculture & Natural Resources J.O.J Okezie 
16) Minister of Trade  Mr. Wenike Briggs   
Federal Ministers 1975 General Murtala Mohammed 
1) Minister of Agriculture  Mr. B.O.W Mafeni 
2) Minister of Finance   Mr. A.E Ekukinan. Major General J.J  
    Oluleye (1976) 
3) Minister of Justice   Mr. Dan Ibekwe 
4) Minister of Communication  Mr. S.O Williams 
5) Minister of Petroleum & Energy Mr. M.T.O Akobo. Colonel M.    
   Buhari (1976) 
6) Minister of Housing, Urban Dev’ & Environment Dr. Adeleye 
7) Minister of Co-operative  Mr. M. Ajose Adeogun. Mr. U.A    
   Mutallab (1976) 
8) Minister of Mines & Power  Mr. Effiong Olu Ekong 
9) Minister of Economic Dev’  Mr. Umoru Mutalab. Mr. M.T.O   
    Akobo (1976) 
10) Minister of Internal Affairs  Mr. Shinkafi 
11) Minister of Water Resources  Dr. I.U William. Osisi Ogu 
12) Minister of Aviation   Mr. Shaibu Kazaure 
13) Minister of Education   Lt. Col. A.A Ali 
14) Minister of Industry   Col. M.I Wushishi 
15) Minister of Labour   Brig H.E.O Adefope 
16) Minister of Works   Capt Olufemi Olumade. Major Gen.   
     O.A Obada (1976)  
17) Minister of Transport   Lt. Col S.M. Yar’Adua. Col. M.   
    Magoro (1976) 
18) Minister of Health   Col. Dan Suleiman. Mr. K. Tinubu   
    (1976) 
19) Minister of Defence   Brig. I.D. Bissala 
20) Minister of Establishment  Brig. J.J. Oduleye 
21) Minister of Internal Affairs  Col. Joseph Nanven Garba 
22) Minister of Trade   Brig. M. Shuwa 
23) Minister of Information  Brig. I.B.M. Haruna 
24) Minster of Youth & Sports Brig. Olufemi Olutoye 
25) Minister of Special Duties  Comm. O.P. Fingesi 
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26) Minister for Federal Capital Development Authority  Mr. Ajose Adeogun 
 
Federal Ministers (1979-1983) President Shehu Shagari 
Ministry      Ministers 
1) Agriculture   Alh. Ibrahim Gusau. Alh. Adamu Ciroma   
   (1981)  
2) Commerce         Mr. Issac Shaahu. Alh. Bello Maitama (1980) 
3) Defence   Prof. Iya Abubarkar. Alh. Akanbi Oniyangi    
  (1981) 
4) Health    Mr. D.C. Ugwu 
5) Housing & Environment Dr. Wahab O. Dosumu 
6) Industries   Alh. Adamu Ciroma 
7) Internal Affairs  Alh. Bello Maitami Yusuf. Alh. Ali Baba    
  (1981) 
8) Mines & Power  Alh. Mohammad Ibrahim Hassan 
9) Science & Tech  Dr. Sylvester U. Ugoh. Dr. W.O Dosumu 
10) Water Resources  Alh. Ndagi Mamudu. Dr. E.Y. Atanu (1981) 
11) Works    Mr. Victor I. Masi. Prof. Essang (1981) 
12) Communications  Alh. Akanbi Oniyagi 
13) Fed. Capital Dev’ Territory Mr. Jatau Kadiya 
14) Aviation   Mr. Samuel Mafuyai. Mr. John Kadiya    
  (1981) 
15) Education   Dr. I.C. Madubuike. Dr. S. Ugoh (1981) 
16) Dev’, Labour & Productivity Mr. Samuel Adebisi Ogedengbe. Dr. E.   
   Osammor (1981) 
17) Internal Affairs  Prof. Ishaya Audu 
18) Finance   Prof. Sunday Matthew Essang 
19) National Planning  Mrs. Adenike Ebun Oyegbola 
20) Police Affairs Dept’  Prof Emmanuel C. Osamor 
21) Social Dev’, Youth, Sport & Culture Engr. Pauliinus C. Amadike 
22) Steel Dev’. (Special Duties) Mr. Paul Unogo. Mallam Ali Makele (1981) 
23) Transport   Alh. Umaru A. Dikko 
24) Justice    Chief Richard Akinjide 
Ministers without Cabinet Ranks 
25) Agriculture   Mr. Emmanuel Aguma 
26) Communication  Chief Etang Okoi Obuli 
27) Education   Mr. Claudius A. Bamgboye 
28) Employment Labour & Productivity Dr. T. Michaulum 
29) Internal Affairs  Dr. Abubarkar Usman 
30) Finance   Mr. Ademola Thomas 
31) Industries   Dr. I. Igbani 
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32) Internal Affairs  Chief (Mrs) Janet Akinriade 
33) Social Dev’ Youth, Sports & Culture Alh. I.A Dan Musa 
34) Transport   Alh. Garba Wushishi 
35) Agriculture   Chief Olu Awotesu 
36) Commerce   Alh. Ahmadu Nahuce 
37) Education   Alh. Benjamin Usman 
38) Internal Affairs  Chief Patrick O. Bolokor 
39) Finance   Alh. Ali Baba 
40) Housing & Environment Alh. Ahmed Musa 
41) Works    Alh. Asheik Jarma 
42) Information   Mr. G. Wushishi  
Federal Ministers 1984-1985 General Buhari 
1) Brig. M. Mangoro  Internal Affairs 
2) Brig. S.A Omojoku  Labour & Productivity 
3) Maj. Gen. D.Y. Bali  Defence 
4) Lt. Col. Abdulahi  Communications 
5) Maj. Gen Mohammed Vasta FCT Minister 
6) Group Capt. S. Omeruha Information, Youth & Culture 
7) Comm. P.S.K Osoni  Health 
8) Dr. Agboola Gambari  Internal Affairs 
9) Dr. O. Sholeye   Finance 
10) Prof. Tam David West Petroleum & Energy 
11) Dr. Mammud Tukur  Commerce & Industry 
12) Mr. C. Ofodile   (Attorney General) Minister of Justice 
13) Alhaji Ibrahim Yerima Edu. Sci. & Technology 
14) Alhaji Abdulahi Ibrahim Transport & Aviation 
15) Dr. Buka Shail   Agric. & Natural Resources 
16) Alhaji Lukman Rilwan Mines, Power & Steel 
17) Chief M.O.S Adigun  National Planning 
18) Dr. E.N. Nsan   Works & Housing 
 
Federal Ministers 1985-1993 General Ibrahim Babangida 
Ministries     Ministers 
1) Agriculture   Retired Lt. Gen Alani Akinrinade 
2) Communications  Lt. Col A.T. Ayuba 
3) Defence   Major Gen. D.Y. Bali 
4) Education    Prof. Jubril Aminu 
5) Employment, Labour & Productivity Rear Admiral Patrick Koshoni 
6) External Affairs  Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi 
7) Federal Capital Territory Maj. Gen. Mamman Vasta 
8) Finance   Dr. Kalu. I. Kalu 
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9) Health    Prof. Olukoye Ransom-Kuti 
10) Industries   Alhaji Lawal Mala 
11) Information   Lt. Col. A.S.I. Ukpo 
12) Internal Affairs  Lt. Col. J.N. Shagaya 
13) Justice    Prince Bola Ajibola 
14) Mines & Power  Alhaji A. Rilwan Lukman 
15) National Planning  Dr. S.P. Okongwu 
16) Petroleum Resources  Prof. Tam David-West 
17) Social Dev’ Youth, Sport & Culture Lt. Col. Ahmed Abdullahi 
18) Science & Technology Prof. Emmanuel Emovo 
19) Trade    Maj. Gen. M.G. Nasko 
20) Transport & Aviation  Brig. J.T. Useni 
21) Works & Housing  Air Comm. Hamza Abdullahi 
22) Special Duties   Air Vice-Marshal A.L. Shekari 
 
1993 Transitional Council Federal Secretaries of Cabinet Ranks 
Ministry     Names 
1) Agric. Water Resources & Rural Dev’ Alh. Garuba Abdulkadir 
2) Secretary of State for Agric.    Alh. Isa Mohammed 
3) Commerce & Tourism    Tinuwa Bakari 
4) Defence      Gen. Sani Abacha 
5) Secretary of State Defence    Alh. Bello Dogondaji 
6) Finance      Chief Dele Olasore 
7) FCT Administrator     Major Gen. Gado Nasko 
8) Foreign Affairs     Mr. M.T Mbu 
9) Secretary of State Federal Admin.   Alh. Seidu Isa 
10) Health & Human Services    Dr. C. Okogie 
11) Secretary of State     Mrs Laraba Gagash 
12) Secretary of Internal Affairs    Alh. Abdurahaman Okene 
13) Industry & Tech     Alh. Aminu Sale 
14) Information & Culture    Uche Chukwumerije 
15) Attorney General & Justice    Mr. Clement Akpamgbo 
16) Petroleum & Mineral Resources   Chief Philip Asiodu 
17) Labour & Productivity    Chief Francis Elah 
18) Power & Steel      Air Vice Marshal Nuru Imam 
19) Police Affairs      Chief Francis Orji 
20) Transport & Communication    Chief Oluwole Adeosun 
21) Works & Housing     Engr. Barnabas Gemade 
22) Chairman National Planning Commission Alh. Mustapha Umaru 
23) Secretary Establishment & Management Services Alh. Zarma Gogharam 
24) Secretary State & Local Gov’ Affairs    Alh. Maccido Dalhat  
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25) Secretary of State & Local Gov’ Affairs Mrs. Emily Aig-Imokhuele 
 
Federal Ministers 1993-1998 General Sani Abacha 
Ministry     Names 
1) Foregin Affairs   Alhaji Baba Gana Kinigbe 
2) Federal Capital Territory  Lt. General J.T. Useni 
3) Education    Dr. Iyorcha Ayu 
4) Industry    Alhaji Bamanga Tukur 
5) Works & Housing   Alhaji Lateef Jakande 
6) Finance    Mr. Kalu Idika Kalu 
7) Petroleum Resources   Mr. Don Etiebet 
8) Power & Steel    Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu 
9) Health & Human Resources  Dr. Sarki Tafida 
10) Internal Affairs   Dr. Alex Ibru 
11) Communications   Alhaji Abubakar Rimi 
12) Labour & Productivity  Dr. Samuel Ogbemudia 
13) Agriculture    Alhaji Adamu Ciroma 
14) Information    Professor Jerry Gana 
15) Justice and Attorney General  Dr. Olu Onyoruma 
16) Commerce and Tourism  Chief Alfred Okilo 
17) Transport and Aviation  Chief Ebenezer Babatope 
18) Water Resources   Alhaji Isa Mohammed 
19) Science and Technology  Dr. Lazarus Unagu 
20) Police Affairs    Mr. Solomon Lar 
21) Local Government Affairs  Ambassador Mohammed Anika 
22) National Planning   Chief S.B. Danyan 
23) Establishment & Manpower Services Mrs Mobolaji Ojomo 
Minister of State 
1) Petroleum    Alhaji Umaru Baba 
2) Health     Mr. Silas 
3) Agriculture    Mrs. Ada Adogy 
4) Transport and Aviation  Alhaji A.B. Yahaya 
5) Power and Steel   Elder Wole Oyelese 
6) Education    Alhaji Wada 
7) Foreign Affairs   Chief Anthony A. 
8) State and Government Affairs Alhaji Aminu Saleh 
 
President Olusegun Obasanjo 1999-2007 First Term, 1999-2003 
Ministry     Names 
1) Finance    Mallam Adamu Ciroma 
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2) Foreign Affairs   Alhaji Sule Lamido 
Hon. Dubin Onyia 
3) Health     Dr. Tim Menakaya 
Dr. Mrs Amina Ndalolo 
4) Industries    Chief Iyorchia Ayu 
Chief Lawrence Nwuruku 
5) Information    Chief Dapo Sarumi 
6) Internal Affairs   Chief S.M. Afolabi 
7) Justice     Kanu Godwin Agabi 
8) Productivity    Chief Tonye Graham Douglas 
9) Police Affairs    Major Gen. David Jenbewon (Rtd) 
10) Power and Steel    Chief Bola Ige 
11) Presidency (Civil Service Matters) Alhaji Danjuma 
Muhammed Bello Kurfi 
12) Presidency (Cooperation & Integration in Africa) Professor Jerry Gana 
13) Presidency (Economic Matters) Vincent Ogbulafor 
14) Presidency (Inter-Governmental Affairs) Ibrahim Umar Kiola 
15) Presidency (Special Projects)  Engr. Dan Chuke 
16) Science and Technology  Chief Ebitimi Banigo 
Mrs. Pauline Tallen 
17) Solid Minerals    Alhaji Musa Gwadabe 
Dr. Bekky Ketebu 
18) Sports & Social Development  Damisi Sango 
19) Transport    Dr. Mrs. Kema Chikwe 
Alhaji Bello Tafida 
20) Water Resources   Col. Muhammadu Kalliel (Rtd) 
Precious Ngelale 
21) Works and Housing    Chief Tony Anenih 
Isaiah Ballat 
22) Agricultural & Rural Development Alhaji Sanni Daura 
Mr. Chris Agbobu 
23) Aviation    Dr. Segun Agagu 
24) Commerce    Engr. Mustapha Bello 
Yomi Edu 
25) Communications   Alhaji Muhammed Arzika 
Alhaji L. Haruna Elewis 
26) Culture and Tourism   Mr. Ojo Maduekwe 
27) Defence    Gen. Yakubu Danjuma (Rtd) 
Mrs. Dupe Adelaja 
28) Education    Prof. Tunde Adeniran 
Alhaji Lawal Batagarawa 
29) Environment    Dr. Hassan Adamu 
Udoma Udo Udoma 
30) Federal Capital Territory  Ibrahim Bunu 
Mr. Solomon Ewuga 
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President Olusegun Obasanjo Ministers (Second Term) 
Ministry     Names 
1) Agriculture &Rural Development Alhaji Adamu Bello 
2) State, Agriculture & Rural Dev’ Dr. Bamidele Dada 
3) Aviation    Dr. Babalola Borisade 
4) Commerce    Alhaji Idris Waziri 
5) Communications    Chief Cornelius Adebayo 
6) Culture and Tourism   Mr. Franklin Ogbuewu 
7) Defence    Dr. Rabiu Kwankwaso 
8) State for Defence   Dr. Rowland Oritsejafor 
9) Education    Mrs. Chinwe Nora Obaji 
10) Environment    Dr. Iyorchia Ayu 
11) Federal Capital Territory  Mallam Nasir el-Rufai 
12) Power and Steel   Senator Liyel Imoke 
13) Finance    Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala 
14) Finance (State)   Mrs. Esther Nenadi Usman 
15) External Affairs   Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji 
16) External Affairs (State)  Alhaji Abubakar Tanko 
17) Health     Prof. Eyitayo Lambo 
18) Health (State)    Mrs. H.E. Esuene 
19) Housing & Urban Dev’  Dr. Rahman Mimiko 
20) Information & National Orientation  Mr. Frank Nweke (Jnr) 
21) Internal Affairs   Ambassador Magaji Muhammed 
22) Internal Affairs (State)  Dr. Joseph Itotoh 
23) Industries    Ambassador Fidelis Tapgun 
24) Inter-Governmental Affairs & Special Duties Col. Musa Muhammed (Rtd) 
25) Integration & Coop. in Africa  Alhaji Lawan Guba 
26) Justice & Attorney General  Chief Bayo Ojo (SAN) 
27) Labour and Productivity  Alhaji Hassan Lawal 
28) Petroleum Resources (State)  Dr. Edmund Daukuro 
29) Police Affairs    Mr. Brodrick Bozimo 
30) Power and Steel   Senator Liyel Imoke 
31) Power and Steel (State)  Alhaji Ahmed Abdulhamid 
32) Science and Technology  Prof. Turner Isoun 
33) Solid Minerals    Mrs. Obiageli Ezekwesili 
34) Sports & Social Development  Alhaji Samaila Sambawa 
35) Transport    Chief Abiye Sekibo 
36) Transport (State)   Alhaji Abibu Aliyu 
37) Water Resources   Alhaji Murktar Shagari 
38) Water Resources (State)  Chief Ishola Awoterebo 
39) Works     Senator Seye Ogunlewe 
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40) Works (State)    Alhaji Sheu Salisu 
41) Women Affairs   Alhaja Maryam Ciroma 
 
President Musa Yar’ Adua 2007-2010 
Ministry     Names 
1) Attorney General & Justice Mr. Michael Kaese Aandoakaa (SAN) 
2) Agriculture & Water Resources Alhaji Sayyadi Ruma 
3) Agriculture & Water Resources (State) Mrs. Fedelia A. Njeze 
4) Aviation    Mr. Babatunde Omotoba 
5) Culture and Tourism   Senator Bello J. Gada 
6) Defence    Dr. Shettima Mustapha 
7) Defence (State)   Ademola Seriki 
8) Education    Dr. Sam Egwu 
9) Education (State)   Mrs. Aishatu Jubri Dukku 
10) Environment    Mr. John Ogar Odey 
11) Federal Capital Territory  Senator M. A. Aliero 
12) Federal Capital Territory (State)   Mr. J.C. Odom 
13) Finance (State)   Mr. Remi Babalola 
14) Foreign Affairs   Chief Ojo Maduekwe 
15) Foreign Affairs (State) 1  Alhaji Jubril Maigari 
16) Foreign Affairs (State) 11  Ambassador Bagudu M. Hirse 
17) Health     Prof. Babatunde Oshotimehin 
18) Health (State)    Dr. Aiyu Idi Hong 
19) Information & Communications Prof. Dora Akunyili 
20) Information & Communication (State) Alhaji Ikra Biblis 
21) Interior     Major General Godwin Abbe (Rtd) 
22) Labour     Chief A. Kayode 
23) Mines & Steel Development  Mrs. Deziani Alison-Madueke 
24) Deputy Chairman, National Planning Commission Dr. Shamsudeen Usman 
25) Niger-Delta Affairs (State) Elder G. Orubebe 
26) Petroleum    Dr. Rilwan Lukeman 
27) Petroleum (State)   Mr. Henry Odein Ajumogobia 
28) Police Affairs    Dr. I.Y. Lame 
29) Power (State)    Arch. Nuhu Uya 
30) Science and Technology  Dr. A.B. Zaku 
31) National Sports Commission  Engr. S.M. Ndanusa 
32) Transport    Alhaji Ibrahim Bio 
33) Women Affairs   Mrs. S.H. Suleiman 
34) Works and Housing   Dr. Hassan M. Lawal 
35) Works and Housing (State)  Mrs. Grace Epiwhre 
36) Youth Development   Senator Akinlabi Olasunkanmi 
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37) Special Duties    Ambassador A. Kasaure 
38) Niger-Delta    Obong Ufot Ekaette 
39) Finance    Alhaji Muktar Mansur 
40) Power     Mr. Olanrewaju Babalola 
41) Commerce and Industry (State) Mr. Humphrey E. Abah 
42) Interior (State)    Abdulrahamari Adamu 
43) Commerce and Industry  Chief Achike Udenwa 
Source: Data Collected from National Archive, Ibadan    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
231 
 
APPENDIX 13: Map of Nigeria Middle-Belt States  
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APPENDIX 14: Major Gideon Orkar’s Speech 
Fellow Nigerian Citizens, 
On behalf of the patriotic and well-meaning peoples of the Middle Belt and the southern 
parts of this country, I, Major Gideon Orkar, wish to happily inform you of the successful 
ousting of the dictatorial, corrupt, drug baronish, evil man, deceitful, homo-sexually-
centred, prodigalistic, un-patriotic administration of General Ibrahim Badamosi 
Babangida.  We have equally commenced their trials for unabated corruption, 
mismanagement of national economy, the murders of Dele Giwa, Major-General 
Mamman Vasta, with other officers as there was no attempted coup but mere intentions 
that were yet to materialise and other human rights violations. 
 The National Guard already in its formative stage is disbanded with immediate effect.  
Decrees Number 2 and 46 are hereby abrogated.  We wish to emphasise that this is not 
just another coup but a well-conceived, planned and executed revolution for the 
marginalised, oppressed and enslaved peoples of the Middle Belt and the south with a  
view to freeing ourselves and children yet unborn from eternal slavery and colonisation 
by a clique of this country. 
 Our history is replete with numerous and uncontrollable instances of callous and 
insensitive dominatory repressive intrigues by those who think it is their birth-right to 
dominate till eternity the political and economic privileges of this great country to the 
exclusion of the people of the Middle Belt and the south. 
 They have almost succeeded in subjugating the Middle Belt and making them voiceless 
and now extending same to the south. 
 It is our unflinching belief that this quest for domination, oppression and marginalisation 
is against the wish of God and therefore, must be resisted with the vehemence. 
 Anything that has a beginning must have an end.  It will also suffice here to state that all 
Nigerians without skeleton in their cupboards need not to be afraid of this change. 
However, those with skeleton in their cupboards have all reasons to fear, because the 
time of reckoning has come. 
 For the avoidance of doubt, we wish to state the three primary reasons why we have 
decided to oust the satanic Babangida administration.  The reasons are as follows:  
 (a)  To stop Babangida’s desire to cunningly, install himself as Nigeria’s life president at 
all costs and by so doing, retard the progress of this country for life.  In order to be able 
to achieve this undesirable goals of his, he has evidently started destroying those groups 
and sections he perceived as being able to question his desires. 
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 Examples of groups already neutralised, pitched against one another or completely 
destroyed are: 
 (1)  The Sokoto caliphate by installing an unwanted Sultan to cause division within the 
hitherto strong Sokoto caliphate. 
 (2)  The destruction of the peoples of Plateau State, especially the Lantang people, as a 
balancing force in the body politics of this country. 
 (3)  The buying of the press by generous monetary favours and the usage of State 
Security Service, SSS, as a tool of terror. 
 (4)  The intent to cow the students by the promulgation of the draconian decree Number 
47. 
 (5)  The cowing of the university teaching and non-teaching staff by an intended massive 
purge, using the 150 million dollar loan as the necessitating factor. 
 (6)  Deliberately withholding funds to the armed forces to make them ineffective and also 
crowning his diabolical scheme through the intended retrenchment of more than half of 
the members of the armed forces.  
 Other pointers that give credence to his desire to become a life president against the 
wishes of the people are: 
 (1)  His appointment of himself as a minister of defence, his putting under his direct 
control the SSS, his deliberate manipulation of the transition programme, his 
introduction of inconceivable, unrealistic and impossible political options, his recent 
fraternisation with other African leaders that have installed themselves as life presidents 
and his dogged determination to create a secret force called the national guard, 
independent of the armed forces and the police which will be answerable to himself alone, 
both operationally and administratively. 
 It is our strong view that this kind of dictatorial desire of Babangida is unacceptable to 
Nigerians of the 1990’s, and, therefore, must be resisted by all. 
 Another major reason for the change is the need to stop intrigues, domination and 
internal colonisation of the Nigerian state by the so-called chosen few.  This, in our view, 
has been and is still responsible for 90 percent of the problems of Nigerians. 
 This indeed has been the major clog in our wheel of progress. 
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 This clique has an unabated penchant for domination and unrivalled fostering of 
mediocrity and outright detest for accountability, all put together have been our undoing 
as a nation. 
 This will ever remain our threat if not checked immediately.  It is strongly believed that 
without the intrigues perpetrated by this clique and misrule, Nigeria will have in all ways 
achieved developmental virtues comparable to those in Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, India, and 
even Japan. 
 Evidence, therefore, this cancerous dominance has as a factor constituted by a major 
and unpardonable clog in the wheel of progress of the Nigerian state.  (Sic) It is suffice to 
mention a few distasteful intrigues engineered by this group of Nigerians in recent past.  
These are: 
 (1)  The shabby and dishonourable treatment meted on the longest serving Nigerian 
general in the person of General Domkat Bali, who in actual fact had given credibility to 
the Babangida administration. 
 (2)  The wholesale hijacking of Babangida’s administration by the all-powerful clique. 
 (3)  The disgraceful and inexplicable removal of Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, Professor 
Tam David-West, Mr Aret Adams and so on from office. 
 (4)  The now-pervasive and on-going retrenchment of Middle Belt and southerners from 
public offices and their instant replacement by the favoured class and their stooges. 
 (5)  The deliberate disruption of the educational culture and retarding its place to suit 
the favoured class to the detriment of other educational minded parts of this country. 
 (6)  The deliberate impoverishment of the peoples from the Middle Belt and the south, 
making them working ghosts and feeding on the formulae of 0-1-1- or 0-0-0 while the 
aristocratic class and their stooges are living in absolute affluence on a daily basis 
without working for it. 
 (7)  Other countless examples of the exploitative, oppressive, dirty games of intrigues of 
its class, where people and stooges that can best be described by the fact that even though 
they contribute very little economically to the well-being of Nigeria, they have over the 
years served and presided over the supposedly national wealth derived in the main from 
the Middle Belt and the southern part of this country, while the people from these parts of 
the country have been completely deprived from benefiting from the resources given to 
them by God. 
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 (8)  The third reason for the change is the need to lay a strong egalitarian foundation for 
the real democratic take off of the Nigerian state or states as they circumstances may 
dictate. 
 In the light of all the above and in recognition of the negativeness of the aforementioned 
aristocratic factor, the overall progress of the Nigerian state a temporary decision to 
excise the following states namely, Sokoto, Borno, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi states from 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria comes into effect immediately until the following 
conditions are met. 
 The conditions to be met to necessitate the re-absorption of the aforementioned states 
are as following: 
 (a)  To install the rightful heir to the Sultanate, Alhaji Maccido, who is the people’s 
choice. 
 (b)  To send a delegation led by the real and recognised Sultan Alhaji Maccido to the 
federal government to vouch that the feudalistic and aristocratic quest for domination 
and operation will be a thing of the past and will never be practised in any part of the 
Nigeria state. 
 By the same token, all citizens of the five states already mentioned are temporarily 
suspended from all public and private offices in Middle Belt and southern parts of this 
country until the mentioned conditions above are met. 
 They are also required to move back to their various states within one week from today.  
They will, however, be allowed to return and joint the Federal Republic of Nigeria when 
the stipulated conditions are met. 
 In the same vein, all citizens of the Middle Belt and the south are required to come back 
to their various states pending when the so-called all-in-all Nigerians meet the conditions 
that will ensure a united Nigeria.  A word is enough for the wise. 
 This exercise will not be complete without purging corrupt public officials and 
recovering their ill-gotten wealth, since the days of the oil boom till date.  Even in these 
hard times, when Nigerians are dying from hunger, trekking many miles to work for lack 
of transportation, a few other Nigerians with complete impunity are living in 
unbelievable affluence both inside and outside the country. 
 We are extremely determined to recover all ill-gotten wealth back to the public treasury 
for the use of the masses of our people.  You are all advised to remain calm as there is no 
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cause for alarm.  We are fully in control of the situation as directed by God.  All airports, 
seaports and borders are closed forthwith.  
 The former Armed Forces Ruling Council is now disbanded and replaced with National 
Ruling Council to be chaired by the head of state with other members being a civilian 
vice-head of state, service chiefs, inspector general of police, and one representative each 
from NLC, NUJ, NBA, and NANS. 
 A curfew is hereby imposed from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. until further notice.  All members of the 
armed forces and the police forces are hereby confined to their respective barracks. 
 All unlawful and criminal acts by those attempting to cause chaos will be ruthlessly 
crushed.  Be warned as we are prepared at all costs to defend the new order. 
 All radio stations are hereby advised to hook on permanently to the national network 
programme until further notice.  
 Long live all true patriots of this great country of ours. May God and Allah through his 
bountiful mercies bless us all. 
Major Gideon Orkah 
April 22, 1990 
Lagos, Nigeria 
Source: http://www.dawodu.com/orkar.htm access on 22/06/2013. 
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APPENDIX 15: A profile of Nigeria’s Government since Independence 
Date Type Main Actors Control of the military 
January 
1960-1966 
Elected 
civilian, with 
strong 
regional bias 
Prime Minister Balewa, 
Alhaji Ahmadu Bello 
(Premier, Northern 
Region), Chief Awolowo 
(leader of federal 
opposition 1960-62), Chief 
Samuel Akintola (Premier, 
Western Region) President 
Azikiwe 
Small military (10,000), 
colonial in orientation but 
professional in character, 
increasingly drawn into internal 
security by rising political 
tension 
January-July 
1966 
Military junta 
after first coup 
Major Nzeogwu, General 
Ironsi 
Assassination of prominent 
political leaders, destroyed 
military esprit de corps when 
Igbo military officers were 
indiscriminately killed by 
northern soldiers during the July 
counter-coup of 1966. This 
threatened military 
professionalism 
July 1966-
July 1975 
Collegial 
military junta, 
weak at 
inception, but 
strengthened 
by civil war 
(1967-1970) 
victory 
General Gowon, members 
of the Supreme Military 
Council and the civilian 
‘super permanent 
secretaries’ 
Broad-based support of all 
armed forces for military junta, 
in spite of earlier problems 
partly due to lack of 
commitment to transition to 
civil rule table-table 
July 1975-
September 
1979 
Military junta Generals Mohammed, 
Obasanjo, Yar’Adua, 
Danjuma and middle-level 
officers who overthrew 
previous junta 
As above, but more credibility 
and more emphasis on military 
professionalism and transition to 
civilian rule 
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Dates Type Main Actors Control of the 
military 
October 1979-
December 
1983 
Elected civil rule 
under 1979 
Constitution 
President Shagari of National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN), 
Chief Awolowo of Unity 
Party of Nigeria (UPN). 
Multi-party political 
structure, presidential style of 
government 
Limited control of 
the military, creation 
of alternative base in 
the Nigeria Police 
Force as well as 
patronage to ensure 
loyalty to 
government 
December 
1983-August 
1985 
Popular military junta Generals Buhari, Babangida, 
Idiagbon and Abacha 
Professional-political 
prerogative; 
increasing 
authoritarian 
tendency in a largely 
internally oriented 
policy agenda 
August 1985-
August 1993 
Transition from junta 
to personalized 
dictatorship in a 
palace coup 
General Babangida, with ‘bit 
parts’ to close civilians and 
‘military politicians’ 
Co-option of the 
military in the ruler’s 
personal project via 
patronage and deft 
political 
manoeuvrings 
August 1993-
November 
1993 
Interim government 
representing 
interregnum after 
annulled elections 
and 12 June 1993 and 
exit of Babangida 
Chief Ernest Shonekan, head 
of interim government and 
General Abacha, Defence 
Minister 
Clear military 
control of 
government that 
lacks legitimacy and 
popular support in a 
period of high 
political tension 
November 
1993-June 
1998 
Full-blown military 
dictatorship 
General Abacha Undermined military 
professionalism, 
increased use of 
military intelligence 
and other security 
outfits (especially 
death squads) against 
civilian and military 
opponents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
239 
 
Dates  Type Main Actors Control of the military 
June 1998-
May 1999 
Military dictatorship 
with a ‘human face’ 
under internal and 
external pressure to 
reform politically and 
exit gracefully 
General Abubakar 
Abdulsalaam 
Maintain the military’s status 
quo, with no effective reform 
plan. More focus on political 
transition and preparation for 
military’s withdrawal from 
government 
May 1999-
May 2007 
Elected civilian 
government 
General Obasanjo, 
presidential style of 
government 
Increasing presidential control 
of military, rather than 
democratic control, 
commitment to military 
professionalism, and seems to 
have diminished the likelihood 
of full-blown military coup 
May 2007-to 
date 
Elected civilian 
government 
PresidentYar’Adua 
(2007-2010), 
Goodluck Jonathan 
(2010-to date) 
Increasing presidential control 
of military, rather than 
democratic control. 
Commitment to military 
professionalism. It appears 
that issues regarding ethnicity 
and religion in the military 
may undermine military 
professionalism 
    
Sources: (Fayemi c.2012, 2003; Ehwarieme 2011). 
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APPENDIX 16: Decrees Ceasing to have Effect on the Coming into Force of 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
Year Promulgated Decree  
No 
Title 
1979 Cap.62 
LFN 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) 
Act, including the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 
1984 1 Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1984 
1984 2 State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree 
1984 6 Banking (Freezing of Accounts) Decree 1984 
1984 13 Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of 
Powers) Decree 1984 
1984 16 Civil Service Commission and other Statutory Bodies, Etc. 
(Removal of Certain Persons from Office) Decree 1984 
1984 17 Public Officers (Special Provisions) Decree 1984 
1984 23 Military Courts (Special Powers) Decree 1984 
1984 34 Regulated and Other Professions (Private Practice Prohibition) 
Decree 1984 
1985 8 Judgements of Tribunals (Enforcement, Etc.) Decree 1985 
1986 1 Treason and Other Offences (Special Military Tribunals) 
Decree 1986 
1987 2 Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunals) Decree 1987 
1989 12 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) 
Decree 1989, including the Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1989 
1990 6 Forfeiture of Assets (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 1990 
1990 27 National Council of State Decree 1990 
1990 28 Executive Power (Constitution Amendment, Etc.) Decree 1990 
1991 9 Tribunals (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 1991 
1992 21 Association of Individuals (Dissolution and Proscription, Etc.) 
1992 Decree 
1992 24 Academic Staff Union of Universities (Proscription and 
Prohibition from Participation in Trade Union) Decree 1992 
1993 29 Treason and Treasonable Offences Decree 1993 
1993 63 National Guard Decree 1993 
1993 107 Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1993 
1994 12 Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of 
Powers) Decree 1994 
1996 2 Transition to Civil Rule (Lifting Ban on Politics) Decree 1996 
1996 27 Ahmadu Bello University (Appointment of Sole Administrator) 
Decree 1996 
1998 3 Constitutional Court Decree 1998 
1998 34 Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) Decree 1998 
1998 35 Political Parties (Registration and Activities) Decree 1998 
1998 36 Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional 
Provisions) Decree 1999 
1999 3 State Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional 
Provisions) Decree 1999 
1999 5 National Assembly (Basic Constitutional and Transitional 
Provisions) Decree 1999 
1999 6 Presidential Election (Basic Constitutional and Transitional 
Provisions) Decree 1999 
Source: www.nigeria-law.org (April 16, 2012) 
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APPENDIX 17: Total Defence Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 1980-
2010 
Year Total 
Military 
Expenditure 
GDP Percentage 
of Military 
Expenditure 
to GDP 
1980  1319.2 49632.3 2.7 
1982  1125.1 49069.3 2.3 
1983  1090.2 53107.4 2.1 
1984  928.2 59622.5 1.6 
1985  975.7 67908.6 1.4 
1986   951.4 69147 1.4 
1987   736 105222.8 0.7 
1988   1101.3 139085.3 0.8 
1989  1081.4 216797.5 0.5 
1990  1606.9 267550 0.6 
1991  2245.3 312139.7 0.7 
1992  2706.6 532613.8 0.5 
1993   4171 683869.8 0.6 
1994  5492.87 89986.2 0.6 
1995   8628.8 1933212 0.3 
1996   13493.4 2702719 0.5 
1997   18027.13 2801973 0.6 
1998   20910.44 2708431 0.8 
1999   58011.74 3194015 1.8 
2000   50357.22 4582127 1.1 
2001   63469.24 4725086 1.3 
2002   91227.42 6912381 1.3 
2003   61743.99 10169130 0.6 
2004   86978.46 11673600 0.7 
2005   93205.24 14735320 0.6 
2006   90250.94 18709580 0.5 
2007   107798.1 20853580 0.5 
2008  101000 24048480 0.4 
2009   86029.4 24712670 0.3 
2010   86029.4 24712670 0.3 
Sources: Anyanwu, Egwaikhide and Aiyedogbon (2012: 100-101). Computed from Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletin Vol. 20 Dec. 2009, CBN Annual Report and Statement of 
Account Dec. 31, 2010, GDP is at current basic prices (₦’Millions). 
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APPENDIX 18 : Ethics Documents 
Appendix 1 Information Sheet 
Name of Researcher:  Ibikunle Edward Adeakin 
   School of Social Sciences 
   Political Science and Public Policy 
   The University of Waikato 
   Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240 
   New Zealand 
   Phone: + 64 7 8384466 ext 8332 
   E-mail: iea1@waikato.ac.nz 
 
Supervisors 
Professor Dan Zirker (Chief Supervisor)  Dr. Alan Simpson (Supervisor) 
Dean      Senior Lecturer 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences   Political Science and Public Policy 
The University of Waikato   The University of Waikato 
E-mail: dzirker@waikato.ac.nz   E-mail: Poli0219@waikato.ac.nz 
Phone: + 64 7 8384526    Phone: + 64 7 8384724 
 
Background 
This researcher is a doctoral candidate in political science and public policy at the University of 
Waikato. The research being investigated primarily focuses on civil-military relations in Nigeria. 
The research argues if Nigeria has adopted a new and more sophisticated form of military 
intervention in the twenty-first century. The justification for this analysis is based on the several 
political events that have occurred in Nigeria since the military handed over power to civil-rule in 
May 29, 1999. 
Interview Process 
The interview questions focuses on civil-military relations in Nigeria over the last decade. I am 
interested in hearing about your views on whether a new pattern of military intervention is 
occurring in Nigeria. 
The entire interview should approximately take 60-90 minutes of your time depending on time you 
have available. I would like to tape-record the interview so that I can obtain an accurate record of 
your views. 
As a participant, you have the choice of being anonymous or not; this will be discussed at the start 
of the interview and again at the end of it. I will not use your name or identity in any form in the 
doctoral thesis, unless you give permission. 
However, I wish to notify you that even when all this will have been done, confidentiality may be 
inadvertently breached with people who may be familiar with your opinions and arguments on the 
issue at hand. I will, on my part, do whatever is humanly possible to protect your identity. 
All information(s) derived from this interview (for example, audio recordings, written transcripts 
and others) will be held securely by the School of Social Sciences, Political Science and Public 
Policy University of Waikato. No one expect me or my supervisors will have access to them. They 
will be stored there until the research is complete and the doctoral thesis has been approved and 
accepted by the University of Waikato. After this period, the research materials will be stored 
securely for an indefinite period by the University of Waikato. 
If you agree to take part in this interview, you have the following rights which are: 
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 To refuse to answer any particular question, or withdraw from the interview at any time. 
 To ask any further questions about the interview that is, how the data collected will be 
used, or on the general nature of the research project.  
 To re-examine any information you have provided and amend any part you wish, and/or 
request that certain information not be used, up to a period of one month after the 
interview has taken place. 
 To withdraw your consent (written or verbal), up to a period of one month, by contacting 
me at the address above. 
 To take any complaints you may have about the interview process to the University of 
Waikato Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee or you 
can email its secretary at fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz 
 You may also contact my chief supervisor or supervisor whose contacts are given above. 
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Appendix 2 Consent Form for Elite Interviews 
Topic of Study: Is a New Pattern of Military Intervention Emerging in Nigeria? 
I consent to undertake in this elite interview after reading and understanding the Information Sheet 
for this doctoral research. 
This doctoral research has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the 
University’s Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Any questions about the ethical conduct of this 
research may be sent to the secretary of the Committee, e-mail: fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz, postal 
address, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Te Kura Kete Aronui, University of Waikato, Te 
Whare Wananga o Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240.  
I would like to be identified for this part of the doctoral research project 
YES  NO (Please circle one) 
I would like to be identified with a pseudonym 
YES  NO  (Please circle one) 
I consent that this interview be audio recorded 
YES  NO  (Please circle one) 
I would like to receive a transcript copy of this interview 
YES  NO  (Please circle one) 
If yes, kindly print your e-mail address here.......................................... 
I have read and understood the requirements for this research exercise and willing to participate. 
Name............................................................       (Participant)          
Signature...................................................... 
Date................................ 
I agree to abide with all the conditions outlined above for this research exercise 
Name..............................................................  (Researcher) 
Signature......................................................... 
Date................................... 
Thank you for your invaluable contribution, your cooperation is highly appreciated by the 
researcher. 
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Elite Interview Questions 
1) Does the military have any prerogatives enshrined in the 1999 Constitution? 
2) Does a significant level of military involvement in the polity increases the level of human 
rights violations in Nigeria? 
3) Is there legislative or civilian oversight on the military particularly as regards human rights 
abuses? 
4) Is there a weakness of civilian expertise in defence matters in Nigeria? 
5) Is there a blurring of jurisdictional lines between the military and civilian courts? 
6) Does military professionalism strengthens the military’s corporate interests in Nigeria? 
7) Can it be argued as a statement of fact that informal political alliances between the political 
office winners and high ranking ex-military officers impact specific political outcomes in 
Nigeria? 
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APPENDIX 19: Ethics Approval for Field Research 
Ibikunle Edward Adeakin 
 
Prof Dan Zirker 
 
Dr Alan Simpson  
 
12 December 2010  
 
Dear Ibikunle  
 
Application for Ethical Approval: FS2010-51: “Is a New Pattern of Military Intervention 
Emerging in Nigeria?”  
 
Thank you for submitting a revised Information Sheet and Consent Form in response to my email 
of 9 December. These were received by email on 11 December. The changes you have 
made fully satisfy the issues raised by the Committee (although there are just a couple of 
minor proofreading errors in the forms which you should correct before using them). 
  
This letter is to provide formal ethical approval for your PhD project. 
  
In cases like yours, where you are undertaking research as a student of the university in a risky 
context overseas, the Committee has been asked to advise you to contact the University 
Risk Manager, Ken Housley, at some point prior to leaving New Zealand, in order to 
discuss with him anything his Office might wish to advise, especially with regards to 
insurance arrangements.   
 
With best wishes for a successful project,    
  
  
John Paterson Chair FASS Human Research Ethics Committee 
